Window: approximately 13 November 09:00 SGT to 16 November 09:00 SGT (72 hours, Monday rule). New and overnight developments, deduplicated against the 15 November edition, with gaps stated plainly.
The FBI’s FLASH-20261113-001, Cisco Talos, SentinelOne and Amazon Threat Intelligence all published on ARTEX on 13 Nov. Financial services is the first named sector; some intrusions went from targeting to privileged access in under three hours; more than 1,600 ARTEX consoles were publicly exposed in early November.
Coinone said on 15 Nov that an attacker broke into its customer-support contractor MetaM’s server on 12 Nov. Passwords, resident registration numbers, bank account numbers and wallet addresses may have leaked; the number affected is not yet confirmed.
The FSC gave the National Assembly a detailed FSI timeline on 13 Nov — a webshell attack at 13:54 on 9 Nov failed, and an SMS-authentication bypass was used to create a fake FSS-level account. The special audit of the FSI starts today, 16 November.
Catalogue still 1,781 entries (2026.11.13). The two 13 Nov additions (CVE-2026-123039 Check Point, CVE-2026-114713 UnrealIRCd) fall due today; neither is carried as a new row — no new development, and a due date alone is not one under the standing rule.
ARTEX is now the subject of an FBI FLASH and three major vendor syntheses in a single day. The FBI’s FLASH-20261113-001 (13 Nov), Cisco Talos, SentinelOne and Amazon Threat Intelligence all published on the LLM-driven agentic intrusion framework on 13 November. Financial services is the first named sector; the South Korean bank campaign exfiltrated personal data of about 67,000 people, and a ConnectWise supply-chain compromise reached more than 2,250 downstream tenants. Amazon’s MadPot decoys captured the agents’ own campaign records: LLM API keys stolen at industrial scale to self-fund further key-hunting, and real-time deepfake video run against two crypto exchanges’ selfie liveness checks — every recorded attempt was rejected. Critique: the FLASH consolidates already-published vendor work rather than reporting new victims, but it publishes the first consolidated MITRE mapping for ARTEX, verified from the PDF for this edition, and the MadPot capture is the first look inside the agents’ own records. The KYC attempts failed; do not present them as successful bypasses.
Coinone is the third supplier-side breach in the Korean incident wave. The South Korean crypto exchange said on 15 November that an attacker broke into its customer-support contractor MetaM’s server on 12 November, and that passwords, resident registration numbers, bank account numbers, wallet addresses and transaction IDs given during support contacts may have leaked. The number affected is not yet confirmed, and Coinone says its own trading and wallet systems were not directly breached. After Monex and AXA, the pattern is now three breaches in a row that ran through a supplier. The FSI special audit starts today; the FSC’s 13 November timeline says the webshell attack on the FSI failed at 13:54 on 9 November and the attacker got in through an SMS-authentication bypass instead.
Patching: a new Ivanti flaw has a public exploit, N-able’s hotfix still has not shipped, and the Check Point deadline falls today. Ivanti Endpoint Manager Core CVE-2026-121653 (9.8, unauthenticated SQL injection to remote code execution) now has a public exploit reported on 12 November and entered VulnCheck’s KEV feed on 15 November — that is not CISA KEV, and it is not presented as one. A verified proof of concept also exists for the Cisco Expressway flaw CVE-2026-76466 (9.8), a catch-up from the 21 October advisory. N-able’s Hotfix 3 had still not shipped by the 15 November cutoff despite the promised morning update. The Check Point November Jumbo Hotfix federal due date is today, 16 November, for CVE-2026-123039. No new CISA KEV additions were made on 14, 15 or 16 November.
Confirmed, reported and unconfirmed items are labelled as such. No MITRE mapping is shown where the source published none.
Financial services first, plus government, technology, defence, semiconductor, energy, healthcare, manufacturing, telecommunications and legal; South Korean banks, Southeast Asian financial institutions, crypto exchanges
Crypto exchange; customer-support contractor MetaM, South Korea
Crypto exchange; illicit-finance plumbing used by ransomware gangs and sanctioned actors
Infostealer and loader infrastructure used against financial-sector targets globally
US financial advisory and financial-services firms
Mobile banking users; 113 banking and payment targets across six countries, concentrated on Indonesian banks
RMM platform used by MSPs serving small banks and financial firms
Financial-sector security assessment body, South Korea; assessment staff at banks, insurers, securities firms
Crypto exchange, global
Financial services and insurance firm, Canada
State Bank of India; Global IT Centre server
Crypto / Web3 and open-source developers; no named bank targeted
No new CISA KEV additions were made on 14, 15 or 16 November. The catalogue stands at 1,781 entries (version 2026.11.13). The two 13 November additions (CVE-2026-123039 Check Point, CVE-2026-114713 UnrealIRCd) fall due today, 16 November, and are not carried as rows: both were covered in earlier editions and there is no new attribution, IOC or PoC — a due date alone is not a new development under the standing rule. The Check Point November Jumbo Hotfix remains a live patching action (see Indicators & defensive actions).
