Window: approximately 13 November 09:00 SGT to 14 November 09:00 SGT. New and overnight developments, deduplicated against the 13 November edition, with gaps stated plainly.
An LLM-driven agentic pentest framework is in live intrusions against financial services. FBI FLASH-20261113-001 and a Cisco Talos write-up land the same day; >2,500 ARTEX C2 IPs, 1,600+ exposed consoles, 2,250+ ConnectWise downstream tenants.
Microsoft publishes its teardown of the ScreenConnect worm; Huntress reports a second wave on 13 Nov — 205 hosts across 41 organisations. The technician-trap spread is designed behaviour and still has not been observed to succeed.
Researchers count 21 production servers mining XMRig within hours of the PoC, 19 of them on Hotfix 2. N-able has published IOCs but says it has seen no compromise using the new flaws. Still no fix — disable the Legacy API.
Check Point CVE-2026-123039 (Gaia privilege escalation, chained with PHP2Shell) and UnrealIRCd CVE-2026-114713 join the catalogue on 13 Nov. Both carry a 16 November federal due date.
AI-driven intrusion is now a named, government-warned threat to finance: the FBI and Cisco Talos both published on ARTEX in the same window. ARTEX is an open-source, LLM-driven agentic pentesting framework in use by malicious actors since at least August 2026. The FBI’s FLASH-20261113-001 names financial services among ten targeted sectors, cites a South Korean financial-sector campaign that exposed personal data of about 67,000 people, and the ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply-chain compromise that reached 2,250+ downstream customer environments. Talos counts more than 2,500 ARTEX-associated C2 IP addresses and says campaigns range from opportunistic scanning to targeted intrusion and supply-chain activity, including Storm-3358 hitting financial organisations in Southeast Asia. Some intrusions went from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours. The framework needs almost no operator skill, which is the point: it compresses the time banks have to detect and respond, and it often leaves no known indicators behind.
The RMM crisis is now a second wave, and the N-able chains are being exploited faster than vendors can patch. Microsoft published its own teardown of SCKit, the worm abusing cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels, and Huntress reported a second wave on 13 Nov — 205 hosts across 41 organisations, a new installer host and new markers. The technician-trap spread remains designed behaviour, not an observed infection path. Separately, the N-able 4EverAble2Shell chain was exploited within about five hours of its public PoC: researchers count 21 production N-central servers mining Monero, 19 of them already on Hotfix 2, while N-able says it has seen no compromise using the new flaws and has still not shipped a fix. The one solid control is disabling the Legacy API, which is not the default. CISA added the Check Point Gaia privilege-escalation flaw chained with PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-123039) to its exploited-vulnerabilities catalogue on 13 Nov.
A wave of confirmed financial-sector breaches landed overnight, led by India’s largest bank. State Bank of India filed a police case a month after hackers stole a 375,000-record set from its Global IT Centre; only 3,897 records in that set have been confirmed to hold customer personal data, and the bank says no account numbers, balances, passwords, one-time codes, card data, PAN or Aadhaar were in the identified records — the 375,000 figure is the size of the dark-web dataset, not a confirmed victim count. KB Capital in South Korea confirmed a breach of 1,811 people, and Brazil’s National Treasury confirmed a leak of about 30,000 registrations and about 4,000 Pix keys. INC Ransom claimed Raymond James, Game Changer Wealth and Jamaica’s JETS payment network — all unverified. Trezor confirmed hardware implants in three Safe 5 wallets sold by a Southeast Asian reseller. Singapore’s CSA says reported cyber incidents have tripled since September. Binance has still not published Recovery Update #10 or its full zero-knowledge proof, while the US Justice Department says more than $2.7bn of the stolen funds have been frozen.
Confirmed, reported and unconfirmed items are labelled as such. No MITRE mapping is shown where the source published none.
Financial services and cryptocurrency; ten sectors named by the FBI, including finance
Managed service providers and their clients; MSPs serve small banks and financial firms
RMM platform used by MSPs serving small banks and financial firms
India’s largest bank; Global IT Centre, CBD Belapur, Navi Mumbai
Capital-finance arm of KB Financial Group, South Korea; vehicle lease asset management system
Brazil’s federal treasury; e-Serviços portal users and federal payment recipients
US investment bank / wealth manager; Louisiana wealth manager; Jamaica’s payment-network operator
Independent financial advisory and brokerage firm, Canada
Financial-sector security assessment body, South Korea; assessment staff at banks, insurers, securities firms
Cooperative banking group, France
Crypto exchange, global
US lenders; Insight Credit Union and Sawyer Savings Bank
Bank, Taiwan; 418 customers hit in the 3 Nov incident
Life-insurance and private-pension subsidiary of Caixa Seguridade / Caixa Econômica Federal, Brazil; 7.6 million active customers
Two CISA KEV additions were made on 13 November. The catalogue stands at 1,781 entries (version 2026.11.13). The Barracuda pair (CVE-2026-116606 / CVE-2026-111560) and Ivanti CVE-2026-118527 fell due on 13 November with no new attribution, IOCs or PoC in-window — per the standing rule a due date alone is not a new development, so they are not carried forward as watchlist rows.
