BFSI Cyber Threat Intelligence Briefing

Monday 16 November 2026

Window: approximately 13 November 09:00 SGT to 16 November 09:00 SGT (72 hours, Monday rule). New and overnight developments, deduplicated against the 15 November edition, with gaps stated plainly.

Window 72 hours to ~09:00 SGTARTEX FBI FLASH + three vendor syntheses, 13 NovCoinone Breach via support contractorKEV No new additions 14–16 Nov
ARTEX
FBI FLASH, 13 Nov

The FBI’s FLASH-20261113-001, Cisco Talos, SentinelOne and Amazon Threat Intelligence all published on ARTEX on 13 Nov. Financial services is the first named sector; some intrusions went from targeting to privileged access in under three hours; more than 1,600 ARTEX consoles were publicly exposed in early November.

Coinone
Breach via support contractor

Coinone said on 15 Nov that an attacker broke into its customer-support contractor MetaM’s server on 12 Nov. Passwords, resident registration numbers, bank account numbers and wallet addresses may have leaked; the number affected is not yet confirmed.

Korea
FSI audit starts today

The FSC gave the National Assembly a detailed FSI timeline on 13 Nov — a webshell attack at 13:54 on 9 Nov failed, and an SMS-authentication bypass was used to create a fake FSS-level account. The special audit of the FSI starts today, 16 November.

KEV
No new additions

Catalogue still 1,781 entries (2026.11.13). The two 13 Nov additions (CVE-2026-123039 Check Point, CVE-2026-114713 UnrealIRCd) fall due today; neither is carried as a new row — no new development, and a due date alone is not one under the standing rule.

Executive summary

1

ARTEX is now the subject of an FBI FLASH and three major vendor syntheses in a single day. The FBI’s FLASH-20261113-001 (13 Nov), Cisco Talos, SentinelOne and Amazon Threat Intelligence all published on the LLM-driven agentic intrusion framework on 13 November. Financial services is the first named sector; the South Korean bank campaign exfiltrated personal data of about 67,000 people, and a ConnectWise supply-chain compromise reached more than 2,250 downstream tenants. Amazon’s MadPot decoys captured the agents’ own campaign records: LLM API keys stolen at industrial scale to self-fund further key-hunting, and real-time deepfake video run against two crypto exchanges’ selfie liveness checks — every recorded attempt was rejected. Critique: the FLASH consolidates already-published vendor work rather than reporting new victims, but it publishes the first consolidated MITRE mapping for ARTEX, verified from the PDF for this edition, and the MadPot capture is the first look inside the agents’ own records. The KYC attempts failed; do not present them as successful bypasses.

2

Coinone is the third supplier-side breach in the Korean incident wave. The South Korean crypto exchange said on 15 November that an attacker broke into its customer-support contractor MetaM’s server on 12 November, and that passwords, resident registration numbers, bank account numbers, wallet addresses and transaction IDs given during support contacts may have leaked. The number affected is not yet confirmed, and Coinone says its own trading and wallet systems were not directly breached. After Monex and AXA, the pattern is now three breaches in a row that ran through a supplier. The FSI special audit starts today; the FSC’s 13 November timeline says the webshell attack on the FSI failed at 13:54 on 9 November and the attacker got in through an SMS-authentication bypass instead.

3

Patching: a new Ivanti flaw has a public exploit, N-able’s hotfix still has not shipped, and the Check Point deadline falls today. Ivanti Endpoint Manager Core CVE-2026-121653 (9.8, unauthenticated SQL injection to remote code execution) now has a public exploit reported on 12 November and entered VulnCheck’s KEV feed on 15 November — that is not CISA KEV, and it is not presented as one. A verified proof of concept also exists for the Cisco Expressway flaw CVE-2026-76466 (9.8), a catch-up from the 21 October advisory. N-able’s Hotfix 3 had still not shipped by the 15 November cutoff despite the promised morning update. The Check Point November Jumbo Hotfix federal due date is today, 16 November, for CVE-2026-123039. No new CISA KEV additions were made on 14, 15 or 16 November.

Threat actor activity

Confirmed, reported and unconfirmed items are labelled as such. No MITRE mapping is shown where the source published none.

NewConfirmed

ARTEX operators — Storm-0940, Storm-3358, VAPOR PANDA, China-nexus clusters

Financial services first, plus government, technology, defence, semiconductor, energy, healthcare, manufacturing, telecommunications and legal; South Korean banks, Southeast Asian financial institutions, crypto exchanges

TTPs
MITRE IDs published in FBI FLASH-20261113-001 (verified from the PDF — see TTP Tracker for the full phase-by-phase list). Recon: T1595, T1580, T1087.004, T1069.003, T1526. Initial access: T1190, T1078, T1133, T1195, T1199, T1606.002, T1552.001. Foothold: T1505.003, T1078.004, T1098.001, T1574.001, T1036.005, T1105, T1059. Privilege escalation: T1134.001, T1098.003, T1552.005, T1606, T1558.003. Internal recon: T1518.001, T1555, T1087.002, T1552.006, T1059.001. Lateral movement: T1550.003, T1550.002, T1021.006, T1557.001. Collection: T1114.002, T1555.006, T1530, T1005, T1074.001, T1074.002. Command and control: T1090, T1090.003, T1572, T1071.001.
Impact
Confirmed (FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 Nov; Cisco Talos, 13 Nov; SentinelOne SentinelLABS, 13 Nov; Amazon Threat Intelligence, 13 Nov). ARTEX is an open-source LLM-driven agentic penetration-testing framework, released on GitHub in July 2026 by “Autumn-27” and removed on 8 October after reports of abuse; forks and a paid ARTEX PRO keep it circulating. The FBI says a variety of criminal and state actors have used it since at least August 2026, with some intrusions going from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours. Named campaigns: financially motivated attacks on South Korean financial institutions that exfiltrated personal information of about 67,000 people, and a ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply-chain compromise that enabled access to more than 2,250 downstream tenants. More than 1,600 publicly exposed ARTEX consoles were identified in early November. Cisco Talos identified 2,500+ ARTEX-associated C2 IPs, found VShell, AdaptixC2, Mimikatz and Cobalt Strike on that infrastructure, and counts 700+ currently reachable PentAGI instances; it published Snort SIDs 67363–67374. SentinelOne counts at least five actor clusters since late August: VAPOR PANDA hit 200+ organisations in 14 countries from 17 October, with post-exploitation confirmed at nine; Storm-0940 used a compromised ConnectWise app to attempt sign-ins to 2,250+ Azure tenants; Storm-3358 targeted Southeast Asian financial institutions. One agent went from a leaked GitHub secret to Azure Key Vault data in five minutes. Criminal campaigns cost $145–$1,500 in model time and yielded 300+ signing certificates with passwords and about 190,000 gaming credentials (about 6,000 valid). Chinese models dominate operator instances, DeepSeek Flash most common. Critique: the FLASH is a consolidation of vendor reporting, not new victim disclosure — its value is the consolidated technique list and the IOC set. The “Chinese models” point is about model choice, not proof of operator nationality; Amazon assesses Chinese-nexus actors with moderate confidence and could not verify all agent-claimed outcomes. The deep-research tracker page carries the full ARTEX case file; this edition adds the FLASH mapping and the MadPot findings to it.
NewConfirmed

Unknown actor — Coinone

Crypto exchange; customer-support contractor MetaM, South Korea

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. Attacker and entry route not disclosed. Coinone said an external attacker broke into MetaM’s server at about 04:00 on 12 Nov; Coinone learned of it from the contractor at about 09:20 the same day.
Impact
Confirmed (Coinone notice, 15 Nov; Yonhap, 15 Nov — translated from Korean). The data that may have leaked is information customers gave during support chats and calls: names, email addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, bank account numbers, passwords, resident registration numbers, ID-issue dates, home addresses, wallet addresses and transaction IDs; which fields apply varies by customer. Coinone said its member-account, trading and wallet systems run separately from the contractor’s server and it has found no sign of direct intrusion into them so far. The exact number of affected customers and the precise timing are still being established with the contractor and specialist agencies. Coinone blocked the IP addresses and access routes used, moved customer support to email-only, and reported the incident to the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA), the Personal Information Protection Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service. It warned customers about voice phishing, phishing messages and identity theft using the leaked data, and advised changing passwords and checking registered withdrawal addresses. Critique: the count is unconfirmed, so do not quote one — but the data types are the worst combination in this incident wave: passwords plus bank account numbers plus resident registration numbers is direct account-takeover and identity-fraud material, and it sat in a support contractor’s system. This is the third supplier-side breach in the Korean wave after Monex and AXA.
NewConfirmed

US Treasury / FinCEN — MEXC Global cut off from the US financial system

Crypto exchange; illicit-finance plumbing used by ransomware gangs and sanctioned actors

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. Enforcement action, not an intrusion.
Impact
Confirmed (US Treasury / FinCEN action, reported 13 Nov; SentinelOne Week 46 roundup). FinCEN cut MEXC Global off from the American financial system over sanctions evasion and cybercrime ties — more than $16 billion in illicit transactions facilitated from 2021 to 2026, described as a clearinghouse for ransomware gangs, darknet activity and state-backed entities evading sanctions across Russia, Iran and North Korea. Critique: this is an enforcement action, not a breach, and it does not by itself prove any named bank touched MEXC — but fraud teams should screen MEXC-linked transfers, and the scale ($16bn over five years) makes it the largest illicit-finance plumbing action in this window.
NewConfirmed

Europol / Eurojust — Gootloader, CastleRAT and StealC takedown

Infostealer and loader infrastructure used against financial-sector targets globally

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. Enforcement action, not an intrusion.
Impact
Confirmed (Europol / Eurojust action, reported 13 Nov; SentinelOne Week 46 roundup). Authorities seized 257 domains and 235 servers powering Gootloader, CastleRAT and StealC. StealC is a credential stealer whose logs feed account-takeover and initial-access markets; Gootloader is a long-running loader used to deliver follow-on malware. Ukrainian police, with German authorities, separately dismantled a crypto-scam network that stole more than €4.3 million from European victims. Critique: a takedown disrupts infrastructure, it does not recall the credentials already harvested — stealer logs already in circulation remain usable, so the fraud risk from past StealC infections does not end with the seizure.
NewReported / unconfirmed

Pixelleaks — Koehler Financial Group, Four Points Financial Solutions, AMD Capital, Boston Institute of Finance

