Threat actor tracking TLP:AMBER First profile

n0n

A data-theft and destructive-extortion group that surfaced in September 2026 and built its reputation on an AI-assisted operation and a leak site listing hundreds of victims — while its own exposed server showed a far smaller operation. Tracked here: history, attack path, behaviour and procedures, indicators and victimology, with every claim tied to its source and every leak-site listing labelled as a claim until a victim confirms it or data is published.

First seen: 18 September 2026Status: ActiveLast updated: 20 November 2026Sources: 30
What it is Data-theft extortion with destructive impact

Credential-only access — no vulnerability exploitation has been documented in any intrusion. The group exfiltrates data, then encrypts files with the .n0n extension or destroys data and backups instead, and pressures victims through a Tor leak site.

SOCRadar, from the group’s own exposed workspace, October 2026.

What to believe The leak-site count is inflated

Bitdefender: the site listed more than 100 victims, but data from the group’s own file server shows it targeted just over 20 organisations. Treat every listing as a claim, not a confirmed breach.

Bitdefender Threat Debrief, November 2026.

18 Sep 2026First seen; leak site live within four days
93Victims listed by 19 Oct, total demands $283.7M (SOCRadar)
100+ vs ~20Listed victims vs real targets, per the exposed server (Bitdefender)
0Transactions across 55 collected ransom wallets as of 16 Oct (SOCRadar)

At a glance

The profile in one table. Spelling matters: the group insists on its name as two lowercase n letters with a zero between them.

AttributeDetail
Namen0n — two lowercase n letters with a zero between them; written N0n in some reporting
TypeFinancially motivated data-theft and destructive-extortion group
First seen18 September 2026 (CyberXTron); leak site listing victims within four days
Slogan“n0n | no js | no mercy” — carried across its Tor and clearnet portals
Leak siteTor-hosted data leak site; clearnet portal n0n.to (inactive); RSS feed; active / leaked / honor listings; keyed negotiation rooms
EncryptorLightweight AES-256-CBC locker, Windows / Linux / PowerShell variants plus an OpenSSL stage for firewall appliances; appends .n0n; ransom note n0n_READ_ME.txt
Initial accessCredential-only: infostealer-harvested credentials, credential stuffing against FortiGate SSL-VPN, weak RDP/WinRM credentials, exposed AWS keys, reused hosting-portal sessions. No CVE has been tied to an intrusion.
Extortion modelDouble extortion plus a declared threat to encrypt or destroy backups and shadow copies; demands 0.5–33 BTC per victim, up to $28M in the maritime wave; negotiation room requires a 10% upfront payment
AttributionNone established. Some vendors list the group as likely Russia-based without showing evidence; SOCRadar found no definitive geographic or national attribution. Evidence cited by Cydome indicates the group is not related to Iran, China or North Korea.
AssessmentOpportunistic and broad, with a maritime / logistics concentration in October and a US and South Korea focus. Bitdefender has high confidence n0n does not have the means to sustain a top-10 ransomware ranking.

History

Newest first. Each entry is dated and sourced; leak-site claims are labelled as claims.

Attack path

One lifecycle, with the impact shifting between exfiltration, encryption, destruction and network disruption depending on the target. Reconstructed from the exposed operator workspace (SOCRadar).

  1. Initial access — credentials only

    Credential stuffing against 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances through residential proxies (requests to /remote/logincheck carrying Cookie: APBSID=n0n), weak or default RDP/WinRM administrator credentials, exposed long-lived AWS IAM access keys, and reused hosting-provider portal sessions. The earliest reporting attributes the credentials to third-party infostealer malware. No exploit payloads and no CVE references were found in the operator’s files.

    Maritime-wave variant: for the 12 October batch, the evidence points the other way — small, application-scoped data sets and incomplete infostealer coverage across the victims suggest an exposed shared application or vulnerability (a terminal system, EDI integration or file-transfer product), not 38 separate credential intrusions. The shared source is unconfirmed.

  2. Persistence and collection

    Hidden administrator accounts disguised as services (svc_upd, svc_reg, svc<slug>), scheduled tasks named *Sync, NetAssist and similar, covert proxies, and SSH authorized keys on cloud hosts. The operator steals browser credentials (including Chrome’s app-bound key), live session cookies via cloned Chrome profiles driven over DevTools, mailboxes (a full IMAP dump of a provider staff mailbox), and emailed MFA codes. Discovery sweeps cover 445/3389/5985/1433 internally, plus EC2/ECS/SSM mapping and S3 bucket listing.