| CVE ID | CVSS score | Affected product | Exploitation status (PoC / in the wild) | Relevance to finance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-123039 — NEW KEV 13 Nov | 7.8 | Check Point Security Gateways (Gaia DynamicCLI) | In the Wild (KEV, due 16 Nov) | New in-window (CISA KEV addition, 13 Nov). Local privilege escalation in Gaia DynamicCLI, chained with PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619) in the Mobile Access Portal to gain root on unpatched Security Gateways. Check Point reported exploitation from 30 Oct to 4 Nov, “a couple of dozen” systems in one region. Fix is the November Jumbo Hotfix: R82.20 Take 14, R82.10 Take 52, R82 Take 132, R81.20 Take 174 or later; stopping dynamic_server is a temporary mitigation. No standalone PoC reported — exploitation is via the chained PHP2Shell flaw. KEV ransomware use: Unknown. Verification limit: the live CISA feed fetched during this run was a stale cached copy (1 Nov); the addition is confirmed by three independent KEV trackers (Carthage Electronics, Axis Intelligence, EastBayCyber) agreeing on the date, catalogue version 2026.11.13 and 1,781 entries — see Could not verify. |
| CVE-2026-114713 — NEW KEV 13 Nov | 8.6 | UnrealIRCd 6.0.0–6.2.7 (5.x also affected, end-of-life) | In the Wild (KEV, due 16 Nov) | New in-window (CISA KEV addition, 13 Nov). Improper neutralisation of delimiters (CWE-140) in the IRCv3 label handling; a normal user on a linked network can run commands with server authority. The project said exploitation had already been observed online in its 7 Nov advisory. Fix: 6.2.7.1 or the emergency hot-patch bundle-20261107. Low BFSI relevance — IRC servers are not a finance stack component; included only as a one-line KEV note. KEV ransomware use: Unknown. No PoC reported. |
| Citrix NetScaler November batch — STATUS, CVE records 13 Nov | 9.5 (highest) | NetScaler ADC, NetScaler Gateway, NetScaler Console, Secure Access Client (Windows/Linux) | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | New in-window development: the CVE records for the batch were published 13 Nov. SecurityWeek counts 28 fixes, nine critical; SecurityOnline said four bulletins fixing 31 CVEs; The Hacker News said 12 flaws. The count is still unresolved between sources — do not pick one. Headline flaws: CVE-2026-107412 (9.5, memory flaw); CVE-2026-120868 (9.3, memory overflow in packet processing, affects all ADC/Gateway deployments); CVE-2026-120869 (9.4, improper authentication in NetScaler Console, unauthenticated bypass of authentication to access restricted resources — adjacent-network, needs Console IP access); CVE-2026-118268 (8.5, Secure Access Client for Windows privilege escalation to SYSTEM) and CVE-2026-118269 (Linux equivalent). Fixes: ADC/Gateway 14.1-73.57 and 13.1-64.39; Console 14.1-74.34. Citrix says it is not aware of any exploits for the announced vulnerabilities. Separately, CitrixBleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777) is still actively exploited — OffSeq honeypots recorded 316,950 exploitation attempts from 19 source IPs in the last 30 days, last seen 13 Nov 21:41 UTC (14 Nov 05:41 SGT), with DragonForce ransomware as the severe outcome in past cases. |
| CVE-2026-119618 — STATUS, PoC verified as crash-only | 9.8 (Red Hat) / no CVSS yet (NVD) | Apache HTTP Server 2.4.55–2.4.70; standalone mod_h2 2.0.8–2.0.42 | Public PoC — in-the-wild exploitation not confirmed | New in-window development: the third-party research PoC (GitHub googlesky/CVE-2026-119618, created 12 Nov) was verified directly on GitHub in this window. It reproduces heap corruption and ASan crashes on 2.4.70 and clean behaviour on 2.4.71, with a containerised lab and ASan/TSan evidence — but it does not demonstrate code execution. Conflict — flag: Red Hat scores the CVE 9.8 and says public research demonstrates a reliable exploit against a default-configured server; Sysdig (13 Nov) and Abijita (12 Nov) both stress there is no public RCE PoC and no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation as of 12–13 Nov, and the CVE is not in CISA KEV. Treat exploitation status as “public PoC now exists; it demonstrates heap corruption, not code execution; in-the-wild exploitation not confirmed”. Nine GitHub repos now carry the CVE name, including two new labs on 13 Nov that were not verified — do not link them. Race condition in mod_http2 assign_headers(). Fixed in httpd 2.4.71; disabling HTTP/2 is a mitigation. |
| 4EverAble2Shell / Agent2Shell — CVE-2026-90436 + VULN-2026-0009 — STATUS, exploitation confirmed by researchers | 9.8 (CVE-2026-90436) | N-able N-central (on-premises servers with Legacy API enabled) | Exploitation claimed — contested (see actors) | New in-window (SecurityWeek, 13 Nov; N-able update, 13 Nov). 4EverAble2Shell chains Apache Axis CVE-2026-90436 (9.8) with a separate N-central privilege escalation (Previdian VULN-2026-0009, no CVE yet) to unauthenticated root on the server; it requires the Legacy API to be enabled (non-default). Agent2Shell chains 10+ flaws to SYSTEM on managed Windows agents. Huntback counted 21 production N-central servers mining XMRig, 19 of them on the Hotfix 2 build; N-able says it has seen no signs of compromise using the new flaws and has published IOCs but not confirmed the mining count. No fix existed at publication; follow-up hotfix planned. PoC repo: MSPNightmare/CVEs — N-Central N-Able (GitHub) — genuine researcher disclosure (Sean Bales), with Previdian’s caveat that the public PoC is unverified and may contain malware. RMM used by MSPs serving small banks; a Hotfix-2 bypass with claimed live exploitation is a live patching and hunting priority. Disable the Legacy API; hunt the IOCs in Indicators. |