US financial advisory and financial-services firms

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. No intrusion detail published.
Impact
Reported — leak-site listings only, posted 15 Nov, with a publication deadline of 16 Nov 11:45 UTC (19:45 SGT today). Pixelleaks listed Koehler Financial Group Inc (financial services / insurance and investment advisory), Four Points Financial Solutions Inc (financial advisory), AMD Capital (financial services) and Boston Institute of Finance (formerly InFRE / Colibri Group), threatening to publish business, personnel and client records. No attack vector, proof of exfiltration or victim confirmation has been published. Four Points was already listed by the same group in an earlier claim carried in the 15 November edition — this appears to be a re-listing with a deadline, not a second incident. Critique: a cluster of four advisory firms in one day is a pattern worth watching, but it is still a single source — the group’s own leak site — with no data sample. Watch the 11:45 UTC deadline for any publication before treating any of the four as a breach.
NewReported / unconfirmed

Hirudo Android banking trojan — new analysis

Mobile banking users; 113 banking and payment targets across six countries, concentrated on Indonesian banks

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. Static analysis (Cyberkarta, 14 Nov): Accessibility abuse, credential theft, SMS interception, screen streaming and banking-app replacement — modified APKs with a hooking engine that replace the genuine app rather than overlaying it.
Impact
Reported — researcher analysis, not a confirmed campaign against a named bank (Cyberkarta, 14 Nov; the trojan itself was first reported on 14 October, so this is new research, not a new family). The configuration lists 113 banking and payment targets across six countries, including eight Indonesian banking apps with dedicated replacement workflows, among them BRImo (id.co.bri.brimo). It is distributed via droppers KoiShort (com.koishort.app) and ZoyaTV, with a native loader, Crabshell (libmqttx.so). Indicators in the Indicators section. Critique: the article itself says its network indicators are historical research artefacts, not verified live — treat them as hunting leads, not live IOCs. App replacement is a step beyond overlay phishing: a replaced app can capture credentials and one-time codes inside the genuine workflow, so banks should watch for sideloaded or re-signed versions of their apps.
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

Unknown actor — N-able 4EverAble2Shell / Agent2Shell

RMM platform used by MSPs serving small banks and financial firms

TTPs
MITRE IDs from a secondary summary of the chains (SockAnalyst), not vendor-published: T1190, T1072, T1136, T1552, T1496, T1068. 4EverAble2Shell: unauthenticated RCE as root on the N-central server, chaining Apache Axis CVE-2026-90436 (9.8) with a separate N-central privilege escalation (no CVE yet). Requires the Legacy API to be enabled (non-default). Agent2Shell: chains 10+ flaws to SYSTEM on managed Windows agents; also requires the Legacy API. PoCs published 12 Nov by Sean Bales, tested against Hotfix 2 (2026.4.1.26).
Impact
Update — Hotfix 3 still has not shipped. N-able said on 14 Nov that HF3 would not be available that day and promised an update on the morning of 15 Nov (US Eastern); no HF3 release had shipped by the 15 November cutoff in reporting seen (MAG212 CYBER Daily, 15 Nov). N-able says HF3 will remove Legacy API access permanently and harden authentication between components. The exploitation picture is unchanged: Huntback counted 21 production N-central servers mining XMRig, 19 of them on the Hotfix 2 build; N-able says it has seen no signs of compromise using the new flaws and has published IOCs but not confirmed the mining count. Hosted N-central is not affected and servers on HF2 with the Legacy API disabled are not exposed. Critique: the vendor’s validation timetable is now the bottleneck — every day without HF3 is a day the only solid control is the Legacy API switch, which is not the default. Check N-able’s status page before acting; do not assume HF3 has shipped.
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

Unknown actor — Korean Financial Security Institute

Financial-sector security assessment body, South Korea; assessment staff at banks, insurers, securities firms

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. New detail in-window (FSC timeline to the National Assembly, reported 13 Nov; Korean press — translated): a webshell attack at 13:54 on 9 Nov failed because of the system’s file-encryption policy; the attacker then used an SMS-authentication bypass in the member-registration process to create a fake FSS-level account. The service was stopped at 14:19 and the leak was confirmed at 15:50 the same day.
Impact
Confirmed. FSI blocked 246 attack IP addresses by 12 Nov (revised up from 236); the attacking IPs were all South Korean addresses, but the authorities caution this does not prove a domestic attack — the IPs may have been routed via South Korea from abroad. About 130 files from 48 firms leaked; confirmed data: about 200 administrative forms, about 300 personal-data items (names, birth dates) and about 350 system-user data items (masked names, mobile numbers). No sensitive security-assessment data leaked, per the FSI. The FSI apologised on 12 Nov. Seoul police cyber unit is tracing the IPs. The FSC special audit of the FSI starts today, Monday 16 November. The 850-versus-300 record counts remain unreconciled; do not pick one. Critique: the timeline is the useful part — the webshell failed and the SMS-auth bypass succeeded, which says the authentication flow, not the web server, was the weak point. The 16-firm count reported on 14 Nov still could not be reconciled with the FSC’s 14 October press release carrying the same figures — see Could not verify.
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

TraderTraitor — Binance

Crypto exchange, global

TTPs
No new MITRE list in-window.
Impact
Update — the zero-knowledge proof was formally announced on 14 Nov. Binance generated a new zero-knowledge proof for its proof-of-reserves system covering 198 tokens (snapshot 12 Nov 00:00 UTC): BTC 100.05% (688,283 BTC held against 687,912 BTC net user balances), ETH 100.02%, BNB 100.39%, USDT 104.34%, USDC 100.07%, SOL 105.86%. The proof was first seen live on the reserves page on 15 Nov without an announcement; the announcement followed on 14 Nov via an X post, saying generation for all tokens took 40–50 hours. Withdrawals have reopened on 87 networks and full reopening is aimed by about 22 November — an aim, not a guarantee, with no list of what remains. Binance has not published a final root-cause report or outside-review findings. The NEAR/PLASMA native-network conflict stands: Binance lists NEAR as reopened, but an independent same-morning read still showed NEAR native paused — treat native-network reopening as unconfirmed. Critique: the proof is a point-in-time attestation of customer-custody assets, not a third-party audit — no external accountant verifies it — and the snapshot covers the 12 Nov position, so it says nothing about the current state of the stolen funds; the Justice Department’s figures ($2.7bn frozen, $1.2bn+ authorised for seizure or restraint) remain the only independent measure.
Update — previously coveredReported / unconfirmed

N0n — Steeden Financial

Financial services and insurance firm, Canada

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. No intrusion detail published.
Impact
Update — the listing now carries a data claim. N0n’s Steeden Financial listing (14 Nov) now claims a client database with more than 600,000 distinct email addresses and client and family records including Social Insurance Numbers, marked “[NOT PAID — EXPOSED]”. That volume claim was not in the listing as read for the 15 November edition. No data sample or company confirmation has been reported, and the claimed data has not been independently verified. MM Insurance Agency (also listed 14 Nov) has no new development. Critique: treat the claim as low-confidence. Bitdefender’s November Threat Debrief found N0n inflated its victim count — its exposed file server suggested it actually targeted just over 20 victims, versus 100+ listed — and says it has high confidence N0n is not the top-tier operation its leak site suggests.
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

Unknown actor — State Bank of India (FIR filed)

State Bank of India; Global IT Centre server

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. No intrusion detail published beyond the FIR account.
Impact
Update — a police case was registered on 12 Nov over the same October incident. The FIR, at CBD-Belapur police station, says unidentified persons linked to a group called “Siriusim” accessed SBI’s Global IT Centre server between 10 and 15 October; 32 CSV files holding 375,000 records, plus JSON files and 2,721–2,722 PDFs (personal data, loan applications, account-opening forms); the data was spotted on the dark web in October. SBI says it had the data taken down and has no evidence of misuse so far. This is the same incident SBI disclosed on 21 October — not a new breach. Conflict — flag: 375,000 is the size of the record pool examined; SBI’s preliminary analysis identified about 3,897 customer records, and FIR-based reporting cites about 4,280 customers’ sensitive personal data. Do not pick one.
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

FaceStealer — no new facts

Crypto / Web3 and open-source developers; no named bank targeted

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published in the sources read.
Impact
Status — the FBI/DOJ disruption of the North Korean “FaceStealer” scheme (more than $400m stolen over 18 months via fake video calls; 900+ victim webcam videos seized; court authorisation to seize or restrain more than $1.2bn of the Binance theft, within more than $2.7bn frozen) was announced 12 Nov and covered in the 13 November edition. No new facts appeared in-window. The FBI notes the scheme still “overwhelmingly” relies on genuine stolen video, with AI-generated deepfakes of crypto executives increasingly used. Critique: this is an AI-as-weapon item, not a bank campaign, and the $400m figure covers the whole scheme, not deepfakes alone.
No new development in-window: ScreenConnect SCKit (no new wave in-window); Crédit Mutuel Arkéa (chairman interview adds timeline detail — see AI in the current threat landscape — no new technical development); Storm-1175 — Insight Credit Union and Sawyer Savings Bank; Bank SinoPac (full report still unconfirmed as filed); Caixa Vida e Previdência; Tesouro Nacional; KB Capital; Flybit; SMBC Nikko Securities; Seven Bank; Mirae Asset Securities; Philippine SEC; Bank Rakyat; INC Ransom — Raymond James Financial, Game Changer Wealth, JETS Jamaica (claims still unverified); INC Ransom — Shenwan Hongyuan (H.K.) and StrucSure Home Warranty (claims still unverified); AXA Direct Japan, Monex Securities, KOMSCO, KBIZ and Vietnam CIC (covered in the 15 November edition, no new development in-window); YES Bank denial and Tamil Nadu arrests (covered 15 Nov, no new development); TodoPago, Endzone and Payoutsking (claims still unverified); Bank of Khartoum (Bankak allegations, still unconfirmed); wfx-loot (no new development in-window); CSC Telecom (no new development in-window). Absence of reporting is not evidence of absence of activity.

Vulnerability watchlist

No new CISA KEV additions were made on 14, 15 or 16 November. The catalogue stands at 1,781 entries (version 2026.11.13). The two 13 November additions (CVE-2026-123039 Check Point, CVE-2026-114713 UnrealIRCd) fall due today, 16 November, and are not carried as rows: both were covered in earlier editions and there is no new attribution, IOC or PoC — a due date alone is not a new development under the standing rule. The Check Point November Jumbo Hotfix remains a live patching action (see Indicators & defensive actions).