  3. Exfiltration

    Per-target pipelines with data budgets, sending everything to the operator’s central storage (the “monster” server). S3 bulk pulls run with per-bucket byte caps; exfiltration uses zip-base64 POSTs to the C2 channel (8 GiB budget) and uploads to a public file-hosting service. Data typically leaks about four days after public disclosure.

  4. Encryption and destruction

    Wrapper scripts stop services (MSSQL, SQL Agent, SSAS, SSIS, SQLWriter, W3SVC, MySQL), delete shadow copies and wipe free space before the locker runs. The locker is AES-256-CBC with a single hardcoded key per build. In some cases the operator deletes data and backups instead of encrypting — S3 mass deletion in 1,000-item batches, and a hosting provider’s servers and backups removed. On Cisco Firepower Management Center appliances, the operator flips firewall rules to BLOCK and injects a Snort rule (n0n-lock, sid 2100001); in the Inter case the group claimed this severed national network traffic.

  5. Extortion and publication

    Ransom notes, countdowns, keyed negotiation rooms (opening one requires a 10% upfront payment) and direct extortion emails. To raise pressure, n0n contacts victims’ clients, MSPs, unions and the media — in one case emailing PayPal’s security team over a breach at its contact-centre provider. Leaks are published as scrubbed ZIP archives and torrents distributed from a VPN-bound seedbox. Each victim gets a unique Bitcoin address; a check of all 55 collected addresses showed zero transactions as of 16 October 2026.

MITRE ATT&CK — interactive diagram

The group’s behaviour, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. Select a technique to see the procedure n0n actually used, how it was observed, and what to hunt for. The full procedure table follows the diagram, so the content stands even without scripting.

Confirmed procedure — from the exposed workspace (SOCRadar) Reported — early mapping, procedure not published (CyberXTron) Aggregator-reported — third-party detection content, incl. Azazel-linked items Red underline — destructive impact technique
Reconnaissance
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Credential Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Command & Control
Exfiltration
Impact
No technique published for this tactic

Select a technique

Click any cell in the matrix to see the procedure n0n used, how it was observed, and what to hunt for.

Notes on the mapping. The confirmed procedures come from SOCRadar’s analysis of the operator’s exposed workspace (28 Oct 2026). CyberXTron’s first mapping (22 Sep 2026) lists techniques as “associated” without published procedures — those are marked Reported. Threadlinqs detection content adds parent techniques (T1090, T1114, T1567) and two Azazel-linked items (T1036.004, T1048) — marked Aggregator-reported and not adopted as n0n procedures; see Possible connections. One correction: CyberXTron’s early table lists “T1685 — Disable or Modify Tools”; no such technique exists in MITRE ATT&CK. The behaviour matches T1562.001, confirmed in SOCRadar’s mapping, and T1685 is not carried as a technique here.

Procedures — the full table

Every technique in the diagram, with the procedure observed. This table is the reference; the diagram above is the navigation.