| CVE-2026-109618 / 109619 (PHP2Shell) — STATUS, chained flaw now in KEV | 9.2 | PHP; PAN-OS and other network/security products; Check Point Security Gateways | In the Wild | New in-window development: the chained privilege-escalation flaw CVE-2026-123039 was added to CISA KEV on 13 Nov (see the row above). GreyNoise telemetry reported in the 13 Nov afternoon deep-research check shows PHP2Shell exploitation continued through 12 Nov. The Check Point campaign detail is unchanged: attackers chained PHP2Shell in the Mobile Access Portal with CVE-2026-123039 to gain root on unpatched gateways, planted the TSGA backdoor, pivoted to a VMware ESXi host and ran a wiper — “a couple of dozen” systems in one region. Both fixes are in the November Jumbo Hotfix. The PHP2Shell fix had been available since 23 Oct — the one-week patch lag is the lesson. Keep management interfaces off the internet; apply the November Jumbo Hotfix. IOCs: 130.94.19[.]204, 130.94.19[.]168; upload_progress_pwn string in PHP session files; process masquerading as CPconfigdaemon; DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes. |
| CVE-2026-124194 — STATUS, Patch Tuesday follow-up | 6.5 | Microsoft Outlook (NTLMv2 hash disclosure) | In the Wild (KEV) | New in-window (Qualys, 13 Nov): November Patch Tuesday is the largest on record by Qualys’s count — 1,252 CVEs this month. Conflict — flag: Microsoft’s own count differs (1,362 CVEs across 27 updates per other trackers) and Tenable counted 1,093 — a counting-method difference between trackers, not a new item. About 35% of November patches carried a Low reliability rating in Qualys’s assessment as of 11 Nov. Outlook CVE-2026-124194 remains the exploited item in the batch. Microsoft confirmed the Windows 11 update KB5132061 fails to install on some devices that took the October non-security preview KB5127936, and KB5131085 (Windows 10 / Server 2019) is reported to break Exchange — both affect deployment planning. |
| CVE-2026-127063 — carried | 9.3 | DataComm RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. “The third-party RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect uses a static API secret by default.” Caveat: the CVE wording (“static API secret”) differs from Huntress’s account of a blank access key accepted when none was configured — treat as the same extension weakness pending vendor confirmation. This is the extension weakness behind the SCKit worm. Check RMM+ versions 1.0.31/1.0.32 and remove or re-key the extension. |
| CVE-2026-121529 (“Fortinet2Shell”) — carried | Critical (no CVSS figure in sources read) | FortiClientMac 7.4.0–7.4.7; FortiClientWindows 7.4.0–7.4.7 and 7.2.0–7.2.14 | Public exploit — in-the-wild exploitation not reported | No change in-window. Origin-validation flaw, unauthenticated remote code execution on FortiClient endpoints. PSIRT FG-IR-26-194. Not in CISA KEV. FortiClient is the endpoint agent on bank staff machines; an unauthenticated RCE with a public exploit is a patching priority. |
| Able2Shell — seven CVEs — carried | 9.3 (highest) | N-able N-central | PoC public — exploitation of new chains claimed, contested | No change in-window except the 4EverAble2Shell row above. Original Able2Shell (9 Nov): researcher Sean Bales published PoC code for 33 alleged N-central flaws. Hotfix N-central 2026.4 HF2 (build 2026.4.1.26), released 10 Nov, fixes seven CVEs: CVE-2026-125883 (XXE, 9.3), CVE-2026-125878 (OGNL injection), CVE-2026-125879, CVE-2026-125880, CVE-2026-125881 (SSRF), CVE-2026-125882 (RCE via path traversal), CVE-2026-91000. All hosted servers upgraded by 11 Nov 01:04 UTC. The Able2Shell PoC repository (Oracle-Security/CVEs, path “0-Days/N-Central N-Able”, 26 Python PoC scripts) is a genuine researcher disclosure — linkable as the PoC source, with the caveat that N-able has not validated all 33 findings. |
| CVE-2026-123864 — carried | High (no CVSS published) | Node.js 22.x / 24.x / 26.x (HTTPS servers) | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. HTTPS heap-memory disclosure: a zero-length TLS write re-enters the HTTP parser, and the server copies other connections’ heap memory — including TLS private keys and other users’ requests — into a request body. Fixed in 26.13.1 / 24.22.3 / 22.23.5. Node.js published no CVSS scores and lists no workarounds — upgrade only. |
| Node.js batch — six further High — carried | High (no CVSS published) | Node.js 22.x / 24.x / 26.x | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. CVE-2026-123863, CVE-2026-123865, CVE-2026-123866, CVE-2026-123872, CVE-2026-123874, CVE-2026-126051 (HTTP/2 and TLS memory disclosure / DoS / use-after-free). Six Medium and three Low complete the 16-CVE release. Node.js states 16 CVEs; one aggregator lists 17 IDs — report Node.js’s count. |