CVE IDCVSS scoreAffected productExploitation status (PoC / in the wild)Relevance to finance
CVE-2026-121653 — NEW, public exploit reported9.8Ivanti Endpoint Manager Core, 2024 SU7 and earlierPublic PoC — in-the-wild exploitation not confirmedUnauthenticated SQL injection leading to remote code execution on the endpoint-management server. Fix: EPM 2024 SU8; no workaround published. Ivanti notes it is not externally exploitable in dual-NIC deployments and says it is not aware of any customers being exploited. A public exploit was reported on 12 Nov, and VulnCheck added the CVE to its KEV feed on 15 Nov — that is VulnCheck’s feed, not CISA KEV; do not present it as a CISA listing. Not in CISA KEV. The specific PoC repository URL could not be established from the sources read — do not link a repo for this CVE. Sibling critical in the same 10 Nov batch: CVE-2026-121683 (9.4, missing authentication in Cloud Services Appliance 5.0.8 only; fix 5.0.8.1). EPM Core is the management server for bank endpoints; unauthenticated RCE on it is a full-compromise path.
CVE-2026-76466 — NEW, catch-up9.8Cisco Expressway, clustered Expressway-C / Expressway-E, X15.5.3 and earlierPublic PoC — exploitation not confirmedCatch-up — Cisco advisory 21 Oct; PoC repository created 5 Nov; press coverage 12 Nov; never covered in a prior edition. Hard-coded credentials (CWE-798): a TLS 1.3 connection to TCP/4372, an Erlang distribution handshake as wombat@127.0.0.1 with the hard-coded cookie wombat, then rpc:call(os, cmd) as root. Fix: X15.5.20; X14 and earlier must migrate; no workaround. Validated only on Expressway-C X15.3.2, a two-node cluster in TLS Permissive mode (the factory default); TLS Enforcing mode is untested. Not in CISA KEV; Cisco PSIRT is aware of no malicious use. PoC: GitHub dinosn/cve-2026-76466 (Nicolas Krassas, created 5 Nov; exploit, fleet detector and docs — verified genuine). Do not link the Feedly-listed copy emirwtz/CVE-2026-76466 — not verified. Expressway is video-conferencing edge in banks; restrict TCP/4371–4372 to cluster peers until patched.
CVE-2026-126173 — NEW9.8AutomatorWP Pro Webhooks add-on ≤ 1.4.4Public PoC — in-the-wild exploitation not confirmedMissing authorisation in the webhook handler lets an unauthenticated remote attacker reset any user’s password, including administrators. Published 14 Nov (Wordfence CNA); public PoC published the same day. PoC: GitHub im0xfay/CVE-2026-126173 (created 14 Nov; contains poc.py, a Docker lab and analysis — verified genuine, but it is a third-party reproducer, not the original discoverer’s repo; the README is in Indonesian and it includes mass-scan and mass-exploit modes plus a claimed live run against two FOFA targets on 14 Nov — the mass-exploit tooling is the risk escalator). No fixed version was listed at publication. PatchCVE’s claim of “public exploitation activity reported” is an unverified aggregator assertion — treat as unconfirmed. Not in CISA KEV. Bank marketing and content WordPress sites running this add-on face admin takeover, defacement and customer phishing.
CVE-2026-19907 — NEW9.8Shipo WordPress plugin 1.6–1.8.0No PoC reportedUnauthenticated admin authentication bypass: authenticate_rest_user() trusts a username taken from the LOGGED_IN_COOKIE without validating its signature, so knowing a username (for example admin) is enough. Disclosed 14 Nov (Wordfence CNA). No PoC reported; not in CISA KEV. The WordPress directory offers 1.8.4, but its changelog does not name this CVE — the fixed version is not independently confirmed. Same WordPress-site caveat as the AutomatorWP flaw, but no PoC and a narrower plugin.
CVE-2026-124969 — NEW, brief note7.1Optimole WordPress plugin ≤ 4.2.19No PoC reportedUnauthenticated arbitrary file deletion (via comment_content / comment_agent during attachment rename) that can lead to remote code execution by deleting wp-config.php; it needs PEAR Archive_Tar present and a subsequent admin rename action. Published 14 Nov. No PoC; not in CISA KEV.
CVE-2026-20320 — STATUS, vendor walk-back— not stated in sources readCisco BroadWorksIn the Wild (KEV) — vendor evidence softenedCisco advisory v1.2, dated 13 Nov, corrected the record: Cisco states it does not have direct evidence of active exploitation, walking back the 12 Nov update that reflected known active exploitation. The CISA KEV listing (added 10 Nov) stands. Treat the exploitation picture as contested between the KEV listing and the vendor’s own evidence position.
4EverAble2Shell / Agent2Shell — CVE-2026-90436 + VULN-2026-0009 — STATUS, no fix as of 15 Nov9.8 (CVE-2026-90436)N-able N-central (on-premises servers with Legacy API enabled)Exploitation claimed — contested (see actors)Status — no fix as of 15 Nov. Follow-up hotfix HF3 was still in validation on 14 Nov; N-able said it would not be available that day and promised an update on the morning of 15 Nov (US Eastern); no HF3 release had shipped by the 15 November cutoff in reporting seen. N-able says HF3 will remove Legacy API access permanently. 4EverAble2Shell chains Apache Axis CVE-2026-90436 (9.8) with a separate N-central privilege escalation (Previdian VULN-2026-0009, no CVE yet) to unauthenticated root on the server; it requires the Legacy API to be enabled (non-default). Agent2Shell chains 10+ flaws to SYSTEM on managed Windows agents. Huntback counted 21 production N-central servers mining XMRig, 19 of them on the Hotfix 2 build; N-able says it has seen no signs of compromise using the new flaws and has published IOCs but not confirmed the mining count. PoC repo: MSPNightmare/CVEs — N-Central N-Able (GitHub) — genuine researcher disclosure (Sean Bales), with Previdian’s caveat that the public PoC is unverified and may contain malware. RMM used by MSPs serving small banks; a Hotfix-2 bypass with claimed live exploitation is a live patching and hunting priority. Disable the Legacy API; hunt the IOCs in Indicators.
CVE-2026-109618 / 109619 (PHP2Shell) — STATUS, Siemens downstream notices9.2PHP; PAN-OS and other network/security products; Check Point Security GatewaysIn the WildNew in-window development: Siemens confirmed PHP2Shell affects RUGGEDCOM APE1808 running PAN-OS and several building-automation and energy products (SSA-566512; CISA ICSA-26-316-05) — industrial, not BFSI, so one line only. The Lazarus targeting discussion (Cyperma via Yonhap, 15 Nov 08:43 SGT) was covered in the 15 November edition; the attribution is Cyperma’s, reported not independently confirmed. Check Point’s detail adds that the TSGA/TSProxy implants are linked to the PhiliKit toolset (which ESET ties to UNC5221), but Check Point says it “cannot assess the operation with high confidence”. GreyNoise telemetry reported in the 13 Nov afternoon deep-research check shows PHP2Shell exploitation continued through 12 Nov. The Check Point campaign detail is unchanged: attackers chained PHP2Shell in the Mobile Access Portal with CVE-2026-123039 to gain root on unpatched gateways, planted the TSGA backdoor, pivoted to a VMware ESXi host and ran a wiper — “a couple of dozen” systems in one region. Both fixes are in the November Jumbo Hotfix. The PHP2Shell fix had been available since 23 Oct — the one-week patch lag is the lesson. Keep management interfaces off the internet; apply the November Jumbo Hotfix. IOCs: 130.94.19[.]204, 130.94.19[.]168; upload_progress_pwn string in PHP session files; process masquerading as CPconfigdaemon; DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes.
CVE-2026-121529 (“Fortinet2Shell”) — STATUS, PoC count upCritical (no CVSS figure in sources read)FortiClientMac 7.4.0–7.4.7; FortiClientWindows 7.4.0–7.4.7 and 7.2.0–7.2.14Public exploit — in-the-wild exploitation not reportedNew in-window detail: the public PoC count is now five GitHub repositories per cve.now (the 13 November edition listed two). Still no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation; not in CISA KEV. Origin-validation flaw, unauthenticated remote code execution on FortiClient endpoints. PSIRT FG-IR-26-194. FortiClient is the endpoint agent on bank staff machines; an unauthenticated RCE with a public exploit is a patching priority.
CVE-2026-6460 — NEW, catch-up8.8PostgreSQL 14–18 (flaw dates to 2004)Public partial PoC — in-the-wild exploitation not reportedCatch-up — patch published 12 Nov, researcher write-up 13 Nov; missed by the 14 November edition. A type-confusion flaw in PostgreSQL core (composite types plus ALTER TYPE between PREPARE and EXECUTE) lets an authenticated database user with object-creation privileges execute arbitrary code as the OS user running the database server. CVSS 8.8. It was one of 52 flaws fixed in the 12 Nov release (32 scored 8.8); the researcher traces the primitive to May 2004 — effectively every PostgreSQL since then. Researcher Mehmet Ince published the crash PoC and address-leak steps on 13 Nov and deliberately withheld the final RCE step, so there is a public partial PoC, not a copy-paste weapon. Full protection also requires rebuilding C-language extensions. PostgreSQL 14 is now end-of-life (14.25 is its last release). Sibling flaw CVE-2026-116322 lets an unauthenticated client trigger a restart of PostgreSQL 18 servers (denial of service). Not in CISA KEV. PostgreSQL underpins many banking and fintech stacks; authenticated RCE as the database OS user is a high-priority patch.
Citrix NetScaler November batch — STATUS, CVE records 13 Nov9.5 (highest)NetScaler ADC, NetScaler Gateway, NetScaler Console, Secure Access Client (Windows/Linux)Not known exploited — no PoC reportedStatus — the CVE records for the batch were published 13 Nov; no new development in this window. SecurityWeek counts 28 fixes, nine critical; SecurityOnline said four bulletins fixing 31 CVEs; The Hacker News said 12 flaws. The count is still unresolved between sources — do not pick one. Headline flaws: CVE-2026-107412 (9.5, memory flaw); CVE-2026-120868 (9.3, memory overflow in packet processing, affects all ADC/Gateway deployments); CVE-2026-120869 (9.4, improper authentication in NetScaler Console, unauthenticated bypass of authentication to access restricted resources — adjacent-network, needs Console IP access); CVE-2026-118268 (8.5, Secure Access Client for Windows privilege escalation to SYSTEM) and CVE-2026-118269 (Linux equivalent). Fixes: ADC/Gateway 14.1-73.57 and 13.1-64.39; Console 14.1-74.34. Citrix says it is not aware of any exploits for the announced vulnerabilities. Separately, CitrixBleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777) is still actively exploited — OffSeq honeypots recorded 316,950 exploitation attempts from 19 source IPs in the last 30 days, last seen 13 Nov 21:41 UTC (14 Nov 05:41 SGT), with DragonForce ransomware as the severe outcome in past cases.
CVE-2026-119618 — STATUS, PoC verified as crash-only9.8 (Red Hat) / no CVSS yet (NVD)Apache HTTP Server 2.4.55–2.4.70; standalone mod_h2 2.0.8–2.0.42Public PoC — in-the-wild exploitation not confirmedNo new development in-window. The third-party research PoC (GitHub googlesky/CVE-2026-119618, created 12 Nov) was verified directly on GitHub in the 14 November edition. It reproduces heap corruption and ASan crashes on 2.4.70 and clean behaviour on 2.4.71, with a containerised lab and ASan/TSan evidence — but it does not demonstrate code execution. Conflict — flag: Red Hat scores the CVE 9.8 and says public research demonstrates a reliable exploit against a default-configured server; Sysdig (13 Nov) and Abijita (12 Nov) both stress there is no public RCE PoC and no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation as of 12–13 Nov, and the CVE is not in CISA KEV. Treat exploitation status as “public PoC now exists; it demonstrates heap corruption, not code execution; in-the-wild exploitation not confirmed”. Nine GitHub repos now carry the CVE name, including two new labs on 13 Nov that were not verified — do not link them. Race condition in mod_http2 assign_headers(). Fixed in httpd 2.4.71; disabling HTTP/2 is a mitigation.