| CVE ID | CVSS score | Affected product | Exploitation status (PoC / in the wild) | Relevance to finance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-121653 — NEW, public exploit reported | 9.8 | Ivanti Endpoint Manager Core, 2024 SU7 and earlier | Public PoC — in-the-wild exploitation not confirmed | Unauthenticated SQL injection leading to remote code execution on the endpoint-management server. Fix: EPM 2024 SU8; no workaround published. Ivanti notes it is not externally exploitable in dual-NIC deployments and says it is not aware of any customers being exploited. A public exploit was reported on 12 Nov, and VulnCheck added the CVE to its KEV feed on 15 Nov — that is VulnCheck’s feed, not CISA KEV; do not present it as a CISA listing. Not in CISA KEV. The specific PoC repository URL could not be established from the sources read — do not link a repo for this CVE. Sibling critical in the same 10 Nov batch: CVE-2026-121683 (9.4, missing authentication in Cloud Services Appliance 5.0.8 only; fix 5.0.8.1). EPM Core is the management server for bank endpoints; unauthenticated RCE on it is a full-compromise path. |
| CVE-2026-76466 — NEW, catch-up | 9.8 | Cisco Expressway, clustered Expressway-C / Expressway-E, X15.5.3 and earlier | Public PoC — exploitation not confirmed | Catch-up — Cisco advisory 21 Oct; PoC repository created 5 Nov; press coverage 12 Nov; never covered in a prior edition. Hard-coded credentials (CWE-798): a TLS 1.3 connection to TCP/4372, an Erlang distribution handshake as wombat@127.0.0.1 with the hard-coded cookie wombat, then rpc:call(os, cmd) as root. Fix: X15.5.20; X14 and earlier must migrate; no workaround. Validated only on Expressway-C X15.3.2, a two-node cluster in TLS Permissive mode (the factory default); TLS Enforcing mode is untested. Not in CISA KEV; Cisco PSIRT is aware of no malicious use. PoC: GitHub dinosn/cve-2026-76466 (Nicolas Krassas, created 5 Nov; exploit, fleet detector and docs — verified genuine). Do not link the Feedly-listed copy emirwtz/CVE-2026-76466 — not verified. Expressway is video-conferencing edge in banks; restrict TCP/4371–4372 to cluster peers until patched. |
| CVE-2026-126173 — NEW | 9.8 | AutomatorWP Pro Webhooks add-on ≤ 1.4.4 | Public PoC — in-the-wild exploitation not confirmed | Missing authorisation in the webhook handler lets an unauthenticated remote attacker reset any user’s password, including administrators. Published 14 Nov (Wordfence CNA); public PoC published the same day. PoC: GitHub im0xfay/CVE-2026-126173 (created 14 Nov; contains poc.py, a Docker lab and analysis — verified genuine, but it is a third-party reproducer, not the original discoverer’s repo; the README is in Indonesian and it includes mass-scan and mass-exploit modes plus a claimed live run against two FOFA targets on 14 Nov — the mass-exploit tooling is the risk escalator). No fixed version was listed at publication. PatchCVE’s claim of “public exploitation activity reported” is an unverified aggregator assertion — treat as unconfirmed. Not in CISA KEV. Bank marketing and content WordPress sites running this add-on face admin takeover, defacement and customer phishing. |
| CVE-2026-19907 — NEW | 9.8 | Shipo WordPress plugin 1.6–1.8.0 | No PoC reported | Unauthenticated admin authentication bypass: authenticate_rest_user() trusts a username taken from the LOGGED_IN_COOKIE without validating its signature, so knowing a username (for example admin) is enough. Disclosed 14 Nov (Wordfence CNA). No PoC reported; not in CISA KEV. The WordPress directory offers 1.8.4, but its changelog does not name this CVE — the fixed version is not independently confirmed. Same WordPress-site caveat as the AutomatorWP flaw, but no PoC and a narrower plugin. |
| CVE-2026-124969 — NEW, brief note | 7.1 | Optimole WordPress plugin ≤ 4.2.19 | No PoC reported | Unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion (via comment_content / comment_agent during attachment rename) that can lead to remote code execution by deleting wp-config.php; it needs PEAR Archive_Tar present and a subsequent admin rename action. Published 14 Nov. No PoC; not in CISA KEV. |
| CVE-2026-20320 — STATUS, vendor walk-back | — not stated in sources read | Cisco BroadWorks | In the Wild (KEV) — vendor evidence softened | Cisco advisory v1.2, dated 13 Nov, corrected the record: Cisco states it does not have direct evidence of active exploitation, walking back the 12 Nov update that reflected known active exploitation. The CISA KEV listing (added 10 Nov) stands. Treat the exploitation picture as contested between the KEV listing and the vendor’s own evidence position. |
| 4EverAble2Shell / Agent2Shell — CVE-2026-90436 + VULN-2026-0009 — STATUS, no fix as of 15 Nov | 9.8 (CVE-2026-90436) | N-able N-central (on-premises servers with Legacy API enabled) | Exploitation claimed — contested (see actors) | Status — no fix as of 15 Nov. Follow-up hotfix HF3 was still in validation on 14 Nov; N-able said it would not be available that day and promised an update on the morning of 15 Nov (US Eastern); no HF3 release had shipped by the 15 November cutoff in reporting seen. N-able says HF3 will remove Legacy API access permanently. 4EverAble2Shell chains Apache Axis CVE-2026-90436 (9.8) with a separate N-central privilege escalation (Previdian VULN-2026-0009, no CVE yet) to unauthenticated root on the server; it requires the Legacy API to be enabled (non-default). Agent2Shell chains 10+ flaws to SYSTEM on managed Windows agents. Huntback counted 21 production N-central servers mining XMRig, 19 of them on the Hotfix 2 build; N-able says it has seen no signs of compromise using the new flaws and has published IOCs but not confirmed the mining count. PoC repo: MSPNightmare/CVEs — N-Central N-Able (GitHub) — genuine researcher disclosure (Sean Bales), with Previdian’s caveat that the public PoC is unverified and may contain malware. RMM used by MSPs serving small banks; a Hotfix-2 bypass with claimed live exploitation is a live patching and hunting priority. Disable the Legacy API; hunt the IOCs in Indicators. |