| CVE-2026-126263 — carried | 9.8 | FortiMail 8.0.0–8.0.1, 7.6.0–7.6.4, 7.4.0–7.4.6 | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. SQL injection (CWE-89): an authenticated attacker can execute unauthorised code/commands via crafted requests. Fixed in 8.0.2 / 7.6.7 / 7.4.7; FortiMail Cloud already remediated. Internally discovered with the Frontier AI model Claude Mythos. |
| CVE-2026-126155 — carried | 9.1 | FortiMail 8.0.0–8.0.1, 7.6.0–7.6.6, 7.4.0–7.4.8, 7.2 all versions | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. Incorrect authorisation (CWE-863): an unauthenticated remote attacker can obtain an authenticated IBE webmail session as any IBE recipient and read or send their encrypted mail. Fixed in 8.0.2 / 7.6.7 / 7.4.9; 7.2 must migrate to a fixed release; FortiMail Cloud remediated 5 Oct. |
| CVE-2026-121653 — carried | 9.8 | Ivanti Endpoint Manager Core, 2024 SU7 and earlier | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. SQL injection in EPM Core allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution. Fix: EPM 2024 SU8. Sibling critical: CVE-2026-121683 (9.4, missing authentication in Cloud Services Application 5.0.8 only; fix 5.0.8.1). Ivanti says it is not aware of any customers being exploited, and none of the 13 CVEs in its 10 Nov batch is in CISA KEV. |
| VSA-2026-062 (no CVE ID yet) — carried | — no CVSS assigned | Xen Orchestra / Xen Orchestra Appliance | Actively exploited | No change in-window. Empty-object login token gives Admin privilege; full XCP-ng host takeover as root. Fixed in Xen Orchestra 6.9.1 / 6.10.0. IOCs: 91.211.251.112:8001 and Tor domain ustar3rqxgnskzgnwkgpofgtvxevm6cx3lxdbwt4mndtveqyaohid.onion:3333. |
| SAP November Patch Day — four CVSS 10.0 — carried | 10.0 | SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP / Web Dispatcher / Gateway | Not known exploited | No change in-window. CVE-2026-76964 (ICM memory corruption, unauthenticated RCE — “ICM2SHELL”), CVE-2026-89126 (Web Dispatcher memory corruption, unauthenticated RCE), CVE-2026-89103 (Gateway broken access control), CVE-2026-120017 (SAML2 missing authentication). Patch internet-facing systems first. |
| Fortinet batch — eight criticals — carried | 9.8–9.0 | FortiOS / FortiManager / FortiAnalyzer / FortiSASE | Not known exploited | No change in-window. Worst CVE-2026-126170 (9.8, JSON RPC API). Fixed in FortiOS 7.2.14/7.4.13/7.6.8/8.0.2 and FortiManager/FortiAnalyzer 7.2.13/7.4.12/7.6.8/8.0.2 — some fixes still “upcoming”; apply the FortiGuard virtual patch, keep OFTP/FGFM ports off the internet. |
| Microsoft November Patch Tuesday — carried | Up to 9.9 | Microsoft enterprise stack (Exchange, SharePoint, SQL Server, AD, LDAP, DNS) | One exploited (Outlook CVE-2026-124194 — see row above) | No change in-window except the Qualys follow-up above. 1,094 newly released CVEs per Microsoft (Qualys counts 1,252 for the month; Tenable counts 1,093 — counting-method differences, flagged not resolved). Notable criticals, none reported exploited: SharePoint CVE-2026-120002 (9.9); SQL Server CVE-2026-116945 (9.8); Windows Search CVE-2026-116928 (9.8, zero-click); LDAP CVE-2026-119958 (9.8, zero-click, unauthenticated); Windows DNS CVE-2026-88218 (9.8); iSCSI CVE-2026-88234 (9.8); Exchange CVE-2026-118207 (8.8); AD DS CVE-2026-118146 (8.8); Schannel CVE-2026-119952 (8.1). Tenable notes the exploited Outlook CVE was discovered by a researcher using Claude. |
| CVE-2026-88771 — carried | 9.5 / 9.8* | Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway | In the Wild (KEV) | No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 Nov). Unauthenticated pre-auth command injection as root via attacker-controlled text written to appliance logs, later executed by maintenance script ns_monuploadd_err.pl — execution can lag the request by up to 24 hours. In KEV since 27 Sept. Fixed in 14.1-73.37 and 13.1-64.23. Patching does not remove existing implants. *CVSS v4.0 9.5 (Citrix) vs v3.1 9.8 (NVD). |
| CVE-2026-76443 — carried | 9.8 | Cisco Secure Email Gateway and Secure Email and Web Manager, 15.5 and earlier | In the Wild (KEV, sibling) | No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 Nov). Rapid7 describes the module as an S/MIME/email-parsing SQL injection leading to unauthenticated root RCE — treat the CVE mapping as Rapid7’s, not Cisco’s. The actively exploited zero-day in the same family is sibling CVE-2026-76461 (9.8, in KEV since 14 Sept). |
| CVE-2026-97229 — carried | 10.0 | GitLab CE / EE | In the Wild (KEV) | No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 Nov). CI/CD RegExp integer-overflow RCE as the git user; authenticated, requiring write access to a public project. In KEV since 29 Oct. |