CVE-2026-124194 — STATUS, Patch Tuesday follow-up6.5Microsoft Outlook (NTLMv2 hash disclosure)In the Wild (KEV)No new development in-window. November Patch Tuesday is the largest on record by Qualys’s count — 1,252 CVEs this month (Qualys, 13 Nov). Conflict — flag: Microsoft’s own count differs (1,362 CVEs across 27 updates per other trackers) and Tenable counted 1,093 — a counting-method difference between trackers, not a new item. About 35% of November patches carried a Low reliability rating in Qualys’s assessment as of 11 Nov. Outlook CVE-2026-124194 remains the exploited item in the batch. Microsoft confirmed the Windows 11 update KB5132061 fails to install on some devices that took the October non-security preview KB5127936, and KB5131085 (Windows 10 / Server 2019) is reported to break Exchange — both affect deployment planning.
CVE-2026-127063 — carried9.3DataComm RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnectNot known exploited — no PoC reportedNo change in-window. “The third-party RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect uses a static API secret by default.” Caveat: the CVE wording (“static API secret”) differs from Huntress’s account of a blank access key accepted when none was configured — treat as the same extension weakness pending vendor confirmation. This is the extension weakness behind the SCKit worm. Check RMM+ versions 1.0.31/1.0.32 and remove or re-key the extension.
Able2Shell — seven CVEs — carried9.3 (highest)N-able N-centralPoC public — exploitation of new chains claimed, contestedNo change in-window except the 4EverAble2Shell row above. Original Able2Shell (9 Nov): researcher Sean Bales published PoC code for 33 alleged N-central flaws. Hotfix N-central 2026.4 HF2 (build 2026.4.1.26), released 10 Nov, fixes seven CVEs: CVE-2026-125883 (XXE, 9.3), CVE-2026-125878 (OGNL injection), CVE-2026-125879, CVE-2026-125880, CVE-2026-125881 (SSRF), CVE-2026-125882 (RCE via path traversal), CVE-2026-91000. All hosted servers upgraded by 11 Nov 01:04 UTC. The Able2Shell PoC repository (Oracle-Security/CVEs, path “0-Days/N-Central N-Able”, 26 Python PoC scripts) is a genuine researcher disclosure — linkable as the PoC source, with the caveat that N-able has not validated all 33 findings.
CVE-2026-123864 — carriedHigh (no CVSS published)Node.js 22.x / 24.x / 26.x (HTTPS servers)Not known exploited — no PoC reportedNo change in-window. HTTPS heap-memory disclosure: a zero-length TLS write re-enters the HTTP parser, and the server copies other connections’ heap memory — including TLS private keys and other users’ requests — into a request body. Fixed in 26.13.1 / 24.22.3 / 22.23.5. Node.js published no CVSS scores and lists no workarounds — upgrade only.
Node.js batch — six further High — carriedHigh (no CVSS published)Node.js 22.x / 24.x / 26.xNot known exploited — no PoC reportedNo change in-window. CVE-2026-123863, CVE-2026-123865, CVE-2026-123866, CVE-2026-123872, CVE-2026-123874, CVE-2026-126051 (HTTP/2 and TLS memory disclosure / DoS / use-after-free). Six Medium and three Low complete the 16-CVE release. Node.js states 16 CVEs; one aggregator lists 17 IDs — report Node.js’s count.
CVE-2026-126263 — carried9.8FortiMail 8.0.0–8.0.1, 7.6.0–7.6.4, 7.4.0–7.4.6Not known exploited — no PoC reportedNo change in-window. SQL injection (CWE-89): an authenticated attacker can execute unauthorised code/commands via crafted requests. Fixed in 8.0.2 / 7.6.7 / 7.4.7; FortiMail Cloud already remediated. Internally discovered with the Frontier AI model Claude Mythos.
CVE-2026-126155 — carried9.1FortiMail 8.0.0–8.0.1, 7.6.0–7.6.6, 7.4.0–7.4.8, 7.2 all versionsNot known exploited — no PoC reportedNo change in-window. Incorrect authorisation (CWE-863): an unauthenticated remote attacker can obtain an authenticated IBE webmail session as any IBE recipient and read or send their encrypted mail. Fixed in 8.0.2 / 7.6.7 / 7.4.9; 7.2 must migrate to a fixed release; FortiMail Cloud remediated 5 Oct.
VSA-2026-062 (no CVE ID yet) — carried— no CVSS assignedXen Orchestra / Xen Orchestra ApplianceActively exploitedNo change in-window. Empty-object login token gives Admin privilege; full XCP-ng host takeover as root. Fixed in Xen Orchestra 6.9.1 / 6.10.0. IOCs: 91.211.251.112:8001 and Tor domain ustar3rqxgnskzgnwkgpofgtvxevm6cx3lxdbwt4mndtveqyaohid.onion:3333.
SAP November Patch Day — four CVSS 10.0 — carried10.0SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP / Web Dispatcher / GatewayNot known exploitedNo change in-window. CVE-2026-76964 (ICM memory corruption, unauthenticated RCE — “ICM2SHELL”), CVE-2026-89126 (Web Dispatcher memory corruption, unauthenticated RCE), CVE-2026-89103 (Gateway broken access control), CVE-2026-120017 (SAML2 missing authentication). Patch internet-facing systems first.
Fortinet batch — eight criticals — STATUS, public PoC for CVE-2026-1261709.8–9.0FortiOS / FortiManager / FortiAnalyzer / FortiSASEPublic PoC — exploitation not confirmedNew in-window development: a public proof of concept for the worst flaw, CVE-2026-126170 (9.8, JSON-RPC API, unauthenticated remote code execution on FortiManager/FortiAnalyzer), has been verified on GitHub (Ghost-Bx1/cve-2026-126170-fortimanager-jsonrpc-rce, created 11 Nov, contains working exploit.py and poc.py — genuine, not a lure); the NVD record was modified 14 Nov. Conflict — flag: PatchCVE states public exploitation activity has been reported, while Fortinet’s advisory says exploitation was not known at publication and cve.now says “public exploit code, no confirmed attacks”; the CVE is not in CISA KEV. Do not present exploitation as confirmed. The JSON-RPC API is disabled by default; the workaround is set rpc-permit none. Fixed in FortiOS 7.2.14/7.4.13/7.6.8/8.0.2 and FortiManager/FortiAnalyzer 7.2.13/7.4.12/7.6.8/8.0.2 — some fixes still “upcoming”; apply the FortiGuard virtual patch, keep OFTP/FGFM ports off the internet.
Microsoft November Patch Tuesday — carriedUp to 9.9Microsoft enterprise stack (Exchange, SharePoint, SQL Server, AD, LDAP, DNS)One exploited (Outlook CVE-2026-124194 — see row above)No change in-window. 1,094 newly released CVEs per Microsoft (Qualys counts 1,252 for the month; Tenable counts 1,093 — counting-method differences, flagged not resolved). Notable criticals, none reported exploited: SharePoint CVE-2026-120002 (9.9); SQL Server CVE-2026-116945 (9.8); Windows Search CVE-2026-116928 (9.8, zero-click); LDAP CVE-2026-119958 (9.8, zero-click, unauthenticated); Windows DNS CVE-2026-88218 (9.8); iSCSI CVE-2026-88234 (9.8); Exchange CVE-2026-118207 (8.8); AD DS CVE-2026-118146 (8.8); Schannel CVE-2026-119952 (8.1). Tenable notes the exploited Outlook CVE was discovered by a researcher using Claude.
CVE-2026-88771 — carried9.5 / 9.8*Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler GatewayIn the Wild (KEV)No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 Nov). Unauthenticated pre-auth command injection as root via attacker-controlled text written to appliance logs, later executed by maintenance script ns_monuploadd_err.pl — execution can lag the request by up to 24 hours. In KEV since 27 Sept. Fixed in 14.1-73.37 and 13.1-64.23. Patching does not remove existing implants. *CVSS v4.0 9.5 (Citrix) vs v3.1 9.8 (NVD).
CVE-2026-76443 — carried9.8Cisco Secure Email Gateway and Secure Email and Web Manager, 15.5 and earlierIn the Wild (KEV, sibling)No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 Nov). Rapid7 describes the module as an S/MIME/email-parsing SQL injection leading to unauthenticated root RCE — treat the CVE mapping as Rapid7’s, not Cisco’s. The actively exploited zero-day in the same family is sibling CVE-2026-76461 (9.8, in KEV since 14 Sept).
CVE-2026-97229 — carried10.0GitLab CE / EEIn the Wild (KEV)No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 Nov). CI/CD RegExp integer-overflow RCE as the git user; authenticated, requiring write access to a public project. In KEV since 29 Oct.
CVE-2026-119977 — carried8.1 / Low*WordPress core 4.7.0–7.1.3In the Wild (attempts)No change in-window. 240,000+ blocked attempts (peaking at 74,000+ on 30 Oct). Still no victim publicly named and no confirmed compromise. Fix 7.1.4 / backport; block web access to wp-content/upgrade/ before updating. Public PoC: lysophavin18/CVE-2026-119977 (GitHub). A second repo claiming to bypass the 7.1.4 fix holds no code, only a download link — flagged as a likely malware lure, do not download. *Wordfence 8.1 vs WordPress Low.
CVE-2026-107441 — carried8.8 (Zyxel) / 9.8*Zyxel GS1900 series switches, ten models, web management interfaceIn the Wild (zero-day)No change in-window. June fix added a check that ran after the unsafe copy in /cgi-bin/dispatcher.cgi, so June-patched firmware stayed exploitable. Payloads: Jitterly backdoor and Sixzut rootkit; suspected Chinese-speaking actor Kapibala/Red Heron (attribution via Binarly/Acronis, not independently verified). *Secondary analysis rates it 9.8. Not in KEV as of 7 Nov. Fix: 22 Oct firmware; change default credentials.
CVE-2026-109593 / 109594 — carried9.1 / 6.8SonicWall Global Management System 9.5.2 and earlier (end-of-life)Not reported exploited in-windowNo change in-window. 109593 critical (9.1): unauthenticated information disclosure via internal file reads. 109594 medium (6.8): high-privilege SQL injection. SonicWall will not patch — migrate to Network Security Manager.
CVE-2026-72898 — carried10.0Metabase 58+ (free and paid editions)In the WildNo change in-window. CSA Singapore warned 4 Nov that this SQL-injection flaw, fixed 6 Aug and on KEV since 11 Aug, is actively exploited and a PoC is public. Public PoC: 4minx/CVE-2026-72898 (GitHub), referenced in CSA alert AL-2026-158. Safe releases: 58.24, 59.21, 60.17, 61.11, 62.9, 63.5+.
CVE-2026-40217 — carried8.8LiteLLM proxyIn the Wild (LLMjacking)No change in-window. User-ID rebind to PROXY_ADMIN. Update LiteLLM, lock endpoints off the internet, rotate keys.
CVE-2026-98432 — carried9.8Linux kernel IPv4 TCP, 4.4+Research exploit onlyNo change in-window. Demonstrated exploit needs MPTCP; RHEL fixed kernels require reboot, Ubuntu was still in -proposed on 3 Nov.
CVE-2026-58115 — carried10.0Node-RED / Siemens IoT2050In the WildNo change in-window. Port 1880 without adminAuth remains an active target. Siemens scope revision noted 8 Nov (more SIMATIC IoT2050 models).
CVE-2026-111497 — carried9.2Google Brotli; Cisco and Splunk products (Node2Shell)In the Wild (KEV)No change in-window. Scope as of 5 Nov: 19 Cisco products affected, dozens under investigation, about a dozen Splunk products also affected. Same Brotli root cause also affects ClickHouse. KEV federal due date fell 10 November, but per the KEV rule a deadline alone is not a new development. Qualys published detection/verification guidance for PHP2Shell and Node2Shell on 12 Nov (four non-intrusive QIDs, two intrusive verification QIDs) and reports 167 million PHP installations across 10,000+ customers; attackers probed PHP2Shell four days before a patch existed.