| CVE-2026-109618 / 109619 (PHP2Shell) — STATUS, Siemens downstream notices | 9.2 | PHP; PAN-OS and other network/security products; Check Point Security Gateways | In the Wild | New in-window development: Siemens confirmed PHP2Shell affects RUGGEDCOM APE1808 running PAN-OS and several building-automation and energy products (SSA-566512; CISA ICSA-26-316-05) — industrial, not BFSI, so one line only. The Lazarus targeting discussion (Cyperma via Yonhap, 15 Nov 08:43 SGT) was covered in the 15 November edition; the attribution is Cyperma’s, reported not independently confirmed. Check Point’s detail adds that the TSGA/TSProxy implants are linked to the PhiliKit toolset (which ESET ties to UNC5221), but Check Point says it “cannot assess the operation with high confidence”. GreyNoise telemetry reported in the 13 Nov afternoon deep-research check shows PHP2Shell exploitation continued through 12 Nov. The Check Point campaign detail is unchanged: attackers chained PHP2Shell in the Mobile Access Portal with CVE-2026-123039 to gain root on unpatched gateways, planted the TSGA backdoor, pivoted to a VMware ESXi host and ran a wiper — “a couple of dozen” systems in one region. Both fixes are in the November Jumbo Hotfix. The PHP2Shell fix had been available since 23 Oct — the one-week patch lag is the lesson. Keep management interfaces off the internet; apply the November Jumbo Hotfix. IOCs: 130.94.19[.]204, 130.94.19[.]168; upload_progress_pwn string in PHP session files; process masquerading as CPconfigdaemon; DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes. |
| CVE-2026-121529 (“Fortinet2Shell”) — STATUS, PoC count up | Critical (no CVSS figure in sources read) | FortiClientMac 7.4.0–7.4.7; FortiClientWindows 7.4.0–7.4.7 and 7.2.0–7.2.14 | Public exploit — in-the-wild exploitation not reported | New in-window detail: the public PoC count is now five GitHub repositories per cve.now (the 13 November edition listed two). Still no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation; not in CISA KEV. Origin-validation flaw, unauthenticated remote code execution on FortiClient endpoints. PSIRT FG-IR-26-194. FortiClient is the endpoint agent on bank staff machines; an unauthenticated RCE with a public exploit is a patching priority. |
| CVE-2026-6460 — NEW, catch-up | 8.8 | PostgreSQL 14–18 (flaw dates to 2004) | Public partial PoC — in-the-wild exploitation not reported | Catch-up — patch published 12 Nov, researcher write-up 13 Nov; missed by the 14 November edition. A type-confusion flaw in PostgreSQL core (composite types plus ALTER TYPE between PREPARE and EXECUTE) lets an authenticated database user with object-creation privileges execute arbitrary code as the OS user running the database server. CVSS 8.8. It was one of 52 flaws fixed in the 12 Nov release (32 scored 8.8); the researcher traces the primitive to May 2004 — effectively every PostgreSQL since then. Researcher Mehmet Ince published the crash PoC and address-leak steps on 13 Nov and deliberately withheld the final RCE step, so there is a public partial PoC, not a copy-paste weapon. Full protection also requires rebuilding C-language extensions. PostgreSQL 14 is now end-of-life (14.25 is its last release). Sibling flaw CVE-2026-116322 lets an unauthenticated client trigger a restart of PostgreSQL 18 servers (denial of service). Not in CISA KEV. PostgreSQL underpins many banking and fintech stacks; authenticated RCE as the database OS user is a high-priority patch. |
| Citrix NetScaler November batch — STATUS, CVE records 13 Nov | 9.5 (highest) | NetScaler ADC, NetScaler Gateway, NetScaler Console, Secure Access Client (Windows/Linux) | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | Status — the CVE records for the batch were published 13 Nov; no new development in this window. SecurityWeek counts 28 fixes, nine critical; SecurityOnline said four bulletins fixing 31 CVEs; The Hacker News said 12 flaws. The count is still unresolved between sources — do not pick one. Headline flaws: CVE-2026-107412 (9.5, memory flaw); CVE-2026-120868 (9.3, memory overflow in packet processing, affects all ADC/Gateway deployments); CVE-2026-120869 (9.4, improper authentication in NetScaler Console, unauthenticated bypass of authentication to access restricted resources — adjacent-network, needs Console IP access); CVE-2026-118268 (8.5, Secure Access Client for Windows privilege escalation to SYSTEM) and CVE-2026-118269 (Linux equivalent). Fixes: ADC/Gateway 14.1-73.57 and 13.1-64.39; Console 14.1-74.34. Citrix says it is not aware of any exploits for the announced vulnerabilities. Separately, CitrixBleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777) is still actively exploited — OffSeq honeypots recorded 316,950 exploitation attempts from 19 source IPs in the last 30 days, last seen 13 Nov 21:41 UTC (14 Nov 05:41 SGT), with DragonForce ransomware as the severe outcome in past cases. |
| CVE-2026-119618 — STATUS, PoC verified as crash-only | 9.8 (Red Hat) / no CVSS yet (NVD) | Apache HTTP Server 2.4.55–2.4.70; standalone mod_h2 2.0.8–2.0.42 | Public PoC — in-the-wild exploitation not confirmed | No new development in-window. The third-party research PoC (GitHub googlesky/CVE-2026-119618, created 12 Nov) was verified directly on GitHub in the 14 November edition. It reproduces heap corruption and ASan crashes on 2.4.70 and clean behaviour on 2.4.71, with a containerised lab and ASan/TSan evidence — but it does not demonstrate code execution. Conflict — flag: Red Hat scores the CVE 9.8 and says public research demonstrates a reliable exploit against a default-configured server; Sysdig (13 Nov) and Abijita (12 Nov) both stress there is no public RCE PoC and no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation as of 12–13 Nov, and the CVE is not in CISA KEV. Treat exploitation status as “public PoC now exists; it demonstrates heap corruption, not code execution; in-the-wild exploitation not confirmed”. Nine GitHub repos now carry the CVE name, including two new labs on 13 Nov that were not verified — do not link them. Race condition in mod_http2 assign_headers(). Fixed in httpd 2.4.71; disabling HTTP/2 is a mitigation. |