TacticTechniqueProcedure observedConfidence
ReconnaissanceT1595.001RDP batch scans; a ranked list of 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances.Confirmed
Initial AccessT1078Weak or default RDP/WinRM administrator credentials; firewall-manager admin accounts.Confirmed
Initial AccessT1078.004Exposed long-lived AWS IAM access keys.Confirmed
Initial AccessT1133Internet-facing FortiGate SSL-VPN, RDP and WinRM.Confirmed
ExecutionT1059.001Strike, exfiltration and implant scripts pasted into RDP sessions.Confirmed
Execution / PersistenceT1053.005Locker and audit runs as SYSTEM tasks every 5–10 minutes; persistence tasks named AfricaSync, FinSoftSync*, SvcSync, NetAssist.Confirmed
ExecutionT1651AWS SSM commands, hosting-panel recipes and Zabbix script execution.Confirmed
PersistenceT1547.001Registry Run key n0nNote opens the ransom note at every logon.Confirmed
PersistenceT1136.001Hidden administrators svc_upd (“Software Update”), svc_reg (“Registry Service”), svc<slug>.Confirmed
PersistenceT1098.004Operator keys installed via VNC console on cloud clones; root@3090-AI on FMC appliances.Confirmed
Defense EvasionT1562.001Symantec Endpoint Protection stopped and disabled.Confirmed
Defense EvasionT1564.002SpecialAccounts\UserList value 0 for the cover accounts.Confirmed
Defense EvasionT1070.004Toolkit overwritten three times and deleted; launchers self-delete.Confirmed
Defense EvasionT1027Obfuscated files or information — listed as associated in the early mapping; no procedure published.Reported
Defense EvasionT1036.004Masquerading — reported by Threadlinqs for the Azazel-linked cluster; not in SOCRadar’s n0n mapping.Aggregator
Credential AccessT1110.004FortiGate /remote/logincheck credential stuffing via residential proxies (Cookie: APBSID=n0n); 15-thread SOCKS5 pool per Threadlinqs.Confirmed
Credential AccessT1110.002Offline cracking of stolen SaaS user hashes and encrypted 7z archives.Confirmed
Credential AccessT1555.003Chrome/Edge credential stores decrypted, including Chrome’s app-bound key.Confirmed
Credential AccessT1539Live administrator Chrome profiles copied and driven over DevTools.Confirmed
Credential AccessT1111Billing-panel MFA codes read from the staff mailbox.Confirmed
Credential AccessT1003.003NTDS.dit copy from a shadow copy (scripted).Confirmed
DiscoveryT1046Internal sweeps of 445/3389/5985/1433.Confirmed
DiscoveryT1580EC2/ECS/SSM mapping and hosting-panel VM inventories.Confirmed
DiscoveryT1619S3 bucket listing and prefix census.Confirmed
Lateral MovementT1021.001Headless xfreerdp sessions driven by key injection and OCR.Confirmed
Lateral MovementT1021.006pywinrm strikes, triage and browser theft.Confirmed
CollectionT1530S3 bulk pulls with per-bucket byte caps.Confirmed
CollectionT1114.002Full IMAP dump of a provider staff mailbox.Confirmed
CollectionT1115RDP results returned through the clipboard.Confirmed
CollectionT1113Remote screen captured and read with OCR to drive logons.Confirmed
CollectionT1074Data staged — listed in the early mapping; per-target staging pipelines with data budgets in the workspace account.Reported
CollectionT1114Email collection — parent technique reported by Threadlinqs; SOCRadar’s T1114.002 is the confirmed sub-technique.Aggregator
Command & ControlT1071.001HTTPS implant C2 (c2srv.py) and the kserver panel.Confirmed
Command & ControlT1001Status beacon disguised as card-payment JSON to /x/i.Confirmed
Command & ControlT1572SSH -D SOCKS tunnels over Tor.Confirmed
Command & ControlT1090.003Tor, SSH pivots, gost exits on compromised hosts, residential proxies.Confirmed
Command & ControlT1090Proxy — parent technique reported by Threadlinqs; SOCRadar’s T1090.003 is the confirmed sub-technique.Aggregator
ExfiltrationT1041Zip-base64 POSTs to /c2/…/out (8 GiB budget).Confirmed
ExfiltrationT1567.002Uploads to a public file-hosting service.Confirmed
ExfiltrationT1567Exfiltration over web service — parent technique reported by Threadlinqs; SOCRadar’s T1567.002 is the confirmed sub-technique.Aggregator
ExfiltrationT1048Exfiltration over alternative protocol — reported by Threadlinqs for the Azazel-linked cluster; not in SOCRadar’s n0n mapping.Aggregator
ImpactT1486n0n locker (Windows/Linux) and the OpenSSL stage on FMC appliances; files renamed to .n0n.Confirmed
ImpactT1485S3 mass deletion; a provider’s servers and backups removed.Confirmed
ImpactT1490Shadow copies deleted; free space wiped.Confirmed
ImpactT1489MSSQL, MySQL and IIS stopped before encryption.Confirmed
ImpactT1565.001Firewall rules flipped to BLOCK in the FMC configuration database.Confirmed

Technique names link to MITRE ATT&CK. “Confirmed” means the procedure was observed in the operator’s exposed workspace and published by SOCRadar. “Reported” means the technique appears in an early mapping without a published procedure. “Aggregator” means it appears in third-party detection content only.

Tracking changes to TTPs

Newest first. This is the section that moves: when a new technique is observed, a procedure changes, or a reported technique is confirmed or dropped, it goes here at the top with a date. Techniques are never silently removed — a removal gets a dated entry too.

Indicators of compromise

As published by SOCRadar from the operator’s exposed workspace (28 Oct 2026). Defanged. The full list on SOCRadar’s platform may be longer; this is the published set.