| CVE-2026-119977 — carried | 8.1 / Low* | WordPress core 4.7.0–7.1.3 | In the Wild (attempts) | No change in-window. 240,000+ blocked attempts (peaking at 74,000+ on 30 Oct). Still no victim publicly named and no confirmed compromise. Fix 7.1.4 / backport; block web access to wp-content/upgrade/ before updating. Public PoC: lysophavin18/CVE-2026-119977 (GitHub). A second repo claiming to bypass the 7.1.4 fix holds no code, only a download link — flagged as a likely malware lure, do not download. *Wordfence 8.1 vs WordPress Low. |
| CVE-2026-107441 — carried | 8.8 (Zyxel) / 9.8* | Zyxel GS1900 series switches, ten models, web management interface | In the Wild (zero-day) | No change in-window. June fix added a check that ran after the unsafe copy in /cgi-bin/dispatcher.cgi, so June-patched firmware stayed exploitable. Payloads: Jitterly backdoor and Sixzut rootkit; suspected Chinese-speaking actor Kapibala/Red Heron (attribution via Binarly/Acronis, not independently verified). *Secondary analysis rates it 9.8. Not in KEV as of 7 Nov. Fix: 22 Oct firmware; change default credentials. |
| CVE-2026-109593 / 109594 — carried | 9.1 / 6.8 | SonicWall Global Management System 9.5.2 and earlier (end-of-life) | Not reported exploited in-window | No change in-window. 109593 critical (9.1): unauthenticated information disclosure via internal file reads. 109594 medium (6.8): high-privilege SQL injection. SonicWall will not patch — migrate to Network Security Manager. |
| CVE-2026-72898 — carried | 10.0 | Metabase 58+ (free and paid editions) | In the Wild | No change in-window. CSA Singapore warned 4 Nov that this SQL-injection flaw, fixed 6 Aug and on KEV since 11 Aug, is actively exploited and a PoC is public. Public PoC: 4minx/CVE-2026-72898 (GitHub), referenced in CSA alert AL-2026-158. Safe releases: 58.24, 59.21, 60.17, 61.11, 62.9, 63.5+. |
| CVE-2026-40217 — carried | 8.8 | LiteLLM proxy | In the Wild (LLMjacking) | No change in-window. User-ID rebind to PROXY_ADMIN. Update LiteLLM, lock endpoints off the internet, rotate keys. |
| CVE-2026-98432 — carried | 9.8 | Linux kernel IPv4 TCP, 4.4+ | Research exploit only | No change in-window. Demonstrated exploit needs MPTCP; RHEL fixed kernels require reboot, Ubuntu was still in -proposed on 3 Nov. |
| CVE-2026-58115 — carried | 10.0 | Node-RED / Siemens IoT2050 | In the Wild | No change in-window. Port 1880 without adminAuth remains an active target. Siemens scope revision noted 8 Nov (more SIMATIC IoT2050 models). |
| CVE-2026-111497 — carried | 9.2 | Google Brotli; Cisco and Splunk products (Node2Shell) | In the Wild (KEV) | No change in-window. Scope as of 5 Nov: 19 Cisco products affected, dozens under investigation, about a dozen Splunk products also affected. Same Brotli root cause also affects ClickHouse. KEV federal due date fell 10 November, but per the KEV rule a deadline alone is not a new development. Qualys published detection/verification guidance for PHP2Shell and Node2Shell on 12 Nov (four non-intrusive QIDs, two intrusive verification QIDs) and reports 167 million PHP installations across 10,000+ customers; attackers probed PHP2Shell four days before a patch existed. |
Showing all 30 watchlist rows.
Vendor, SaaS and service-provider exposure affecting financial organisations.
Trezor confirmed three Safe 5 devices sold by Southeast Asian reseller CryptoBilis contained malicious hardware implants — an extra circuit board designed to capture the wallet recovery phrase from the screen and exfiltrate it over a cellular network. All three were bought from CryptoBilis between 20 Aug and 23 Sep 2026; 48 CryptoBilis customers have contacted Trezor since its 30 Oct warning. Firmware 2.13.1 (released 11 Nov) stops the implants found so far from capturing anything, but cannot protect phrases already captured. No affected customer has reported lost funds. Trezor has cut its reseller network by about 80%.
Critique: a crypto-custody supply-chain case, not a bank breach — but the pattern (a trusted reseller channel compromised, a firmware fix that cannot undo already-captured secrets) is the same one banks face with any third-party hardware or software in the custody chain. Clients holding crypto should be told to buy only from the vendor directly and to treat any recovery phrase entered on a reseller-bought device as compromised.
The CI secret-stealer campaign that used stolen GitHub credentials to push a payload into 61,764 repositories is still being measured. GitGuardian’s 13 Nov follow-up adds: the npm-hook delivery form bypassed GitHub’s workflow hold (public job logs from 19 repositories, 18 with successful exfiltration); hook commits rose to 838 per three hours on the morning of 11 Nov and 1,210 on the morning of 12 Nov; version 3 added Telegram delivery with fallback C2 153[.]75[.]82[.]159:8080/exfil (v2a C2 18[.]143[.]168[.]96:8080/exfil). Aikido’s counts stand at 4,837 compromised accounts, 61,764 probed repositories and the payload run in at least 1,806–1,835 repositories. The campaign is a GitHub-account takeover (stolen tokens), not a GitHub vulnerability.
Critique: financial firms running CI/CD on GitHub should already have audited and rotated secrets; the new detail that matters is the workflow-hold bypass — a control teams may have been relying on — and the Telegram delivery channel, which makes exfiltration harder to spot on network egress.