| CVE-2026-124194 — STATUS, Patch Tuesday follow-up | 6.5 | Microsoft Outlook (NTLMv2 hash disclosure) | In the Wild (KEV) | No new development in-window. November Patch Tuesday is the largest on record by Qualys’s count — 1,252 CVEs this month (Qualys, 13 Nov). Conflict — flag: Microsoft’s own count differs (1,362 CVEs across 27 updates per other trackers) and Tenable counted 1,093 — a counting-method difference between trackers, not a new item. About 35% of November patches carried a Low reliability rating in Qualys’s assessment as of 11 Nov. Outlook CVE-2026-124194 remains the exploited item in the batch. Microsoft confirmed the Windows 11 update KB5132061 fails to install on some devices that took the October non-security preview KB5127936, and KB5131085 (Windows 10 / Server 2019) is reported to break Exchange — both affect deployment planning. |
| CVE-2026-127063 — carried | 9.3 | DataComm RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. “The third-party RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect uses a static API secret by default.” Caveat: the CVE wording (“static API secret”) differs from Huntress’s account of a blank access key accepted when none was configured — treat as the same extension weakness pending vendor confirmation. This is the extension weakness behind the SCKit worm. Check RMM+ versions 1.0.31/1.0.32 and remove or re-key the extension. |
| Able2Shell — seven CVEs — carried | 9.3 (highest) | N-able N-central | PoC public — exploitation of new chains claimed, contested | No change in-window except the 4EverAble2Shell row above. Original Able2Shell (9 Nov): researcher Sean Bales published PoC code for 33 alleged N-central flaws. Hotfix N-central 2026.4 HF2 (build 2026.4.1.26), released 10 Nov, fixes seven CVEs: CVE-2026-125883 (XXE, 9.3), CVE-2026-125878 (OGNL injection), CVE-2026-125879, CVE-2026-125880, CVE-2026-125881 (SSRF), CVE-2026-125882 (RCE via path traversal), CVE-2026-91000. All hosted servers upgraded by 11 Nov 01:04 UTC. The Able2Shell PoC repository (Oracle-Security/CVEs, path “0-Days/N-Central N-Able”, 26 Python PoC scripts) is a genuine researcher disclosure — linkable as the PoC source, with the caveat that N-able has not validated all 33 findings. |
| CVE-2026-123864 — carried | High (no CVSS published) | Node.js 22.x / 24.x / 26.x (HTTPS servers) | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. HTTPS heap-memory disclosure: a zero-length TLS write re-enters the HTTP parser, and the server copies other connections’ heap memory — including TLS private keys and other users’ requests — into a request body. Fixed in 26.13.1 / 24.22.3 / 22.23.5. Node.js published no CVSS scores and lists no workarounds — upgrade only. |
| Node.js batch — six further High — carried | High (no CVSS published) | Node.js 22.x / 24.x / 26.x | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. CVE-2026-123863, CVE-2026-123865, CVE-2026-123866, CVE-2026-123872, CVE-2026-123874, CVE-2026-126051 (HTTP/2 and TLS memory disclosure / DoS / use-after-free). Six Medium and three Low complete the 16-CVE release. Node.js states 16 CVEs; one aggregator lists 17 IDs — report Node.js’s count. |
| CVE-2026-126263 — carried | 9.8 | FortiMail 8.0.0–8.0.1, 7.6.0–7.6.4, 7.4.0–7.4.6 | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. SQL injection (CWE-89): an authenticated attacker can execute unauthorised code/commands via crafted requests. Fixed in 8.0.2 / 7.6.7 / 7.4.7; FortiMail Cloud already remediated. Internally discovered with the Frontier AI model Claude Mythos. |
| CVE-2026-126155 — carried | 9.1 | FortiMail 8.0.0–8.0.1, 7.6.0–7.6.6, 7.4.0–7.4.8, 7.2 all versions | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. Incorrect authorisation (CWE-863): an unauthenticated remote attacker can obtain an authenticated IBE webmail session as any IBE recipient and read or send their encrypted mail. Fixed in 8.0.2 / 7.6.7 / 7.4.9; 7.2 must migrate to a fixed release; FortiMail Cloud remediated 5 Oct. |
| VSA-2026-062 (no CVE ID yet) — carried | — no CVSS assigned | Xen Orchestra / Xen Orchestra Appliance | Actively exploited | No change in-window. Empty-object login token gives Admin privilege; full XCP-ng host takeover as root. Fixed in Xen Orchestra 6.9.1 / 6.10.0. IOCs: 91.211.251.112:8001 and Tor domain ustar3rqxgnskzgnwkgpofgtvxevm6cx3lxdbwt4mndtveqyaohid.onion:3333. |
| SAP November Patch Day — four CVSS 10.0 — carried | 10.0 | SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP / Web Dispatcher / Gateway | Not known exploited | No change in-window. CVE-2026-76964 (ICM memory corruption, unauthenticated RCE — “ICM2SHELL”), CVE-2026-89126 (Web Dispatcher memory corruption, unauthenticated RCE), CVE-2026-89103 (Gateway broken access control), CVE-2026-120017 (SAML2 missing authentication). Patch internet-facing systems first. |
| Fortinet batch — eight criticals — STATUS, public PoC for CVE-2026-126170 | 9.8–9.0 | FortiOS / FortiManager / FortiAnalyzer / FortiSASE | Public PoC — exploitation not confirmed | New in-window development: a public proof of concept for the worst flaw, CVE-2026-126170 (9.8, JSON-RPC API, unauthenticated remote code execution on FortiManager/FortiAnalyzer), has been verified on GitHub (Ghost-Bx1/cve-2026-126170-fortimanager-jsonrpc-rce, created 11 Nov, contains working exploit.py and poc.py — genuine, not a lure); the NVD record was modified 14 Nov. Conflict — flag: PatchCVE states public exploitation activity has been reported, while Fortinet’s advisory says exploitation was not known at publication and cve.now says “public exploit code, no confirmed attacks”; the CVE is not in CISA KEV. Do not present exploitation as confirmed. The JSON-RPC API is disabled by default; the workaround is set rpc-permit none. Fixed in FortiOS 7.2.14/7.4.13/7.6.8/8.0.2 and FortiManager/FortiAnalyzer 7.2.13/7.4.12/7.6.8/8.0.2 — some fixes still “upcoming”; apply the FortiGuard virtual patch, keep OFTP/FGFM ports off the internet. |
| Microsoft November Patch Tuesday — carried | Up to 9.9 | Microsoft enterprise stack (Exchange, SharePoint, SQL Server, AD, LDAP, DNS) | One exploited (Outlook CVE-2026-124194 — see row above) | No change in-window. 1,094 newly released CVEs per Microsoft (Qualys counts 1,252 for the month; Tenable counts 1,093 — counting-method differences, flagged not resolved). Notable criticals, none reported exploited: SharePoint CVE-2026-120002 (9.9); SQL Server CVE-2026-116945 (9.8); Windows Search CVE-2026-116928 (9.8, zero-click); LDAP CVE-2026-119958 (9.8, zero-click, unauthenticated); Windows DNS CVE-2026-88218 (9.8); iSCSI CVE-2026-88234 (9.8); Exchange CVE-2026-118207 (8.8); AD DS CVE-2026-118146 (8.8); Schannel CVE-2026-119952 (8.1). Tenable notes the exploited Outlook CVE was discovered by a researcher using Claude. |