Infrastructure

TypeIndicatorContext
IPv4185.157.161.148Agent box — kserver C2 — /x/i beacon; open file server on :8877 (AS42675, Sweden)
IPv4185.157.161.93ntpsync.io origin — PHP payloads
IPv481.161.239.10“monster” — loot vault — implant C2 — payloads (:8455)
IPv4188.214.135.130“raas” — leak backend — payloads (:8898, :8899)
IPv4198.13.158.143SSH pivot over Tor — SOCKS hop to victim SaaS tenants
IPv445.132.114.241Operator scrub-list IP
IPv4:port217.18.55.185:11434Self-hosted LLM
Domainntpsync.ioBeacon cover domain
Domainn0n-cases.netExtortion mail sender
Emailnotice@n0n-cases.netExtortion mail sender address
Domainn0n.toLeak site (clearnet, inactive)
Domainuberip.comActor mail domain
Onionnongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw7bvk2zemuteoxe6etpusnad.onionOnion leak site (Tor)

Files, paths, registry and accounts

TypeIndicatorContext
File / path*.n0n, *.n0n.tmp, n0n_READ_ME.txt, C:\Users\Public\n0n\Encrypted files — ransom note — staging directory
RegistryHKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run : n0nNoteRansom note at logon
Accountsvc_upd (“Software Update”), svc_reg (“Registry Service”), svc<slug>Hidden administrators
Scheduled task[NAME]Sync*, [NAME]Audit, [NAME]Exfil, NetAssist, ChromeDbg*SYSTEM tasks referencing C:\Users\Public\n0n\
FirewallSnort rule “n0n-lock” (sid 2100001)Injected on compromised Cisco FMC appliances
SSHauthorized_keys entries ending root@3090-AIOperator keys on FMC appliances and cloud clones

Hashes

TypeValueContext
SHA-1dc82e9c22c4a06c6bc03701fce2b55f4f490c651nenc.exe
SHA-256d1fd3a8ac4ada74b8ccbcdf5134797acff401b7fb50e16549b337781dfe1a486nenc.cpp — Windows locker v1
SHA-256340172627cdf40927784956be784bd2b3f5d1584cb79cf31064f387bbe9acb28nenc2.cpp — Windows locker v2
SHA-256886b3608d05069d314fa6300404de6627f96b13a95c5633f6c91dfc2a545ac87nenc2l.cpp — Linux locker

Qubole campaign — reported link to n0n, unverified

As published by Wiz, 9 Nov 2026. These indicators belong to the Qubole campaign; the link between that campaign and n0n is reported, not verified. Do not merge them with the SOCRadar indicators above.

TypeIndicatorContext
AWS account805246085872Qubole’s platform account — hunt AssumeRole calls from non-AWS addresses
IAM principalAIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFSAttacker-only in the environments Wiz examined
IAM principalAIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HWAlso carries legitimate Qubole traffic — only suspicious from non-AWS sources
IPv445.83.220.211, 185.209.199.73, 89.37.63.175Mullvad VPN exit nodes, shared — a match alone is not proof
IP57.129.54.120, 2001:41d0:70d:7800::OVH-hosted addresses used by the actor
Role sessionquiam-*Role session names, e.g. quiam-enum
User agentTruffleHogOn GetCallerIdentity calls, paired with an indicator above
Ransom wallets — 55 Bitcoin addresses (September, including the maritime wave)

As published by SOCRadar, 28 Oct 2026. A check of all 55 showed zero transactions as of 16 October 2026.