Both RMM stories in the actor section are supply-chain stories first: a compromised MSP panel reaches straight into customer networks. SCKit’s second wave (205 hosts, 41 organisations) and the N-able mining servers (21, 19 on Hotfix 2) show the route is live in both directions — MSP to customer, and potentially customer device back to the technician’s session. Firms should ask their providers whether they run ScreenConnect with the RMM+ extension and whether they run N-central with the Legacy API enabled, and hunt for RelayTrap, the TrapWatch task and the N-central IOCs in the Indicators section.
An outage that began 12 Nov (Exchange Online) disrupted Outlook, Teams, Copilot and Defender XDR for users across 74 countries — about 130,000 Downdetector Outlook reports at peak — and was mostly restored by about 03:00 SGT on 14 Nov, with email queues still draining. Microsoft states there was no malicious activity and no security breach; the outage is a technical issue “not related to cyber or AI/agents”. The UK’s NCSC warned on 13 Nov to beware scam calls and messages exploiting the outage. Critique: the incident is operational, not a threat event — but the fraud risk is real and immediate, since outage-themed phishing was already being warned about while mail was still delayed.
The Arara email-delivery breach continues to produce downstream disclosures (MUFG, Nomura, Cabinet Office and Hyakujushi Bank were covered in the 13 November edition), but no new Arara-linked disclosure appeared in this window. The platform’s 6 Nov third report put the total at 81,329,467 email addresses (deduplicated) across up to about 380 client companies, exfiltrated 28–31 Oct; the same platform was also abused 28–30 Oct to send up to about 7.13 million phishing emails impersonating a credit-card company. Do not add the per-company figures together — they are subsets of the same incident.
The open database that exposed 125 million+ SMS messages, including Swedbank account details and one-time codes, has no new development in this window. Swedbank has stopped using the provider and opened an investigation; CERT.LV is investigating. No evidence anyone other than researchers read the data; no confirmed account takeovers or financial loss.
Account takeover, mobile banking trojans, infostealers, DDoS extortion and vishing/smishing.
Cybercriminals exploited the payout APIs of Indian non-banking financial companies, with three Telangana lenders reporting 304 fraudulent transactions between 19 October and 6 November: VIVIFI Indian Finance detected 183 fraudulent transactions worth Rs 3.34 crore within 88 minutes on 19 October; Spandana Sphoorthy Financial reported 82 transactions amounting to Rs 7.8 crore on 1 November; Keerthana Finserv detected 39 transactions worth around Rs 7 crore on 6 November. Similar attacks were reported in six other states and Union territories (Karnataka, Maharashtra, Delhi, Chandigarh, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry), with cumulative losses across India estimated in the hundreds of crores of rupees — an estimate, not a confirmed total. Siphoned funds were diverted through 50–60 bank accounts in each case before being transferred to gaming and betting applications, including Dafabet, 1xBet, WinZO, Betway, My11Circle and Bet365. The Telangana Cyber Security Bureau attributes the exposure to exposed testing environments, outdated APIs, credentials embedded in source code and partner tokens that remain valid for too long. CERT-In’s advisory of 4 November flagged an AI-assisted campaign designated “CRAFTY FALCON” involving exposed testing systems, shared credentials, Rs 1 test transfers and unauthorised payouts, and repeat attacks were reported where remediation was incomplete.
Critique: whether AI was used in the Telangana incidents remains under examination, and the attackers have not been identified — traced IP addresses in six countries do not by themselves establish the attackers’ location. What is established is the pattern: exposed test environments, long-lived partner tokens and Rs 1 test transfers are the early warning, and the same CERT-In advisory already covered this campaign on 4 November. The Rs 1 test-transfer pattern is a concrete detection signal for fraud teams either way.
The US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has cut crypto exchange MEXC Global off from the US financial system over sanctions evasion and cybercrime ties. The FinCEN order says MEXC facilitated more than $16bn in illicit transactions between 2021 and 2026, acting as a clearinghouse for ransomware gangs, darknet activity and Russia, Iran and North Korea sanctions evasion, and cites AML/KYC deficiencies. MEXC says it is reviewing the order with legal counsel. (Reported via SentinelOne’s 13 Nov roundup; FinCEN is the primary.) Critique: this is an enforcement action, not a breach — but a $16bn illicit-flow figure attached to an exchange that banks’ customers use is a screening and de-risking signal, and Binance is already rejecting MEXC-linked transfers.
Korea Digital Exchange, operator of the Flybit virtual-asset exchange, suffered a leak of personal data of 40 customers through unauthorised external access on 1 November, disclosed 13 November (Korean press — translated). The entry route, the exact data items exposed and whether any customer funds were affected have not been disclosed. Small scale, but a confirmed leak at a Korean exchange in the same week as the wider Korean financial-sector incident wave.
Ukrainian Cyber Police, with German authorities, broke up a network that used social media and dating apps to lure European victims into bogus trading platforms and attacker wallets; four suspects were detained and hardware wallets, SIMs and more than $13,000 seized. About €4.3m in victim losses is reported. (Via SentinelOne’s 13 Nov roundup.) Fraud, reported — the figures come from the police operation, and the victim count has not been published.
Have I Been Pwned loaded 179,700 CastleRAT email addresses and 893,000 unique passwords on 13 Nov, from the Operation Endgame seizure (Gootloader, CastleRAT and StealC infrastructure; 235 servers and 257 domains seized; about 6.4 million victim datasets secured). The 12 Nov seizure itself was covered in the 13 November edition; the HIBP loading is the in-window development. Fraud teams should check staff and customer credentials against the notification.