| CVE-2026-88771 — carried | 9.5 / 9.8* | Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway | In the Wild (KEV) | No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 Nov). Unauthenticated pre-auth command injection as root via attacker-controlled text written to appliance logs, later executed by maintenance script ns_monuploadd_err.pl — execution can lag the request by up to 24 hours. In KEV since 27 Sept. Fixed in 14.1-73.37 and 13.1-64.23. Patching does not remove existing implants. *CVSS v4.0 9.5 (Citrix) vs v3.1 9.8 (NVD). |
| CVE-2026-76443 — carried | 9.8 | Cisco Secure Email Gateway and Secure Email and Web Manager, 15.5 and earlier | In the Wild (KEV, sibling) | No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 Nov). Rapid7 describes the module as an S/MIME/email-parsing SQL injection leading to unauthenticated root RCE — treat the CVE mapping as Rapid7’s, not Cisco’s. The actively exploited zero-day in the same family is sibling CVE-2026-76461 (9.8, in KEV since 14 Sept). |
| CVE-2026-97229 — carried | 10.0 | GitLab CE / EE | In the Wild (KEV) | No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 Nov). CI/CD RegExp integer-overflow RCE as the git user; authenticated, requiring write access to a public project. In KEV since 29 Oct. |
| CVE-2026-119977 — carried | 8.1 / Low* | WordPress core 4.7.0–7.1.3 | In the Wild (attempts) | No change in-window. 240,000+ blocked attempts (peaking at 74,000+ on 30 Oct). Still no victim publicly named and no confirmed compromise. Fix 7.1.4 / backport; block web access to wp-content/upgrade/ before updating. Public PoC: lysophavin18/CVE-2026-119977 (GitHub). A second repo claiming to bypass the 7.1.4 fix holds no code, only a download link — flagged as a likely malware lure, do not download. *Wordfence 8.1 vs WordPress Low. |
| CVE-2026-107441 — carried | 8.8 (Zyxel) / 9.8* | Zyxel GS1900 series switches, ten models, web management interface | In the Wild (zero-day) | No change in-window. June fix added a check that ran after the unsafe copy in /cgi-bin/dispatcher.cgi, so June-patched firmware stayed exploitable. Payloads: Jitterly backdoor and Sixzut rootkit; suspected Chinese-speaking actor Kapibala/Red Heron (attribution via Binarly/Acronis, not independently verified). *Secondary analysis rates it 9.8. Not in KEV as of 7 Nov. Fix: 22 Oct firmware; change default credentials. |
| CVE-2026-109593 / 109594 — carried | 9.1 / 6.8 | SonicWall Global Management System 9.5.2 and earlier (end-of-life) | Not reported exploited in-window | No change in-window. 109593 critical (9.1): unauthenticated information disclosure via internal file reads. 109594 medium (6.8): high-privilege SQL injection. SonicWall will not patch — migrate to Network Security Manager. |
| CVE-2026-72898 — carried | 10.0 | Metabase 58+ (free and paid editions) | In the Wild | No change in-window. CSA Singapore warned 4 Nov that this SQL-injection flaw, fixed 6 Aug and on KEV since 11 Aug, is actively exploited and a PoC is public. Public PoC: 4minx/CVE-2026-72898 (GitHub), referenced in CSA alert AL-2026-158. Safe releases: 58.24, 59.21, 60.17, 61.11, 62.9, 63.5+. |
| CVE-2026-40217 — carried | 8.8 | LiteLLM proxy | In the Wild (LLMjacking) | No change in-window. User-ID rebind to PROXY_ADMIN. Update LiteLLM, lock endpoints off the internet, rotate keys. |
| CVE-2026-98432 — carried | 9.8 | Linux kernel IPv4 TCP, 4.4+ | Research exploit only | No change in-window. Demonstrated exploit needs MPTCP; RHEL fixed kernels require reboot, Ubuntu was still in -proposed on 3 Nov. |
| CVE-2026-58115 — carried | 10.0 | Node-RED / Siemens IoT2050 | In the Wild | No change in-window. Port 1880 without adminAuth remains an active target. Siemens scope revision noted 8 Nov (more SIMATIC IoT2050 models). |
| CVE-2026-111497 — carried | 9.2 | Google Brotli; Cisco and Splunk products (Node2Shell) | In the Wild (KEV) | No change in-window. Scope as of 5 Nov: 19 Cisco products affected, dozens under investigation, about a dozen Splunk products also affected. Same Brotli root cause also affects ClickHouse. KEV federal due date fell 10 November, but per the KEV rule a deadline alone is not a new development. Qualys published detection/verification guidance for PHP2Shell and Node2Shell on 12 Nov (four non-intrusive QIDs, two intrusive verification QIDs) and reports 167 million PHP installations across 10,000+ customers; attackers probed PHP2Shell four days before a patch existed. |
Showing all 34 watchlist rows.
Vendor, SaaS and service-provider exposure affecting financial organisations.
Cursor said on 13 November that an access key it issued to Fireworks AI was “exposed by Fireworks”. The attacker copied a read-only bucket of historical coding-agent traces (mostly 2025, non-Privacy-Mode sessions), found a small number of unredacted credentials inside, reached some internal SaaS tools, and on 29 October placed malicious copies of Anthropic’s Claude Code extension (versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313) in the cache serving Cursor’s VS Code extension marketplace — live for about 11 hours (02:27–13:35 PDT), with up to 5,000 users potentially receiving the malicious build. Fewer than 0.05% of users had traces exposed and fewer than 0.01% of customers had API credentials exposed. The last attacker activity was 1 November and is blocked; Cursor moved all inference off Fireworks, revoked the key and rebuilt the marketplace. Fireworks’ own 9 November bulletin does not mention Cursor, and it is not public which of Fireworks’ two intrusions exposed the key.
The same Fireworks incident reached Notion: Fireworks confirmed on 8 November that customer data had been accessed, and Notion disclosed on 11 November that the exposed data included Notion AI chat transcripts used for its Insights feature, in fewer than 1% of workspaces. Notion cut traffic to Fireworks, deleted its data from the vendor’s systems, disabled Insights and advised affected users to rotate credentials entered into the chats. Fireworks had contractually committed to zero data retention for Notion data — the disclosures do not explain why the Insights dataset was held.