bc1qcf8uuvqfnucqt8crr8cgkfjevhvytjahppesem
bc1qxr2ruep9ast6sz32x7eza7csf49sguqwsnhhaa
bc1qyv92sc45cgah5ggwmsppdm323d4jya4rprrqtu
bc1q78uygtqyjumvh3s7dz75s0ttgsrz4jx5t3wu9n
bc1q98r9gusxzn4st2sr9mxvq7r66ny8dfgtdlgk9h
bc1q7zlg34wgtdw0dl0tn4gh52vj9nglt77p9necy8
bc1q97y47gkmd4cve9eadws59xz434ag2mntwy7lnv
bc1qezgj37g0hr8d29txsnpdjs02lr9kjvhyxzwtkg
bc1qp2hk3dla0tqus76emls2sppekvurrcd3ghj827
bc1qncxk5npnqzp39ns8jv5mj9pr6vx0ekpln2605s
bc1qv6mhllrmzdgl2rk09j7ynuqlgzhfguw0sj77vc
bc1q47wp4v8u5myse07mglenk4skssvdj6zfvdrj0l
bc1qh8082ye3dsyhcg8q9mglvr0w80v0gpumd5ndv8
bc1qpp89qpfmvf9xm6ued5v49e92s47m3mn4vngusw
bc1q030z6k205jz46cyn60jqts9v7xlq895ttd6r9p
bc1qtkuqkl5h4qekgpvjpkfgapl5fqgzpxdntlwk9c
bc1qck73xcn7p83emjkgrcpkvujqngnraunu09sc9s
bc1qthtsf88sx3czclzkx73cjxk0u5ep5kqnvhtpt8
bc1qp6wyngevq4aycqll3wpc03pf6qwgwcvr3md6ga
bc1qldy6h5zlv0aqhyyxwfsra3gqjw694yfj8rtl83
bc1qmfhq8plvqe4cdtypgukq7276jmerdt3gqh33xy
bc1qxed2puty9lmcga2mk6780khqtnlrl5ptsm6t49
bc1qfed3fh7f6g8dkmvq7pvrln3f0khf8aut9r2hue
bc1qcxqsrfrefgyv6tevuytquq28c4zrftvcflwm96
bc1qt2f08qa3e4wtn0rkscg4flypp3dxy7dhzefa4e
bc1q2ua7h64tmywa7xfn4l7f0v868tfte80lgfcmh3
bc1qg7nkelnag2sefg45dgu3ay7xyv3ak3v48fh45h
bc1qswvm6d2x8n8mpuz5x2y4wtqpy34xdxe023cw4u
bc1qyfc9qlsmp6jrq8y4v50ps94qtffwvzejsezsqk
bc1qcrm6qxz633suda3eacqxkdnx05ztd2mh0y3dxa
bc1qxktcy6ssugttfr6v5695kzgud9eqw8h7d2r0ss
bc1qe9lq4m7rjgk533u3g3cgf7xs5pn2l8e3l5pfjt
bc1q48vuydq5j8e98lwmt69aqhr5gcu5mn2pc4eqkx
bc1q8etz0apvr6tclxxznsss2tk07v46ckxmrjwsde
bc1qpf72d8lk4caqs3ewej75jasd44umg3juw58asn
bc1qhavzrsz8y2lqcwp5frckl5fy8exhmacyxz3lcy
bc1qqrcegl2a2tkrdln4r6jn2pm9fp84mv60d5y4ug
bc1qsv8yzm09njxmt5khlpyrhnjfupzpd7vykc7e46
bc1qpek2637ed7a4f2nff60rrng52fudqsk9l905ra
bc1q3nswa35s5vax3q3txf3mpy260zad4vyadpfg98
bc1ql0pdlaga5q3xrznd80mzuzgsv4nuz4fzut7td6
bc1qqrvt0ank3y2axmuzxlm2z4879qqxa37nwdafvr
bc1qsclrrwmjnfxzwcmskqlax9htdnc9yd5n99l5ml
bc1qk9s5ngavpwla07w2v3wjwwkt75uj6zmspkxg6p
bc1qx3u3xa7eqkukxuuyr00zq5ynx5ylepw9e4d4ph
bc1qccgses0q46lpttjtuchnsc2rz28qn9lng67hne
bc1qqc2dy605g0hmcaqfm8ne85dwctfw7603f7a03m
bc1qmdzpn0d0flf4pswu8ze57e7yyx883lxp55f7f2
bc1qpjvl29njpedxhljq0nvvskmxra8p9e8stssegm
bc1q50x7akwznysr8r3v00p8uzxqztuzg5t2x0tavt
bc1qmz68h5vyqa9feduhceh34ygmaq3fr3xnau7myf
bc1q3jgtpksgg5ldhq34z93xqtt39y9kzpkz2674x8
bc1qgnmfhcppgdynjfwxzrrspxsfr9zgps6ctgkh2z
bc1q3aw0gz7nnqvfnv9nld686q05lgh2d4yxmzlgcg
bc1q9k3lqn4zfl733pxcwk7erqtdmuw68w80hvru39