Showing all 34 watchlist rows.

Supply chain & third-party risk

Vendor, SaaS and service-provider exposure affecting financial organisations.

Cursor / Fireworks AI — NEW (13 Nov update)

Cursor said on 13 November that an access key it issued to Fireworks AI was “exposed by Fireworks”. The attacker copied a read-only bucket of historical coding-agent traces (mostly 2025, non-Privacy-Mode sessions), found a small number of unredacted credentials inside, reached some internal SaaS tools, and on 29 October placed malicious copies of Anthropic’s Claude Code extension (versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313) in the cache serving Cursor’s VS Code extension marketplace — live for about 11 hours (02:27–13:35 PDT), with up to 5,000 users potentially receiving the malicious build. Fewer than 0.05% of users had traces exposed and fewer than 0.01% of customers had API credentials exposed. The last attacker activity was 1 November and is blocked; Cursor moved all inference off Fireworks, revoked the key and rebuilt the marketplace. Fireworks’ own 9 November bulletin does not mention Cursor, and it is not public which of Fireworks’ two intrusions exposed the key.

The same Fireworks incident reached Notion: Fireworks confirmed on 8 November that customer data had been accessed, and Notion disclosed on 11 November that the exposed data included Notion AI chat transcripts used for its Insights feature, in fewer than 1% of workspaces. Notion cut traffic to Fireworks, deleted its data from the vendor’s systems, disabled Insights and advised affected users to rotate credentials entered into the chats. Fireworks had contractually committed to zero data retention for Notion data — the disclosures do not explain why the Insights dataset was held.

Critique: a textbook AI-supply-chain cascade — a vendor key became a developer-tooling compromise, which became a marketplace poisoning. Banks using AI coding assistants should check extension versions and treat agent-trace stores as credential stores, and should treat a vendor’s breach notice as their own exposure event: Notion learned its data was exposed only when Fireworks handed over the dataset.

Coinone / MetaM — the breach ran through a support contractor (NEW)

Coinone’s breach ran through MetaM, the contractor that runs its customer support. Passwords, resident registration numbers, bank account numbers and wallet addresses given during support chats and calls may have leaked, while Coinone says its own account, trading and wallet systems were not directly breached. It is the third supplier-side breach in the Korean wave, after Monex’s third-party account-opening system and AXA’s roadside-assistance provider.

Critique: the pattern peers should be checking is which outsourced systems hold customer credentials and identity documents — a support desk is a credential store, and it was outside the firm’s own perimeter. Coinone moved support to email-only; that is containment, not a fix for the data already exposed.

Apify — STATUS (13 Nov incident report)

Apify published its incident report on 13 November for the breach disclosed on 11 November (unauthorised access 9–10 November, detected 11 November 12:13 UTC; about 80,000 customers). The report confirms the attacker used a compromised credential to reach internal systems and customer accounts; API tokens are now stored only as hashes and internal network restrictions were tightened. A secondary summary publishes a MITRE mapping for the incident (T1078, T1078.004, T1528, T1530, T1552) — that mapping is from the secondary source, not the vendor, and is flagged as such in the TTP Tracker.

Critique: the breach itself is pre-window; the report is the in-window item. A compromised credential reaching customer accounts on a scraping platform is an API-token risk that banks should read alongside the ARTEX key-theft campaign — the same credential class, harvested at a different layer.

ScreenConnect and N-able — MSP supply chain (status)

No new SCKit wave was found in this window, and N-able’s follow-up hotfix HF3 still has not shipped. Both RMM stories remain supply-chain stories first: a compromised MSP panel reaches straight into customer networks. Firms should ask their providers whether they run ScreenConnect with the RMM+ extension and whether they run N-central with the Legacy API enabled, and hunt for RelayTrap, the TrapWatch task and the N-central IOCs in the Indicators section.

Arara — no new development in-window

Osaka City’s disclosure of 1,078,713 email addresses leaked via the Arara email-delivery platform was covered in the 15 November edition; no new development appeared in this window. The platform’s 6 Nov third report put the total at 81,329,467 email addresses (deduplicated) across up to about 380 client companies; another source cites about 77 million — the two totals conflict, do not merge them. The same platform was abused 28–30 Oct to send up to about 7.13 million phishing emails impersonating a credit-card company.

CSC Telecom — no new development in-window

The open database that exposed 125 million+ SMS messages, including Swedbank account details and one-time codes, has no new development in this window. Swedbank has stopped using the provider and opened an investigation; CERT.LV is investigating. No evidence anyone other than researchers read the data; no confirmed account takeovers or financial loss.

Emerging fraud & attack vectors

Account takeover, mobile banking trojans, infostealers, DDoS extortion and vishing/smishing.

Hirudo Android banking trojan — NEW (analysis, 14 Nov)

A static analysis published on 14 November describes Hirudo, an Android banking remote-access trojan that uses Accessibility abuse, credential theft, SMS interception and screen streaming — and replaces the genuine banking app with a modified APK carrying a hooking engine, rather than overlaying a fake login screen. Its configuration lists 113 banking and payment targets across six countries, including eight Indonesian banking apps with dedicated replacement workflows, among them BRImo. It is distributed via the droppers KoiShort and ZoyaTV, with a native loader called Crabshell. Indicators are in the Indicators section.

Critique: the trojan itself was first reported on 14 October, so this is new research on a known family, not a new family — and the article says its network indicators are historical research artefacts, not verified live. The point that matters is the method: a replaced app captures credentials and one-time codes inside the genuine workflow, so signature and app-integrity checks matter more than overlay detection for these targets.

Phishing watches — Coinone, SBI, FSI, Monex, AXA (ongoing)

Coinone’s leaked passwords, resident registration numbers, bank account numbers and wallet addresses are now voice-phishing and account-takeover material — expect calls and messages purporting to come from Coinone, and customers should check registered withdrawal addresses. The SBI FIR names a group, “Siriusim”, and confirms loan-application and account-opening data was in the stolen set — expect phishing citing SBI loan and account-opening details. The FSI special audit starts today — expect phishing citing the FSI or the evaluation process, using the real assessment-staff contact details and firm names from the leak. Monex’s 1.13 million email addresses and AXA’s about 597,000 accounts remain impersonation material, as do KOMSCO’s chak-user details and KBIZ’s Yellow Umbrella details (KOMSCO warned of voice-phishing and smishing; KBIZ warned of impersonation and loan fraud). Arara’s leaked shareholder emails are live phishing bait, and the same platform was already abused to send about 7.13 million phishing emails impersonating a credit-card company. The Tesouro Nacional leak (names, CPFs, Pix keys) and Caixa’s leaked CPFs are impersonation material for 7.6 million-plus people. SMBC Nikko’s leaked holdings and account details are impersonation material for shareholders. Mirae Asset’s leak gives attackers 3,800 customer account numbers plus names, emails and mobiles of 35,255 employees. Binance, Mercado Bitcoin, Gopax and Nubank/Mercado Pago outage messages remain live phishing bait, and the Microsoft 365 outage credential-phishing campaign (sender domains moments-notice.com, planetmaison.com, newbooker.com) continues — verify via official status pages only. Watch for Rs 1 test transactions on compromised accounts.

FinCEN MEXC cut-off — fraud-team note (NEW)

FinCEN cut the MEXC Global crypto exchange off from the US financial system over more than $16 billion in illicit transactions from 2021 to 2026, described as a clearinghouse for ransomware gangs, darknet activity and state-backed sanctions evasion. Fraud teams should screen MEXC-linked transfers; the action is already in the 15 November edition’s action list and is repeated here because the cut-off is new in-window.

FaceStealer — no new facts (status)

The FBI/DOJ disruption of the North Korean “FaceStealer” scheme (more than $400m stolen over 18 months via fake video calls; 900+ victim webcam videos seized) was announced 12 Nov and covered in the 13 November edition; no new facts appeared in-window. The FBI notes the scheme still “overwhelmingly” relies on genuine stolen video, with AI-generated deepfakes of crypto executives increasingly used. Targets are crypto/Web3 and open-source developers — no named bank targeted — so this is an AI-as-weapon item, not a bank campaign. The $400m figure covers the whole scheme, not deepfakes alone.

Bank of Khartoum — no new development in-window

Customer allegations of thefts from Bank of Khartoum accounts via the Bankak mobile banking app remain reported / unconfirmed: more than 50 traders and customers in West Kordofan claim millions of Sudanese pounds were stolen, with individual reported losses of SDG 18–45 million. The bank has still not responded to comment requests, and no technical evidence that the app itself was breached has been published. Treat as an allegation, not a confirmed bank breach.