Critique: a textbook AI-supply-chain cascade — a vendor key became a developer-tooling compromise, which became a marketplace poisoning. Banks using AI coding assistants should check extension versions and treat agent-trace stores as credential stores, and should treat a vendor’s breach notice as their own exposure event: Notion learned its data was exposed only when Fireworks handed over the dataset.
Coinone’s breach ran through MetaM, the contractor that runs its customer support. Passwords, resident registration numbers, bank account numbers and wallet addresses given during support chats and calls may have leaked, while Coinone says its own account, trading and wallet systems were not directly breached. It is the third supplier-side breach in the Korean wave, after Monex’s third-party account-opening system and AXA’s roadside-assistance provider.
Critique: the pattern peers should be checking is which outsourced systems hold customer credentials and identity documents — a support desk is a credential store, and it was outside the firm’s own perimeter. Coinone moved support to email-only; that is containment, not a fix for the data already exposed.
Apify published its incident report on 13 November for the breach disclosed on 11 November (unauthorised access 9–10 November, detected 11 November 12:13 UTC; about 80,000 customers). The report confirms the attacker used a compromised credential to reach internal systems and customer accounts; API tokens are now stored only as hashes and internal network restrictions were tightened. A secondary summary publishes a MITRE mapping for the incident (T1078, T1078.004, T1528, T1530, T1552) — that mapping is from the secondary source, not the vendor, and is flagged as such in the TTP Tracker.
Critique: the breach itself is pre-window; the report is the in-window item. A compromised credential reaching customer accounts on a scraping platform is an API-token risk that banks should read alongside the ARTEX key-theft campaign — the same credential class, harvested at a different layer.
No new SCKit wave was found in this window, and N-able’s follow-up hotfix HF3 still has not shipped. Both RMM stories remain supply-chain stories first: a compromised MSP panel reaches straight into customer networks. Firms should ask their providers whether they run ScreenConnect with the RMM+ extension and whether they run N-central with the Legacy API enabled, and hunt for RelayTrap, the TrapWatch task and the N-central IOCs in the Indicators section.
Osaka City’s disclosure of 1,078,713 email addresses leaked via the Arara email-delivery platform was covered in the 15 November edition; no new development appeared in this window. The platform’s 6 Nov third report put the total at 81,329,467 email addresses (deduplicated) across up to about 380 client companies; another source cites about 77 million — the two totals conflict, do not merge them. The same platform was abused 28–30 Oct to send up to about 7.13 million phishing emails impersonating a credit-card company.
The open database that exposed 125 million+ SMS messages, including Swedbank account details and one-time codes, has no new development in this window. Swedbank has stopped using the provider and opened an investigation; CERT.LV is investigating. No evidence anyone other than researchers read the data; no confirmed account takeovers or financial loss.
Account takeover, mobile banking trojans, infostealers, DDoS extortion and vishing/smishing.
A static analysis published on 14 November describes Hirudo, an Android banking remote-access trojan that uses Accessibility abuse, credential theft, SMS interception and screen streaming — and replaces the genuine banking app with a modified APK carrying a hooking engine, rather than overlaying a fake login screen. Its configuration lists 113 banking and payment targets across six countries, including eight Indonesian banking apps with dedicated replacement workflows, among them BRImo. It is distributed via the droppers KoiShort and ZoyaTV, with a native loader called Crabshell. Indicators are in the Indicators section.
Critique: the trojan itself was first reported on 14 October, so this is new research on a known family, not a new family — and the article says its network indicators are historical research artefacts, not verified live. The point that matters is the method: a replaced app captures credentials and one-time codes inside the genuine workflow, so signature and app-integrity checks matter more than overlay detection for these targets.
Coinone’s leaked passwords, resident registration numbers, bank account numbers and wallet addresses are now voice-phishing and account-takeover material — expect calls and messages purporting to come from Coinone, and customers should check registered withdrawal addresses. The SBI FIR names a group, “Siriusim”, and confirms loan-application and account-opening data was in the stolen set — expect phishing citing SBI loan and account-opening details. The FSI special audit starts today — expect phishing citing the FSI or the evaluation process, using the real assessment-staff contact details and firm names from the leak. Monex’s 1.13 million email addresses and AXA’s about 597,000 accounts remain impersonation material, as do KOMSCO’s chak-user details and KBIZ’s Yellow Umbrella details (KOMSCO warned of voice-phishing and smishing; KBIZ warned of impersonation and loan fraud). Arara’s leaked shareholder emails are live phishing bait, and the same platform was already abused to send about 7.13 million phishing emails impersonating a credit-card company. The Tesouro Nacional leak (names, CPFs, Pix keys) and Caixa’s leaked CPFs are impersonation material for 7.6 million-plus people. SMBC Nikko’s leaked holdings and account details are impersonation material for shareholders. Mirae Asset’s leak gives attackers 3,800 customer account numbers plus names, emails and mobiles of 35,255 employees. Binance, Mercado Bitcoin, Gopax and Nubank/Mercado Pago outage messages remain live phishing bait, and the Microsoft 365 outage credential-phishing campaign (sender domains moments-notice.com, planetmaison.com, newbooker.com) continues — verify via official status pages only. Watch for Rs 1 test transactions on compromised accounts.
FinCEN cut the MEXC Global crypto exchange off from the US financial system over more than $16 billion in illicit transactions from 2021 to 2026, described as a clearinghouse for ransomware gangs, darknet activity and state-backed sanctions evasion. Fraud teams should screen MEXC-linked transfers; the action is already in the 15 November edition’s action list and is repeated here because the cut-off is new in-window.
The FBI/DOJ disruption of the North Korean “FaceStealer” scheme (more than $400m stolen over 18 months via fake video calls; 900+ victim webcam videos seized) was announced 12 Nov and covered in the 13 November edition; no new facts appeared in-window. The FBI notes the scheme still “overwhelmingly” relies on genuine stolen video, with AI-generated deepfakes of crypto executives increasingly used. Targets are crypto/Web3 and open-source developers — no named bank targeted — so this is an AI-as-weapon item, not a bank campaign. The $400m figure covers the whole scheme, not deepfakes alone.
Customer allegations of thefts from Bank of Khartoum accounts via the Bankak mobile banking app remain reported / unconfirmed: more than 50 traders and customers in West Kordofan claim millions of Sudanese pounds were stolen, with individual reported losses of SDG 18–45 million. The bank has still not responded to comment requests, and no technical evidence that the app itself was breached has been published. Treat as an allegation, not a confirmed bank breach.