Behavioural markers to hunt

Where to lookMarker
FortiGate / firewall logs/remote/logincheck requests carrying Cookie: APBSID=n0n; bursts of failed logins with many distinct usernames from one source
EndpointCreation of C:\Users\Public\n0n\; *.n0n, *.n0n.tmp, n0n_READ_ME*; rapid renames to .n0n after MSSQL/W3SVC/MySQL termination and vssadmin shadow deletion
PowerShellNet.WebClient.DownloadFile to HTTPS hex URLs with ServerCertificateValidationCallback={$true}, followed by Get-FileHash SHA1 checks
PersistenceSYSTEM scheduled tasks referencing C:\Users\Public\n0n\; Registry Run key n0nNote; hidden local admins with non-expiring passwords and UserList=0
BrowserChrome launched with --remote-debugging-port on cloned profiles; portproxy forwarding port 9223 to 127.0.0.1:9222
Firewall appliancesFMC REST tokens from non-management IPs; default policy flips to BLOCK; Snort rule n0n-lock (sid 2100001); OpenSSL-encrypted *.n0n files under /Volume/lib; authorized_keys entries ending root@3090-AI
CloudCloudTrail sequences of ListBuckets, sustained GetObject and DeleteObjects in 1,000-item batches; PutObject writing n0n_READ_ME.txt; ssm:SendCommand from new or inactive keys
Hosting platformsNew OnApp recipes or Zabbix scripts with “maintenance” names; backup-to-template conversions; VMs tagged mnt-*
NetworkJSON POSTs to /x/i containing “ippay-web” with card data

Victimology

What the counts actually mean — and what they do not. Leak-site listings are the group’s own claims; a listing is not proof of a breach.

The count is the story. Bitdefender’s October debrief: 1,072 claimed ransomware victims across leak sites, or 946 after removing 126 n0n entries. The group’s own server shows just over 20 real targets against 100+ listings. Duplicates and false entries appear to come from weaknesses in maintaining the site and polling potential targets. Do not quote a leak-site total as a victim count.

Claimed counts over time

DateClaimed totalBasis
22 Sep 202613Leak-site listings, 10 countries (CyberXTron)
8 Oct 202621Leak-site listings, 17 countries (SOCRadar)
12 Oct 202659 (21 + 38 maritime)Single maritime batch across 18 countries (SOCRadar, Cydome)
19 Oct 202693Leak-site listings; total demands $283.7M (SOCRadar)
Early Nov 2026170+Claimed victims (Check Point Research)
4 Nov 2026~189Claimed since mid-September (OSec)
Mid-Nov 2026195Claimed victims through mid-month (HackerFeeds, via trade press)
16 Nov 2026363 entriesRansomtracker entries, of which 168 are numbered placeholders (Ransomnews)
—Just over 20Real targets per the group’s own exposed server (Bitdefender, SOCRadar: 23 organisations in the workspace)

Tracker totals disagree because they count different things — listings, named victims, placeholders, and workspace evidence. They are kept side by side here and never added together.

Sectors and geography

Early victimology is broad and opportunistic. The first 13 listings: financial services 23% (3), technology, retail & e-commerce and education 15% each (2), government & defence, healthcare, professional services and other 8% each (1). The workspace’s 23 organisations span 15 sectors. October concentrates in logistics and shipping (the 38-organisation maritime wave; South Korea accounts for 12 of the 38, including Busan terminal operators BNCT and Pusan Newport Company), and Bitdefender notes South Korean victims rose to 18 in October, 11 of them claimed by n0n and all in transportation. OSec’s assessment: the primary geographic focus is the US and South Korea, and the most-targeted sectors are logistics and shipping, technology, retail, healthcare, manufacturing and finance.