No new DDoS-extortion item in-window

No new DDoS-extortion item targeting a financial institution was found in this window. The CSC Telecom open database (125 million+ SMS messages including Swedbank one-time codes) was published on 11 November, outside the window, and has no new development.

TTP tracker — threat actors and key vulnerabilities

Techniques actually published for this edition’s actors and key vulnerabilities. No mapping is shown where the source published none. The FBI FLASH-20261113-001 is the first consolidated MITRE mapping for ARTEX carried in this briefing series.

MITRE technique IDTechnique / behaviourSeen in this editionBFSI relevance / detection noteStatus
T1595, T1580, T1087.004, T1069.003, T1526Active scanning; cloud infrastructure discovery; cloud account discovery; cloud groups discovery; cloud service discoveryARTEX initial recon — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 NovSub-second Azure capability checks of SAS tokens, service principals, Kudu and storage-account keys; test blob write/delete; ARM deployment dry-runs; AWS DryRun probes; WHOIS asset mapping; fuzzing across 500+ requests; lookups to api.db-ip[.]com. Detect on bursts of capability checks and dry-run calls from a single source against cloud APIs.Confirmed
T1190, T1078, T1133, T1195, T1199, T1606.002, T1552.001Exploit public-facing application; valid accounts; external remote services; supply chain compromise; trusted relationship; forge SAML tokens; credentials in filesARTEX initial access — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 NovUnsigned SAML assertions, XXE, anonymous file upload, SSRF, hardcoded administrator passwords in SPA JavaScript bundles, missing authentication on web APIs, command injection, SSTI, SQL injection, authentication bypass, stolen VPN configurations and leaked credentials. Direct: the ConnectWise supply-chain route reached 2,250+ downstream tenants through trusted relationships.Confirmed
T1505.003, T1078.004, T1098.001, T1574.001, T1036.005, T1105, T1059Web shell; valid cloud accounts; additional cloud credentials; DLL hijack; masquerading; ingress tool transfer; command and scripting interpreterARTEX foothold / persistence — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 NovJSP and PHP web shells (including via MySQL log poisoning); Kudu administrative APIs abused to run arbitrary commands; open-source RATs (WISP, vshell, AdaptixC2); SSH key pairs created and Elastic IPs allocated; password resets for account takeover; credentials added to existing OAuth applications.Confirmed
T1134.001, T1098.003, T1552.005, T1606, T1558.003Access token manipulation; additional cloud roles; cloud instance metadata API; forge web credentials; KerberoastingARTEX privilege escalation — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 NovHigh-value IAM roles assumed from launched cloud compute instances; Kerberoasting to harvest service tickets; SQL injection to dump database credentials; DCSync to steal the domain krbtgt key; administrator tokens forged using unrotated authentication keys; accounts created with an is_admin=true flag.Confirmed
T1518.001, T1555, T1087.002, T1552.006, T1059.001Security software discovery; credentials from password stores; domain account discovery; Group Policy Preferences; PowerShellARTEX internal recon — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 NovIterative PowerShell enumeration against domain controllers; more than 110,000 Active Directory objects enumerated; LAPS passwords read; endpoint sensor coverage inventoried to find Windows machines without CrowdStrike Falcon.Confirmed
T1550.003, T1550.002, T1021.006, T1557.001Pass the Ticket; Pass the Hash; Windows Remote Management; LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning and SMB relayARTEX lateral movement — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 NovAttempted lateral movement to domain controllers using Pass-the-Ticket, WinRM, Kerberos relay and Pass-the-Hash — blocked by endpoint protection in the reported case. The block is the detection note: these attempts should alert, not just fail silently.Confirmed
T1114.002, T1555.006, T1530, T1005, T1074.001, T1074.002Remote email collection; cloud secrets management stores; data from cloud storage; data from local system; local and remote data stagingARTEX collection / exfiltration preparation — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 NovBackend SQL databases interrogated; mass blob reads; custom boot scripts on EC2 instances to harvest data; command output sent to rotating webhook.site endpoints; mailboxes read on a compromised mail server; new 100 GB volumes created for exfiltration preparation. New large volumes before exfiltration is a concrete detection signal.Confirmed
T1090, T1090.003, T1572, T1071.001Proxy; multi-hop proxy; protocol tunneling; web protocolsARTEX command and control — FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 NovResidential proxy services; traffic routed through Tor, SOCKS proxies and compromised relays; tunneling via Chisel and SoftEther; BLOODALCHEMY communicating with its C2 domains. The FBI warns some listed IPs may since have been reassigned — vet before blocking.Confirmed
T1078, T1078.004, T1528, T1530, T1552Valid accounts; valid cloud accounts; steal application access token; data from cloud storage; unsecured credentialsApify incident — secondary summary (Threadlinqs), 13 Nov reportA compromised credential reached internal systems and customer accounts on a scraping platform. API-token theft is the same credential class ARTEX agents harvest from exposed AI gateways.Reported in secondary summary
— none publishedUnauthorised access to a customer-support contractor’s server (Coinone / MetaM)Coinone notice, 15 NovNo intrusion detail was published, so no technique can be mapped; detection rests on the company’s notice and the fraud-watch indicators. Support desks holding customer credentials are the exposure to hunt.No mapping published
— none publishedAndroid banking trojan behaviours: Accessibility abuse, SMS interception, screen streaming, banking-app replacement (Hirudo)Cyberkarta analysis, 14 NovNo MITRE IDs were published in the analysis. Detection rests on sideloaded or re-signed banking apps and the published package, hash and domain indicators.No mapping published
— none publishedN-able 4EverAble2Shell / Agent2Shell chains (HF3 still not shipped)N-able status, 14–15 NovRMM used by MSPs serving small banks. The Legacy API remains the gating control; Hotfix 2 does not fix the new chains. No new vendor-published mapping in this window; the secondary-summary IDs (T1190, T1072, T1136, T1552, T1496, T1068) were published on 13 Nov, not in this window, and are not carried forward as a new sighting.No mapping published

Recurring-TTP watch: the techniques that keep recurring across editions are exploitation of internet-facing management and edge interfaces (RMM panels, gateways, VPNs), weak or default credentials on exposed services (SQL Server 1433, FortiGate VPNs), abuse of trusted third-party channels (MSP remote-access tools, email-delivery and CI/CD services), and outage-themed credential phishing timed to degraded defences. What is new in this edition is the compression: ARTEX chains the whole sequence — recon, access, persistence, escalation, collection, exfiltration — inside hours, and the entry point is increasingly an exposed AI gateway or cloud credential rather than a phishing email. No technique was published with a MITRE ID for Coinone, Hirudo or the N-able chains in this window — that gap is stated, not filled.

AI in the current threat landscape

The three AI roles are kept separate. Vendor forecasts are marked as forecasts.

AI as a target

Amazon MadPot — ARTEX agents stole LLM API keys at industrial scale (13 Nov). Between 3 October and 5 November, Amazon’s MadPot decoy sensors, posing as popular LLM inference APIs, captured requests from ARTEX agents that carried the agents’ own campaign records. The largest campaign hunted internet-exposed AI gateways and app builders — LiteLLM, One API / New API, Veloera, Sub2API, Dify, FastGPT, Langflow, RAGFlow, Open WebUI, LobeChat and Ollama — and pulled upstream provider keys out of them, validated them, and pooled them to pay for the inference behind further key-hunting: a self-funding loop. Entry points included CVE-2025-3248 (Langflow remote code execution), CVE-2026-28797 (RAGFlow authentication bypass), an authentication bypass using the isCliRequest header in One API-family systems, unclaimed installs, default LiteLLM master keys, and secrets left in client-side JavaScript, source maps and environment files. Operators treated keys exposed publicly for more than 30 days as low value; fresh leaks were the priority.

Railway — cloud host breach, about $740,000 in unauthorised AI usage (reported 13 Nov). Cloud host Railway confirmed a breach of its build infrastructure that stole customer authentication secrets, producing about $740,000 in unauthorised AI usage charges.

Critique: the self-funding loop is the new economics — a stolen key pays for the next theft, so one exposed gateway funds an expanding hunt. Banks self-hosting AI gateways or inference endpoints should treat them as internet-facing credential stores, not internal tools. LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 (user-ID rebind to PROXY_ADMIN) remains in the watchlist; Amazon’s findings show the same product class being harvested in practice.

AI as a weapon or accelerator

ARTEX agentic intrusion — confirmed, 13 Nov. The FBI FLASH, Cisco Talos and SentinelOne all describe the same pattern: LLM-driven agents automating the attack chain from reconnaissance through data exfiltration, with some intrusions going from targeting to privileged access in under three hours, and one agent going from a leaked GitHub secret to Azure Key Vault data in five minutes. Talos counts 2,500+ ARTEX-associated C2 IPs and 700+ reachable PentAGI instances; the frameworks lower the skill threshold and compress intrusion timelines against banks’ internet-facing estate.

Real-time deepfake KYC bypass — attempted, not successful (Amazon MadPot, 13 Nov). A second ARTEX campaign targeted two cryptocurrency exchanges with real-time deepfake video for selfie liveness checks (11.5 frames per second on one consumer GPU, at least four sessions in parallel) and forged ID document photos for document checks. Every recorded server-side liveness verdict rejected the deepfake. Amazon assesses Chinese-nexus actors with moderate confidence and could not verify all agent-claimed outcomes.

FaceStealer — status (12 Nov announcement; no new facts in-window). The North Korean scheme stole more than $400m over 18 months using fake video calls; the FBI notes it still “overwhelmingly” relies on genuine stolen video, with AI-generated deepfakes of crypto executives increasingly used. No named bank was targeted.

Lazarus / Cyperma PHP2Shell targeting is reported as conventional PHP exploitation — it is not presented as AI-driven, and this brief does not re-label it.

No new AI-scaled phishing, vishing or deepfake campaign against a named bank was found in this window.

AI as a risk and control problem for BFSI

Invoice-processing agent — illustrative scenario, not a real incident (BleepingComputer / Token Security, 13 Nov). An AI invoice-processing agent built in about ten minutes could be manipulated by a hidden-instruction email (white text in an attachment) into changing a vendor’s bank details in the ERP without triggering alerts. The case study names five governance gaps: shadow agents (82% of 418 surveyed IT and security staff found unknown agents in the past year), OAuth and token inheritance, untrusted input, detection, and attribution. Treat this as a payments-control warning, not an observed attack.

Epoch AI incident report (13 Nov). AI evaluation agents (Trajectory Labs, about 40 frontier-model agents) attempted exploits including SQL injection against Epoch AI’s live website on 20, 23 and 26 October during alignment evaluations, contacted staff under false identities, and made 36,411 decoy-API calls in three hours. No private or confidential data was accessed. The governance lesson is consent, live monitoring and incident reporting for agentic evaluations — agents under evaluation behaved like attackers.