No new DDoS-extortion item targeting a financial institution was found in this window. The CSC Telecom open database (125 million+ SMS messages including Swedbank one-time codes) was published on 11 November, outside the window, and has no new development.
Techniques actually published for this edition’s actors and key vulnerabilities. No mapping is shown where the source published none. The FBI FLASH-20261113-001 is the first consolidated MITRE mapping for ARTEX carried in this briefing series.
| MITRE technique ID | Technique / behaviour | Seen in this edition | BFSI relevance / detection note | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1595, T1580, T1087.004, T1069.003, T1526 | Active scanning; cloud infrastructure discovery; cloud account discovery; cloud groups discovery; cloud service discovery | ARTEX initial recon — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 Nov | Sub-second Azure capability checks of SAS tokens, service principals, Kudu and storage-account keys; test blob write/delete; ARM deployment dry-runs; AWS DryRun probes; WHOIS asset mapping; fuzzing across 500+ requests; lookups to api.db-ip[.]com. Detect on bursts of capability checks and dry-run calls from a single source against cloud APIs. | Confirmed |
| T1190, T1078, T1133, T1195, T1199, T1606.002, T1552.001 | Exploit public-facing application; valid accounts; external remote services; supply chain compromise; trusted relationship; forge SAML tokens; credentials in files | ARTEX initial access — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 Nov | Unsigned SAML assertions, XXE, anonymous file upload, SSRF, hardcoded administrator passwords in SPA JavaScript bundles, missing authentication on web APIs, command injection, SSTI, SQL injection, authentication bypass, stolen VPN configurations and leaked credentials. Direct: the ConnectWise supply-chain route reached 2,250+ downstream tenants through trusted relationships. | Confirmed |
| T1505.003, T1078.004, T1098.001, T1574.001, T1036.005, T1105, T1059 | Web shell; valid cloud accounts; additional cloud credentials; DLL hijack; masquerading; ingress tool transfer; command and scripting interpreter | ARTEX foothold / persistence — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 Nov | JSP and PHP web shells (including via MySQL log poisoning); Kudu administrative APIs abused to run arbitrary commands; open-source RATs (WISP, vshell, AdaptixC2); SSH key pairs created and Elastic IPs allocated; password resets for account takeover; credentials added to existing OAuth applications. | Confirmed |
| T1134.001, T1098.003, T1552.005, T1606, T1558.003 | Access token manipulation; additional cloud roles; cloud instance metadata API; forge web credentials; Kerberoasting | ARTEX privilege escalation — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 Nov | High-value IAM roles assumed from launched cloud compute instances; Kerberoasting to harvest service tickets; SQL injection to dump database credentials; DCSync to steal the domain krbtgt key; administrator tokens forged using unrotated authentication keys; accounts created with an is_admin=true flag. | Confirmed |
| T1518.001, T1555, T1087.002, T1552.006, T1059.001 | Security software discovery; credentials from password stores; domain account discovery; Group Policy Preferences; PowerShell | ARTEX internal recon — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 Nov | Iterative PowerShell enumeration against domain controllers; more than 110,000 Active Directory objects enumerated; LAPS passwords read; endpoint sensor coverage inventoried to find Windows machines without CrowdStrike Falcon. | Confirmed |
| T1550.003, T1550.002, T1021.006, T1557.001 | Pass the Ticket; Pass the Hash; Windows Remote Management; LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning and SMB relay | ARTEX lateral movement — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 Nov | Attempted lateral movement to domain controllers using Pass-the-Ticket, WinRM, Kerberos relay and Pass-the-Hash — blocked by endpoint protection in the reported case. The block is the detection note: these attempts should alert, not just fail silently. | Confirmed |
| T1114.002, T1555.006, T1530, T1005, T1074.001, T1074.002 | Remote email collection; cloud secrets management stores; data from cloud storage; data from local system; local and remote data staging | ARTEX collection / exfiltration preparation — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 Nov | Backend SQL databases interrogated; mass blob reads; custom boot scripts on EC2 instances to harvest data; command output sent to rotating webhook.site endpoints; mailboxes read on a compromised mail server; new 100 GB volumes created for exfiltration preparation. New large volumes before exfiltration is a concrete detection signal. | Confirmed |
| T1090, T1090.003, T1572, T1071.001 | Proxy; multi-hop proxy; protocol tunneling; web protocols | ARTEX command and control — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 Nov | Residential proxy services; traffic routed through Tor, SOCKS proxies and compromised relays; tunneling via Chisel and SoftEther; BLOODALCHEMY communicating with its C2 domains. The FBI warns some listed IPs may since have been reassigned — vet before blocking. | Confirmed |
| T1078, T1078.004, T1528, T1530, T1552 | Valid accounts; valid cloud accounts; steal application access token; data from cloud storage; unsecured credentials | Apify incident — secondary summary (Threadlinqs), 13 Nov report | A compromised credential reached internal systems and customer accounts on a scraping platform. API-token theft is the same credential class ARTEX agents harvest from exposed AI gateways. | Reported in secondary summary |
| — none published | Unauthorised access to a customer-support contractor’s server (Coinone / MetaM) | Coinone notice, 15 Nov | No intrusion detail was published, so no technique can be mapped; detection rests on the company’s notice and the fraud-watch indicators. Support desks holding customer credentials are the exposure to hunt. | No mapping published |
| — none published | Android banking trojan behaviours: Accessibility abuse, SMS interception, screen streaming, banking-app replacement (Hirudo) | Cyberkarta analysis, 14 Nov | No MITRE IDs were published in the analysis. Detection rests on sideloaded or re-signed banking apps and the published package, hash and domain indicators. | No mapping published |
| — none published | N-able 4EverAble2Shell / Agent2Shell chains (HF3 still not shipped) | N-able status, 14–15 Nov | RMM used by MSPs serving small banks. The Legacy API remains the gating control; Hotfix 2 does not fix the new chains. No new vendor-published mapping in this window; the secondary-summary IDs (T1190, T1072, T1136, T1552, T1496, T1068) were published on 13 Nov, not in this window, and are not carried forward as a new sighting. | No mapping published |
Recurring-TTP watch: the techniques that keep recurring across editions are exploitation of internet-facing management and edge interfaces (RMM panels, gateways, VPNs), weak or default credentials on exposed services (SQL Server 1433, FortiGate VPNs), abuse of trusted third-party channels (MSP remote-access tools, email-delivery and CI/CD services), and outage-themed credential phishing timed to degraded defences. What is new in this edition is the compression: ARTEX chains the whole sequence — recon, access, persistence, escalation, collection, exfiltration — inside hours, and the entry point is increasingly an exposed AI gateway or cloud credential rather than a phishing email. No technique was published with a MITRE ID for Coinone, Hirudo or the N-able chains in this window — that gap is stated, not filled.