BFSI victims — all claims unless stated

OrganisationWhat n0n claimsStatus
VisaCardmember programme records (Asia Pacific): names, emails, phone numbers, travel and dining bookings. No card numbers mentioned.Reported — Data published 19 Nov; Cybernews examined the dump and found more than 6,000 premium customers affected, the data likely from a marketing platform for Visa’s premium dining programmes in Asia-Pacific. Visa confirmed an incident at a third-party provider in Asia Pacific; Visa’s systems not involved, no sign card numbers affected. n0n’s role unconfirmed. Ransomware.live, 18 Nov: most likely Qubole-sourced, not a direct breach (assessed, unconfirmed).
MastercardMEA cardmember programme records claimed.Reported — Data published 19 Nov: about 2,000 entries in a 280KB file; Cybernews researchers say it looks like test data rather than genuine customer information, and its origin and authenticity are unverified. Ransomware.live, 18 Nov: most likely Qubole-sourced, not a direct breach (assessed, unconfirmed).
JPMorgan ChaseEmail campaign records for a premium Reserve card programme claimed.Reported — Data published 19 Nov: roughly 16,000 customer email addresses from the Reserve programme, phone numbers in some cases, account IDs and 124 employee email addresses. JPMorgan confirmed 19 Nov that third-party vendors were targeted and marketing data was accessed; services and sensitive financial data unaffected, and the attack is not connected to the 16 Nov outage. Ransomware.live, 18 Nov: most likely Qubole-sourced, not a direct breach (assessed, unconfirmed).
D.R. Johnson Financial245,667 distinct emails; 5,548 phone numbers; GoldMine archive of 89,740 files.Reported — data published, per leak-site reporting.
Tailored Benefits434,983 emails claimed.Unconfirmed
ARCA Financial; Opus Wealth Advisors; Pearl Planning; Terracotta Wealth; Wise Advisory GroupCanadian advisory and planning firms, named 16 Nov 2026.Unconfirmed
Steeden Financial600,000+ emails claimed, including Social Insurance Numbers.Unconfirmed
Scry AnalyticsLeak of a US private banking client’s customer/signer records, plus an insurance group’s 7,904-record party master.Unconfirmed — leak-site post only, no victim confirmation.
MM Insurance AgencyListed as a claimed victim.Unconfirmed
Higginbotham217,000+ documents published.Reported — publication claimed; victim has not confirmed.
Two unnamed Canadian financial firmsListed as claimed victims.Unconfirmed
Transcom (PayPal’s support outsourcer)86.7 million support-agent records claimed from PayPal’s Citrix and authentication systems, plus an internal network map.Unconfirmed
ExpediaNamed 9 Nov 2026; claimed travel data.Reported — Expedia confirmed a supplier breach on 12 Nov but did not confirm n0n’s figures or say n0n was responsible. Wiz and Sentra documented an October campaign abusing Qubole credentials; Expedia has not said its incident is related.
Ekwiik (Ideal Prepaid Botswana)Prepaid utilities and airtime platform, Botswana; listed anonymously as “Company #216” since 13 Nov; no data volume or types disclosed.Unconfirmed — leak-site listing only, no victim statement.

Case highlights

Dediserve (cloud hosting): taken over through stolen admin browser credentials, with tenant backups extracted — the only Linux locker deployment in the workspace. Inter (Venezuelan ISP): the operator flipped every firewall rule on the ISP’s Cisco FMC to BLOCK, claimed to have severed national network traffic, and demanded 15 BTC. Fanatics (sports e-commerce): an exposed AWS key led to exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets and deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve buckets, with a 30 BTC demand. ChiBiTek (managed IT services): breached end to end through the FortiGate credential-stuffing pipeline.

Telemetry and things worth knowing

The details that change how to think about this group.

An AI-assisted operation, not an autonomous one

The operator uses opencode, an open-source AI coding agent, configured with 154 model entries across seven providers — including “uncensored” and “abliterated” models with safety training removed, and a self-hosted model. The agent wrote and debugged hundreds of attack scripts; gateway spending passed $7,216 by 22 October 2026. The evidence points to a human-directed operation supported by AI; no fully autonomous attack system was observed. The group’s own server also held the AI environment alongside 829 scripts and five encryptor sources.

The economics do not add up — yet

Demands range from 0.5 BTC to 33 BTC per victim, and up to $28 million per organisation in the maritime wave (the reviewed subset ran $2.4–$14 million). Each victim gets a unique Bitcoin address, and opening a negotiation room requires a 10% upfront payment. A check of all 55 collected addresses showed zero transactions as of 16 October 2026. One Canadian financial-services company carries the leak site’s “HONORED” label with a settlement date of 7 October 2026 — the only settlement marker found. The gap between the claimed scale and the observed payments is unresolved.

Key reuse is a recovery opportunity

Each locker build uses a single hardcoded AES-256 key with no per-victim derivation, and one key is likely shared across two victims — so a decryptor for one could unlock the other. Bitdefender notes the same reuse. Because the operator also deletes shadow copies, wipes free space and removes provider-hosted backups, offline or immutable backups remain the only reliable recovery path.

Third-party leverage

Pressure is not limited to the victim. n0n contacts victims’ clients, MSPs, unions and the media, and in one case emailed PayPal’s security team over a breach at its contact-centre provider. The maritime wave shows the same logic at scale: the Nam Dinh Vu Port posting states its archive would expose the cargo flows, booking relationships and operational records of every carrier that called at the terminal.