SBI’s confirmed personal data is impersonation material — expect phishing citing SBI loan and account-opening details. KB Capital’s leaked staff and partner details are business-email-compromise material. The Tesouro Nacional leak (names, CPFs, Pix keys) and Caixa’s leaked CPFs are impersonation material for 7.6 million-plus people — expect phishing citing Caixa Vida e Previdência, Caixa Seguridade or the Treasury. Arara’s 81 million leaked shareholder emails are live phishing bait, and the same platform was already abused to send about 7.13 million phishing emails impersonating a credit-card company. The FSI leak gives attackers real assessment-staff contact details and firm names — expect phishing citing the FSI or the evaluation process. SMBC Nikko’s leaked holdings and account details are impersonation material for shareholders. Mirae Asset’s leak gives attackers 3,800 customer account numbers plus names, emails and mobiles of 35,255 employees. Binance, Mercado Bitcoin, Gopax and Nubank/Mercado Pago outage messages remain live phishing bait, and the Microsoft 365 outage is now being exploited in scam calls and messages — verify via official status pages only. Watch for Rs 1 test transactions on compromised accounts.
Singapore’s Cyber Security Agency issued Advisory AD-2026-017 on 13 Nov urging all organisations to strengthen cyber defences: the average monthly number of reported cyber incidents since September is three times the January–August average, and at least 12 incidents involving Singapore organisations or their service providers were reported between 24 October and 13 November. CSA says the incidents appear to reflect a broader global trend of opportunistic attacks rather than coordinated campaigns targeting Singapore, with attackers scanning for weak systems and using AI to find and exploit weaknesses faster. The Personal Data Protection Commission said separately on 13 Nov that the data breaches it observed arose from attacks exploiting common vulnerabilities in IT systems. CSA has briefed all critical information infrastructure sectors, including banking and finance. Named cases in the window include personal finance portal MoneySmart (3 Nov, customer data copied in Singapore and Hong Kong) and local clothing label Our Second Nature (reported 13 Nov). Critique: the advisory is general, not BFSI-specific, and names no financial victim — but the cause list (unpatched exposed systems, compromised vendors, AI-accelerated exploitation) matches this week’s exploitation themes exactly.
Customer allegations of thefts from Bank of Khartoum accounts via the Bankak mobile banking app remain reported / unconfirmed: more than 50 traders and customers in West Kordofan claim millions of Sudanese pounds were stolen, with individual reported losses of SDG 18–45 million. The bank has still not responded to comment requests, and no technical evidence that the app itself was breached has been published. Treat as an allegation, not a confirmed bank breach.
Techniques actually published for this edition’s actors and key vulnerabilities. No mapping is shown where the source published none.
| MITRE technique ID | Technique / behaviour | Seen in this edition | BFSI relevance / detection note | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1046, T1110.001, T1505.001, T1059.003, T1059.005, T1105, T1071.001, T1071.002, T1095, T1053.005, T1543.003, T1547.001, T1036.005, T1027.002, T1496, T1562.002, T1057, T1082, T1012, T1112 | Network service discovery; password guessing; SQL stored procedures; Windows command shell and Visual Basic; ingress tool transfer; web protocols and file transfer protocols; non-application-layer protocol; scheduled task/job; Windows service; registry run keys / startup folder; masquerading; obfuscated files; resource hijacking (Monero mining); impair defences; system information discovery; system information discovery (registry); modify registry | FortiGuard Labs T-SQL campaign against internet-exposed Microsoft SQL Server (published 12 Nov; catch-up — not in the 13 November edition) | Direct: SQL Server underpins core banking and payment back-ends. The campaign brute-forces TCP 1433 with a 2,700+ password list (users sa, admin), enables xp_cmdshell, then drops an XMRig miner and a Gh0st RAT variant. Detect on failed 1433 logins, xp_cmdshell enablement and scheduled tasks mimicking Microsoft Edge Update. No SQL Server vulnerability is involved — this is a configuration failure, not a patch failure. | Confirmed |
| T1190, T1072, T1136, T1552, T1496, T1068 | Exploit public-facing application; software deployment tools; create account; unsecured credentials; resource hijacking; privilege escalation | N-able 4EverAble2Shell / Agent2Shell chains | RMM used by MSPs serving small banks. Hunt for requests to /dms/services/ServerUI referencing jline.internal.TerminalLineSettings, unexpected xvd.service units and mining processes. The Legacy API is the gating control. | Reported in secondary summary |
| T1595.001, T1595.002, T1583.003, T1588.002, T1588.005, T1588.007, T1190, T1133, T1078, T1078.004, T1059.008, T1047, T1136.001, T1505.003, T1550.002, T1003.002, T1003.004, T1557.001, T1555.003, T1552.001, T1110.001, T1021.002, T1021.006, T1572, T1567 | Active scanning (vulnerability and IP block); acquire infrastructure; obtain capabilities (exploits, code signing, AI); exploit public-facing application; external remote services; valid accounts (default and domain); network device CLI; Windows Management Instrumentation; create account (local); server software component (web shell); pass the ticket; OS credential dumping (security account manager, LSA secrets); adversary-in-the-middle; credentials from password stores; unsecured credentials; brute force; remote services (SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Windows Remote Management); protocol tunnelling; exfiltration over web service | Group-IB DarkLunnen — offensive operations against European targets (blog dated to about 13 Nov; substance covered in the 13 November edition without the mapping) | Indirect but material: the operator used a modified FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 PoC to create a backdoor super-admin account, stole cleartext VPN passwords from a FortiGate config, and brute-forced 5,775 VNC endpoints. FortiGate edge/VPN exploitation and stolen VPN credentials are a direct path into financial networks; no financial victim is named. Note T1588.007 — obtain capabilities: artificial intelligence — the operator had Moonshot AI’s Kimi coding assistant installed, though Group-IB says the evidence does not establish whether or how it was used. | Confirmed |