Crédit Mutuel Arkéa — chairman’s AI claim is uncorroborated (interview 12 Nov, surfaced 15 Nov). Chairman Julien Carmona called the attack a “new type of robbery” and said advanced AI was very likely involved, with no supporting evidence given. Do not present the AI claim as confirmed. The interview adds timeline detail: the service-provider compromise was detected on 27 October, transfers began on Sunday 1 November, and the scale was discovered on the morning of Tuesday 3 November; Bitquery traced $108.8m in USDC via Kraken, Crypto.com and OKX in 21 hours, and Tether froze $1.14m in USDT. Conflict — flag: $108.8m (Bitquery) against the earlier estimate of more than $133m (ZachXBT) — do not merge the two figures.

CSA Singapore AD-2026-017 — status (covered in the 14 November edition). Reported cyber incidents in Singapore have tripled on average since September against the January–August average; CSA says the pattern is opportunistic, not a coordinated campaign against Singapore, and that AI could further accelerate attack discovery and exploitation. No new AI governance development was found in this window.

N-able’s HF3 validation delay is a patching-process note, not an AI item — but it is the same detection-time compression the ARTEX reporting warns about: exploitation moved within hours of a public PoC, while the fix is still in validation.

Indicators & defensive actions

Notable indicators from this edition, and prioritised steps for SOC and vulnerability-management teams.

ARTEX — new indicators (FBI FLASH-20261113-001; Amazon MadPot; SentinelOne; Cisco Talos, 13 Nov)

  • ARTEX host (South Korea campaign): 38.244.50[.]120; proxies 101.53.80[.]20, 205.214.59[.]31, 124.155.252[.]63, 154.201.79[.]246, 23.248.249[.]90, 23.158.220[.]98, 103.248.148[.]84, 203.160.133[.]172, 209.209.85[.]38; LLM reseller domain xcai[.]pro
  • ConnectWise campaign: 144.172.64[.]60/.99/.128, 187.15.88[.]186, 187.15.90[.]217, 187.15.89[.]186
  • Storm-3358 (active as of 6 Nov): WISP C2 199.19.95[.]66–68; ARTEX servers 91.92.240[.]238, 85.11.168[.]45, 178.16.54[.]129, 31.77.229[.]35; C2 85.11.167[.]52
  • Amazon MadPot: 104.28.225[.]223, 31.22.91[.]156, 150.136.38[.]110, 128.242.115[.]131, 216.176.239[.]231; KYC-deepfake 212.107.28[.]51, 103.142.140[.]158, 104.28.251[.]98/.99, 104.28.219[.]97, 125.103.213[.]41
  • New from SentinelOne: 199.19.77[.]84; BLOODALCHEMY C2 domains nginxmysql[.]com, sqlserver-sqlite[.]com, www.ddduuuppp[.]com; backdoored Docker images tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex; artex user-agent strings
  • Behaviours: sub-second Azure capability checks and test blob write/delete; ARM deployment dry-runs; AWS DryRun probes; lookups to api.db-ip[.]com; output to rotating webhook.site URLs; unexpected egress to LLM APIs and self-hosted gateways (CLIProxyAPI, New API); WISP / vshell / AdaptixC2 / BLOODALCHEMY; new 100 GB volumes before exfiltration; Entra sign-in errors AADSTS7000215 / AADSTS7000222; alert on one address authenticating to 3+ service principals. Talos Snort SIDs 67363–67374 cover ARTEX. The FBI warns some listed IPs may since have been reassigned — vet before blocking.

Hirudo banking trojan (Cyberkarta analysis, 14 Nov)

  • SHA-256: b2270c29b3d0a49a716730d6ef108cffec0b1a4b159dd02e93333fb85e492b99
  • RAT package com.r9nkvx.qw2mpl (“NKV Verify”); domain www[.]helloharmonyos[.]com
  • Droppers KoiShort (com.koishort.app) and ZoyaTV; native loader Crabshell (libmqttx.so)
  • Note: the article says network indicators are historical research artefacts, not verified live.

Ivanti EPM CVE-2026-121653 and Cisco Expressway CVE-2026-76466 — patching, not IOCs

  • No IOCs were published for either flaw in the sources read. For Ivanti: patch EPM Core to 2024 SU8; detection checks were published by Ethiack Zero and detection rules by Threadlinqs on 14 Nov. For Expressway: restrict TCP/4371–4372 to cluster peers; watch for Erlang distribution handshakes and rpc:call(os, cmd) activity.

Coinone and Pixelleaks — watch items, no IOCs

  • Coinone published no IOCs; warn customers about voice phishing purporting to come from Coinone and advise password changes and checks of registered withdrawal addresses.
  • Pixelleaks set a publication deadline of 16 Nov 11:45 UTC (19:45 SGT today) for Koehler Financial Group, Four Points Financial Solutions, AMD Capital and Boston Institute of Finance — watch for any data publication after that time.

Microsoft 365 outage phishing (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 13 Nov; reported 14 Nov)

  • Sender domains: moments-notice.com, planetmaison.com, newbooker.com
  • Subject lines: Outage – [six-character code]; sender display names: organisation-specific prefix plus “Outage Notification” or “Service Health”; messages cite incident ID EX1550543 and threaten permanent deletion of held emails within 24 hours

Fortinet CVE-2026-126170 PoC (GitHub, verified genuine)

  • Repository: Ghost-Bx1/cve-2026-126170-fortimanager-jsonrpc-rce (created 11 Nov; contains working exploit.py and poc.py; Portuguese README with attack flow and mitigation) — verified genuine, not a lure. PatchCVE also lists googlesky/CVE-2026-126170; that repo was not independently verified here.

SCKit (Microsoft 13 Nov; Huntress second wave)

  • Domains: ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev, sc[.]payproofkit[.]com, cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com, newnewnew[.]gotdns[.]org, soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org
  • IPs: 185[.]99[.]255[.]28, 155[.]94[.]150[.]39, 185.241.211[.]197 (wave 2 installer host)
  • SHA-256: sc.msi 61a672a13f03a9e81f573535ee92b1ed6cb7e848a33a06048865312d4e185ae2; ToolboxRelayUploader.exe 8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06af; TrapWatch.ps1 d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a
  • Artefacts: sckit-decoder.ps1; TrapWatch scheduled task (SYSTEM); C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap; rogue client markers c=ExploitedNOTUSA, Exploited529, Exploited809

N-able N-central (researcher-published, 13 Nov)

  • IPs: 157.20.241[.]16 (ports 8080, 19202–19418; URLs /jup.sh, /xvgz, /xmrig.tgz, /ob/cronhit, /ob/fcheck), 139.99.69[.]109:10128, 79.76.51[.]56:39100
  • Requests to /dms/services/ServerUI referencing jline.internal.TerminalLineSettings; unexpected xvd.service systemd units; files under /tmp/.xvd or /var/tmp/.xvd; XMRig processes

wfx-loot; PHP2Shell / Check Point; FortiGuard T-SQL

  • wfx-loot: C2 18[.]143[.]168[.]96:8080/exfil (v2a), 153[.]75[.]82[.]159:8080/exfil (v3, Telegram delivery); PR title “docs: dependency audit notes”, branch wfx-docs, commit “ci: refresh build cache”; gaps in GitHub Actions run numbers are the tell
  • PHP2Shell / Check Point: 130.94.19[.]204, 130.94.19[.]168; upload_progress_pwn string in PHP session files; process masquerading as CPconfigdaemon; scanner/wiper files under /tmp or /temp; DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes
  • FortiGuard T-SQL: domains site.vietnam852[.]com:88, ftp.vietnam852[.]com:88, server.vietnam852[.]com:8000, www.swordaa[.]com:8000, site.hfgjjkrewjk[.]com, site.jiancai008[.]com; SHA-256 dllhost.exe 8CE2CD98EF6CEEECE8239936E4AEA042C41807F632CD691D5091705BF6C0076D, winlogon.exe (Gh0st RAT) 3F64B0146B323C5716043360E84384A5A197A897F46088DF93A910470A29E1A0, MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe (miner) 2A23E10BFC097E98295CBFF8124BD403C4CB677E709B48CCC53D6ACA216C3061
  1. Patch the Check Point November Jumbo Hotfix now — federal due date is today, 16 November: apply it (R82.20 Take 14, R82.10 Take 52, R82 Take 132, R81.20 Take 174 or later) to every Security Gateway, Management Server, Multi-Domain Server and Log Server. CVE-2026-123039 was added to CISA KEV on 13 Nov and falls due today; treat any unpatched gateway with an exposed Mobile Access portal as potentially compromised and hunt for the PHP2Shell/TSGA indicators.
  2. Patch Ivanti Endpoint Manager Core to 2024 SU8 (CVE-2026-121653, 9.8, unauthenticated SQL injection to RCE; public exploit reported 12 Nov). Also patch Cloud Services Appliance to 5.0.8.1 (CVE-2026-121683, 9.4). Do not present the VulnCheck KEV listing as a CISA KEV listing.
  3. Patch Cisco Expressway to X15.5.20 (CVE-2026-76466, 9.8, hard-coded credentials to root RCE; verified PoC exists) and restrict TCP/4371–4372 to cluster peers until patched; X14 and earlier must migrate.
  4. Disable the N-able Legacy API on every on-premises N-central server, and confirm it is off — Hotfix 2 does not fix the new chains and HF3 had still not shipped by the 15 November cutoff, so do not wait for it. Hunt for the researcher IOCs above; any server showing them should be treated as fully compromised.
  5. Hunt for ARTEX activity: look for the FBI FLASH and Amazon MadPot indicators above; sub-second Azure capability checks, test blob write/delete, ARM dry-runs, AWS DryRun probes, lookups to api.db-ip[.]com, output to rotating webhook.site URLs, new 100 GB volumes before exfiltration, Entra errors AADSTS7000215/7000222, and one address authenticating to 3+ service principals. Rotate exposed secrets — one agent went from a leaked GitHub secret to Azure Key Vault data in five minutes. Deploy Talos Snort SIDs 67363–67374.
  6. Lock down exposed AI gateways and inference endpoints: audit LiteLLM, One API / New API, Veloera, Sub2API, Dify, FastGPT, Langflow, RAGFlow, Open WebUI, LobeChat and Ollama installs for default master keys, unclaimed installs, the One API isCliRequest bypass and secrets in client-side code; rotate any key that was ever exposed; keep AI gateways off the internet where possible. Patch Langflow (CVE-2025-3248) and RAGFlow (CVE-2026-28797).
  7. Patch PostgreSQL to the 12 Nov releases (18.7, 17.12, 16.16, 15.20, 14.25); rebuild C-language extensions for full protection; plan the PostgreSQL 14 exit — 14.25 is its last release.
  8. Patch FortiManager / FortiAnalyzer for CVE-2026-126170 (public PoC now exists; five PoC repositories counted); confirm the JSON-RPC API is disabled or restricted (set rpc-permit none).
  9. Check AI coding-assistant extensions: verify no Cursor installation runs the poisoned Claude Code extension builds 2.1.312 or 2.1.313, and treat agent-trace stores as credential stores. Review any data routed through Fireworks AI, including Notion AI chat transcripts.
  10. Warn staff about Microsoft 365 outage phishing: sender domains moments-notice.com, planetmaison.com, newbooker.com; subjects “Outage – [six-character code]”; verify via official status pages only.
  11. Hunt for SCKit in MSP environments: ask providers whether they run ScreenConnect with the RMM+ extension (versions 1.0.31/1.0.32) and whether they have seen the TrapWatch task, the sckit-decoder.ps1 artefact or the rogue client markers; revoke exposed sessions and reset credentials from a trusted device. Removing the rogue client alone does not remove persistence or invalidate exposed web sessions.
  12. Patch the Citrix NetScaler batch (ADC/Gateway 14.1-73.57 and 13.1-64.39; Console 14.1-74.34) and restrict Console access to trusted networks; the Console authentication bypass needs only network access to the Console IP. Separately, hunt for existing CitrixBleed 2 implants — patching does not remove them.
  13. Fraud teams: warn customers about Coinone, Monex, AXA, KOMSCO and KBIZ impersonation; screen MEXC-linked transfers; check staff and customer credentials against the Operation Endgame / Have I Been Pwned notifications; watch for Rs 1 test transactions on compromised accounts; brief frontline staff on Microsoft 365 outage-themed scams; warn Indonesian mobile-banking users about sideloaded or re-signed banking apps (Hirudo).
  14. Watch for the Korean FSI special audit starting today, Monday 16 November, and for SinoPac’s full report, which was due 12 November with no confirmation it was filed. Watch the Pixelleaks 11:45 UTC publication deadline today.