Leak-site mechanics

Listings carry a status and a countdown. “PENDING EXPOSURE” anonymises the victim as “Company #N” with only a sector and location, one to three days out. “NOT PAID, EXPOSED” names the victim with a publication date. “HONORED” marks a victim that settled before its deadline. Data is offered as a direct .zip archive and a .torrent, distributed from a VPN-bound seedbox. The maritime batch broke the earlier rhythm: named postings with a single shared publication time, seven days out. Data typically leaks about four days after public disclosure.

The Fortinet connection

OSec notes a recent Fortinet brute-forcing campaign (dubbed “Fortibleed”) likely fuelled the group’s access. The group’s own credential-stuffing pipeline targeted 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances through residential proxies. No Fortinet vulnerability is involved — the attacks use weak or stolen credentials.

Possible connections — unconfirmed

Links reported by others, kept separate from the group’s own record until evidence ties them together.

Azazel and The Gentlemen

CloudSEK’s “Caught in 4K: The Gentlemen Files” (5 Oct 2026) documents a Russian-speaking affiliate of The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service group, using the name Azazel, who used the group’s tooling, negotiation channels and ransom-note template but posted victims on his own leak site (LEAKNED) and kept the proceeds. His exposed servers showed 24+ victim directories and about 6 TB of staged data, and the first reported operational use of MCP’s exec_in_session as a command-and-control channel — a Penelope reverse-shell handler registered as a tool in an AI coding assistant, driven through a local MCP endpoint at 127.0.0.1:35367.

Aggregator detection content (Threadlinqs TL-2026-5634) associates this cluster with n0n at low confidence. The association is not adopted here: the two exposed workspaces are different servers with different toolsets (OpenCode and credential stuffing for n0n; Penelope and MCP for Azazel), SOCRadar’s n0n mapping contains no MCP technique, and Bitdefender treats the two as separate stories in the same debrief. If evidence later ties them together, it will be recorded in the TTP change log.

Attribution

No definitive geographic or national attribution exists. Some threat-intelligence vendors list n0n as likely Russia-based, but the evidence behind that assessment has not been shown. Cydome notes evidence that the group is not related to Iran, China or North Korea, and a detail in the maritime analysis was read as a possible indication of Christian origin — neither is attribution. SOCRadar assesses with medium confidence that the exposed server is a private workspace for a single operator or small team, while the group’s broader framework, tooling and master wallet control indicate a multi-operator operation.

Defensive actions

Drawn from SOCRadar, Fortra and Bitdefender. Prioritised for identity, remote access, cloud and backup owners.

AreaAction
Remote accessEnforce phishing-resistant MFA on RDP, SSL-VPNs and admin portals; monitor /remote/logincheck for credential stuffing (hunt Cookie: APBSID=n0n); invalidate credentials found in infostealer logs; remove internet-exposed RDP.
Firewall managementRestrict FortiManager and FMC interfaces with IP allow-lists and MFA; require approvals for policy changes; flag REST token creation from unknown IPs; hunt the injected Snort rule n0n-lock (sid 2100001).
Cloud keysReplace long-lived keys with short-lived roles; separate S3 list, read and delete permissions; enable Object Lock and versioning; alert on high-volume DeleteObjects calls.
BackupsKeep air-gapped or immutable backups and test restores — n0n purges shadow copies, wipes free space and deletes provider-hosted backups.
CredentialsEnforce strong password policy and regular rotation; hunt hidden admins (svc_*), UserList=0 accounts and root@3090-AI authorized_keys entries.
DetectionSearch EDR, CloudTrail, WinRM/RDP and firewall logs for the indicators and behaviours in this page; consider restricting PowerShell, Python and other advanced scripting for users outside IT.
Extortion readinessPrepare a data-breach and extortion-specific response plan, not just ransomware recovery — stolen data remains stolen even if systems are restored from backup. Ask suppliers first when a company appears on a leak site: much of n0n’s claimed data is the kind suppliers hold.

Could not verify

Open questions, stated plainly rather than filled in.

Sources

Primary sources first. Leak-site content is not linked and no stolen data was accessed.

Page pattern: this profile follows the Tracking Offensive AI Tooling page. New findings go in the TTP change log at the top with a date; the matrix and procedure table update with them. First published 18 November 2026.

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