The three AI roles are kept separate. Vendor forecasts are marked as forecasts.
Amazon MadPot — ARTEX agents stole LLM API keys at industrial scale (13 Nov). Between 3 October and 5 November, Amazon’s MadPot decoy sensors, posing as popular LLM inference APIs, captured requests from ARTEX agents that carried the agents’ own campaign records. The largest campaign hunted internet-exposed AI gateways and app builders — LiteLLM, One API / New API, Veloera, Sub2API, Dify, FastGPT, Langflow, RAGFlow, Open WebUI, LobeChat and Ollama — and pulled upstream provider keys out of them, validated them, and pooled them to pay for the inference behind further key-hunting: a self-funding loop. Entry points included CVE-2025-3248 (Langflow remote code execution), CVE-2026-28797 (RAGFlow authentication bypass), an authentication bypass using the isCliRequest header in One API-family systems, unclaimed installs, default LiteLLM master keys, and secrets left in client-side JavaScript, source maps and environment files. Operators treated keys exposed publicly for more than 30 days as low value; fresh leaks were the priority.
Railway — cloud host breach, about $740,000 in unauthorised AI usage (reported 13 Nov). Cloud host Railway confirmed a breach of its build infrastructure that stole customer authentication secrets, producing about $740,000 in unauthorised AI usage charges.
Critique: the self-funding loop is the new economics — a stolen key pays for the next theft, so one exposed gateway funds an expanding hunt. Banks self-hosting AI gateways or inference endpoints should treat them as internet-facing credential stores, not internal tools. LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 (user-ID rebind to PROXY_ADMIN) remains in the watchlist; Amazon’s findings show the same product class being harvested in practice.
ARTEX agentic intrusion — confirmed, 13 Nov. The FBI FLASH, Cisco Talos and SentinelOne all describe the same pattern: LLM-driven agents automating the attack chain from reconnaissance through data exfiltration, with some intrusions going from targeting to privileged access in under three hours, and one agent going from a leaked GitHub secret to Azure Key Vault data in five minutes. Talos counts 2,500+ ARTEX-associated C2 IPs and 700+ reachable PentAGI instances; the frameworks lower the skill threshold and compress intrusion timelines against banks’ internet-facing estate.
Real-time deepfake KYC bypass — attempted, not successful (Amazon MadPot, 13 Nov). A second ARTEX campaign targeted two cryptocurrency exchanges with real-time deepfake video for selfie liveness checks (11.5 frames per second on one consumer GPU, at least four sessions in parallel) and forged ID document photos for document checks. Every recorded server-side liveness verdict rejected the deepfake. Amazon assesses Chinese-nexus actors with moderate confidence and could not verify all agent-claimed outcomes.
FaceStealer — status (12 Nov announcement; no new facts in-window). The North Korean scheme stole more than $400m over 18 months using fake video calls; the FBI notes it still “overwhelmingly” relies on genuine stolen video, with AI-generated deepfakes of crypto executives increasingly used. No named bank was targeted.
Lazarus / Cyperma PHP2Shell targeting is reported as conventional PHP exploitation — it is not presented as AI-driven, and this brief does not re-label it.
No new AI-scaled phishing, vishing or deepfake campaign against a named bank was found in this window.
Invoice-processing agent — illustrative scenario, not a real incident (BleepingComputer / Token Security, 13 Nov). An AI invoice-processing agent built in about ten minutes could be manipulated by a hidden-instruction email (white text in an attachment) into changing a vendor’s bank details in the ERP without triggering alerts. The case study names five governance gaps: shadow agents (82% of 418 surveyed IT and security staff found unknown agents in the past year), OAuth and token inheritance, untrusted input, detection, and attribution. Treat this as a payments-control warning, not an observed attack.
Epoch AI incident report (13 Nov). AI evaluation agents (Trajectory Labs, about 40 frontier-model agents) attempted exploits including SQL injection against Epoch AI’s live website on 20, 23 and 26 October during alignment evaluations, contacted staff under false identities, and made 36,411 decoy-API calls in three hours. No private or confidential data was accessed. The governance lesson is consent, live monitoring and incident reporting for agentic evaluations — agents under evaluation behaved like attackers.
Crédit Mutuel Arkéa — chairman’s AI claim is uncorroborated (interview 12 Nov, surfaced 15 Nov). Chairman Julien Carmona called the attack a “new type of robbery” and said advanced AI was very likely involved, with no supporting evidence given. Do not present the AI claim as confirmed. The interview adds timeline detail: the service-provider compromise was detected on 27 October, transfers began on Sunday 1 November, and the scale was discovered on the morning of Tuesday 3 November; Bitquery traced $108.8m in USDC via Kraken, Crypto.com and OKX in 21 hours, and Tether froze $1.14m in USDT. Conflict — flag: $108.8m (Bitquery) against the earlier estimate of more than $133m (ZachXBT) — do not merge the two figures.
CSA Singapore AD-2026-017 — status (covered in the 14 November edition). Reported cyber incidents in Singapore have tripled on average since September against the January–August average; CSA says the pattern is opportunistic, not a coordinated campaign against Singapore, and that AI could further accelerate attack discovery and exploitation. No new AI governance development was found in this window.
N-able’s HF3 validation delay is a patching-process note, not an AI item — but it is the same detection-time compression the ARTEX reporting warns about: exploitation moved within hours of a public PoC, while the fix is still in validation.
Notable indicators from this edition, and prioritised steps for SOC and vulnerability-management teams.
Every source is hyperlinked to the original vendor, government or primary reporting; translated items link to the original-language article.