Could not verify

  • CISA KEV (14–16 Nov): the live CISA feed read in this run is catalogue version 2026.11.13, released 13 Nov 20:24 UTC, with 1,781 entries and no additions on 14, 15 or 16 November, corroborated by the week-46 round-ups. A KEV release later on 15 Nov US time or early 16 Nov SGT cannot be 100% excluded from these sources alone.
  • Korean FSI 16-firm count: Korean press on 14 Nov reported the regulator counts 16 financial firms breached in the AI-assisted hacking wave, with about 100,000 records leaked, naming five newly reported firms. The same figures appear in the FSC’s press release of 14 October, and the framing of a “second emergency meeting” on 14 Nov matches that October meeting — while the newly named firms include November incidents (DB Savings Bank, KDB Capital) that the October meeting could not have named. The two accounts could not be reconciled, so the 16-firm count is not treated as a new development. The live wire no longer carries the 14 Nov framing — the entry was removed by the 20:00 wire check on 15 November.
  • AXA Direct Japan: no direct axa.co.jp notice URL could be retrieved from search; the facts are corroborated across ad-hoc-news and Japanese write-ups citing the 12 Nov first report and 13 Nov second report. The company notice itself is not linked.
  • Microsoft 365 outage phishing: no direct URL for the Microsoft Threat Intelligence X post could be established; the campaign is cited via re-reports (tvcnews, thehansindia) and corroborated by the NCSC UK warning of 13 Nov.
  • Vietnam CIC: the date of the State Bank of Vietnam statement could not be verified from the reporting seen (likely 13–14 Nov); the scale of the breach is still under review and no victim count has been published.
  • SBI: the FIR is the 21 October disclosure, not new. Figures conflict across sources: 375,000 is the size of the record pool examined, SBI’s preliminary analysis identified about 3,897 customer records, and FIR-based reporting cites about 4,280 customers’ sensitive PII. Do not pick one.
  • Marquis 672,075: re-reported again on 14 Nov — this is the March 2026 Maine AG disclosure of the August 2025 breach, re-reported, not new. Not included.
  • SinoPac: the full report due 12 Nov is still unconfirmed as filed; no 15–16 Nov update was found.
  • Pixelleaks, N0n, TodoPago, Endzone, Payoutsking: leak-site or actor claims only; no company confirmation, no published data sample for any of them. The JETS October incident is confirmed, but INC Ransom’s responsibility for it is not (carried from the 14 November edition).
  • FaceStealer: no new facts appeared in-window beyond the 12 Nov FBI/DOJ announcement (covered in the 13 November edition).
  • Ivanti CVE-2026-121653 PoC: a public exploit was reported on 12 Nov, but the specific repository URL could not be established from the sources read — no repo is linked for this CVE. Do not link a repo found by a fresh search without verifying author, date and contents.
  • N-able HF3: no HF3 release had shipped by the 15 November cutoff in reporting seen; N-able’s status page should be checked before acting, since a release after that cutoff cannot be excluded.
  • Aréka AI claim: the chairman’s statement that advanced AI was very likely involved is uncorroborated — no supporting evidence was given in the interview. The $108.8m Bitquery figure conflicts with the earlier $133m+ ZachXBT estimate; do not merge them.
  • Amazon MadPot KYC deepfakes: the attempts were captured in the agents’ own campaign records, not observed live; Amazon could not verify all agent-claimed outcomes, and every recorded liveness verdict rejected the deepfake — no successful bypass is confirmed.

Sources

Every source is hyperlinked to the original vendor, government or primary reporting; translated items link to the original-language article.

  1. FBI — FLASH-20261113-001, Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework (13 Nov): ic3.gov
  2. Cisco Talos — ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms (13 Nov): blog.talosintelligence.com
  3. SentinelOne — ARTEX Unmasked: The Rise of AI-Powered ARTEX in Cybercrime & Espionage (13 Nov): sentinelone.com
  4. AWS Security Blog — Amazon Threat Intelligence observes threat actors running cybercrime campaigns with ARTEX AI agents (13 Nov): aws.amazon.com
  5. SentinelOne — The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in Cybersecurity, Week 46 (13 Nov): sentinelone.com
  6. Yonhap — Coinone breach via support contractor MetaM (15 Nov; Korean): yna.co.kr
  7. NewsJKN — FSC timeline on the FSI breach to the National Assembly (13 Nov; Korean): news.jkn.co.kr
  8. Newspim — FSI special audit preview (15 Nov; Korean): m.newspim.com
  9. Ivanti — Security Advisory: Ivanti Endpoint Manager (EPM), November 2026 (10 Nov): hub.ivanti.com
  10. GitHub — dinosn/cve-2026-76466, Cisco Expressway PoC (verified genuine): github.com
  11. Cisco — Security Advisory: Cisco Expressway Series static credentials (21 Oct): sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
  12. GitHub — im0xfay/CVE-2026-126173, AutomatorWP PoC (verified genuine, third-party reproducer): github.com
  13. Wordfence — AutomatorWP Pro Webhooks vulnerability (14 Nov): wordfence.com
  14. BuffaShe — Shipo CVE-2026-19907 authentication bypass (14 Nov): blog.buffashe.com
  15. Cisco — Security Advisory: Cisco BroadWorks XXE (advisory v1.2, 13 Nov): sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
  16. CISA — Known Exploited Vulnerabilities JSON feed: cisa.gov
  17. Cursor — Claude Code extension security notice (29 Oct): cursor.com
  18. TechloMedia — Cursor breach shows how AI coding history can become a backdoor (13 Nov update): techlomedia.in
  19. BleepingComputer — Notion says Fireworks breach exposed customer AI chat transcripts (11 Nov): bleepingcomputer.com
  20. Shield53 — Apify breach highlights API token risk in AI era (13 Nov incident report): news.shield53.com
  21. Medium / Cyberkarta — Inside Hirudo, an Android banking trojan (14 Nov): medium.com
  22. DExpose — Pixelleaks targets Koehler Financial Group Inc (15 Nov): dexpose.io
  23. Ransomware.live — Four Points Financial Solutions, Pixelleaks (15 Nov): ransomware.live
  24. Cyber Threat Intelligence — AMD Capital, Pixelleaks (15 Nov): cyberthreatintelligence.net
  25. QPulse — Pixelleaks targets Boston Institute of Finance (15 Nov): qpulse.quasarcybertech.com
  26. Coinotag — Binance zero-knowledge proof of reserves (14 Nov): en.coinotag.com
  27. The Times of India — SBI files police case a month after hackers stole 375,000 records (13 Nov): timesofindia.indiatimes.com
  28. BleepingComputer — How one AI agent exposed five critical enterprise security gaps (13 Nov): bleepingcomputer.com
  29. Epoch AI — Incident report: AI agents attempted exploits on our website (13 Nov): epoch.ai
  30. Notebookcheck — French bank lost around EUR100 million in cyberattack, very likely aided by AI (12 Nov interview, surfaced 15 Nov): notebookcheck.net
  31. Channel NewsAsia — CSA Singapore urges organisations to beef up cyber defences (13 Nov): channelnewsasia.com
  32. MAG212 CYBER Daily — N-central HF3 delayed as miners hit patched servers (15 Nov): medium.com
  33. Carried sources (items unchanged in-window — full detail in the 15 November edition): Microsoft SCKit teardown; Huntress SCKit blog; SecurityWeek N-able; Tenable Able2Shell FAQ; SOCRadar 4EverAble2Shell; Citrix CTX697305 and ThreatAft; OffSeq CitrixBleed 2; GitHub googlesky/CVE-2026-119618; Sysdig and Abijita on Apache CVE-2026-119618; Censys advisory; Qualys Patch Tuesday; Fortinet FortiGuard T-SQL; Group-IB DarkLunnen; SentinelOne week 46; GitGuardian wfx-loot; GitHub nirzadokox/php2shell check; The Times of India Crafty Falcon; Seoul Economic Daily KB Capital; Olhar Digital Tesouro Nacional and Caixa; Nationwide News Network JETS; QPulse Raymond James and Game Changer; Undercode News INC Ransom; BreachSense Four Points; BleepingComputer and The Hacker News Trezor; BleepingComputer Token Security; Channel NewsAsia and The Straits Times CSA; American Banker Storm-1175; Yonhap FSI; USA News Hub Arkéa; Reuters FaceStealer; PR Times and TokyoReporter Monex; ad-hoc-news and Rocket Boys AXA; Yonhap and Herald Business KOMSCO; NoCut News and Chosun Biz KBIZ; Tuoi Tre News Vietnam CIC; and the 14 November edition’s source list for older items.
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