| — none published | Agentic intrusion via ARTEX and related frameworks (planner/worker LLM agents, autonomous exploitation and credential theft) | FBI FLASH-20261113-001; Cisco Talos ARTEX post (13 Nov) | Financial services explicitly named. Neither source publishes a MITRE mapping, so no IDs are shown — do not invent one. Detection rests on the behavioural indicators in the FLASH: sub-second Azure capability checks and test blob write/delete, ARM deployment dry-runs, AWS DryRun probes, lookups to api.db-ip[.]com, output to rotating webhook.site URLs, unexpected egress to LLM APIs and self-hosted gateways (CLIProxyAPI, New API), and new 100 GB volumes before exfiltration. | No mapping published |
| — none published | Rogue ScreenConnect client deployment; session-cookie theft (RelayTrap); technician-workstation trap | Microsoft SCKit teardown; Huntress second wave (13 Nov) | MSP supply-chain risk for banks and insurers. No MITRE mapping was published in the Microsoft post. Hunt for the TrapWatch scheduled task, the sckit-decoder.ps1 artefact, the c=Exploited<N> client markers and the domains in the Indicators section. | No mapping published |
Recurring-TTP watch: the techniques that keep recurring across editions are exploitation of internet-facing management and edge interfaces (RMM panels, gateways, VPNs), weak or default credentials on exposed services (SQL Server 1433, FortiGate VPNs), and abuse of trusted third-party channels (MSP remote-access tools, email-delivery and CI/CD services). No technique was published with a MITRE ID for the ARTEX or SCKit items in this edition — that gap is stated, not filled.
The three AI roles are kept separate. Vendor forecasts are marked as forecasts.
Railway AI-secrets breach — confirmed (via SentinelOne roundup, 13 Nov). Cloud host Railway confirmed attackers escaped build-filesystem isolation on 20 Oct via an unknown flaw and stole decrypted customer auth secrets, including AI-provider API keys — likely for resale or model distillation — hitting at most about 1.85% of workspaces (about 100,000 environments) and linked-account tokens for 1,852 users. About $740,000 of unauthorised AI usage followed. No customer databases were accessed and no private Git repositories were downloaded; tokens were rotated and Railway will cover unreimbursed fraudulent charges. Attackers used autonomous AI agents in a 26-hour contest with defenders.
ARTEX agents hunting AI keys (Talos, 13 Nov). Unattributed agents searched public GitHub for credentials and AI API keys and, in one case, moved from GitHub search to Azure Key Vault exfiltration within five minutes. Datadog-observed ARTEX activity in AWS included compromised long-term keys, public Cognito pools and CloudWatch searches for financial information and secrets.
wfx-loot (status update). The CI secret stealer continued to harvest AI service keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, Cursor, Copilot) from compromised repositories — see the supply-chain section.
ARTEX — the item of the day (FBI FLASH + Talos, 13 Nov). An open-source, LLM-driven agentic pentesting framework is being used in live intrusions since at least August 2026, letting low-skill actors run complex multi-target campaigns at machine speed — some intrusions went from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours. Financial services are explicitly named among the targeted sectors. Co-deployed tooling includes AntiFox, CyberStrikeAI and PentAGI. Talos’s forecast — marked as a forecast — is that future chains will likely culminate in autonomous data exfiltration and ransomware activation.
KYC-deepfake campaign (Amazon MadPot, 13 Nov). Amazon Threat Intelligence’s companion honeypot post captured ARTEX AI-agent requests including AI-credential theft and a KYC-deepfake campaign. This is a honeypot observation, not a confirmed bank-targeted campaign — do not present it as one.
No new AI-scaled phishing, vishing or deepfake campaign against a named bank was found in this window beyond the MadPot observation above. The FBI’s FaceStealer announcement ($400m+, 900+ webcam videos) is 12 November reporting, already covered in the 13 November edition; its 13 November coverage adds no new facts.
AI agents as a new attack surface — research walkthrough, not a real incident (Token Security, via BleepingComputer, 13 Nov). Researchers showed how an AI invoice-processing agent could be tricked by hidden text in an email into changing vendor bank details in an ERP system — a hypothetical walkthrough of five enterprise security gaps in agentic systems, not a real incident. It is usable as a control lesson, not as evidence of an attack: firms deploying invoice or payment agents should treat agent tool calls (especially bank-detail changes) as privileged actions with human approval, and should test for prompt injection through email and document content.
CSA Singapore (13 Nov) says AI is letting attackers find and exploit weaknesses faster — the same acceleration theme as the ARTEX reporting, stated by a regulator rather than a vendor.
Taiwan’s FSC has issued an agentic-AI security advisory for the sector (covered in the 13 November edition); no new development in this window. Railway’s 26-hour contest between autonomous attacker agents and defenders is a live example of AI-versus-AI incident response, and of the detection-time compression banks should plan for.
Notable indicators from this edition, and prioritised steps for SOC and vulnerability-management teams.
Every source is hyperlinked to the original vendor, government or primary reporting; translated items link to the original-language article.