BFSI Cyber Threat Intelligence Briefing

Saturday 14 November 2026

Window: approximately 13 November 09:00 SGT to 14 November 09:00 SGT. New and overnight developments, deduplicated against the 13 November edition, with gaps stated plainly.

Window 24 hours to ~09:00 SGTKEV 2 new additions 13 Nov — total 1,781ARTEX FBI FLASH + TalosSBI 375,000-record dark-web set
ARTEX
FBI FLASH + Talos

An LLM-driven agentic pentest framework is in live intrusions against financial services. FBI FLASH-20261113-001 and a Cisco Talos write-up land the same day; >2,500 ARTEX C2 IPs, 1,600+ exposed consoles, 2,250+ ConnectWise downstream tenants.

SCKit
Second wave

Microsoft publishes its teardown of the ScreenConnect worm; Huntress reports a second wave on 13 Nov — 205 hosts across 41 organisations. The technician-trap spread is designed behaviour and still has not been observed to succeed.

N-able N-central
Exploitation confirmed

Researchers count 21 production servers mining XMRig within hours of the PoC, 19 of them on Hotfix 2. N-able has published IOCs but says it has seen no compromise using the new flaws. Still no fix — disable the Legacy API.

KEV
2 additions, due 16 Nov

Check Point CVE-2026-123039 (Gaia privilege escalation, chained with PHP2Shell) and UnrealIRCd CVE-2026-114713 join the catalogue on 13 Nov. Both carry a 16 November federal due date.

Executive summary

1

AI-driven intrusion is now a named, government-warned threat to finance: the FBI and Cisco Talos both published on ARTEX in the same window. ARTEX is an open-source, LLM-driven agentic pentesting framework in use by malicious actors since at least August 2026. The FBI’s FLASH-20261113-001 names financial services among ten targeted sectors, cites a South Korean financial-sector campaign that exposed personal data of about 67,000 people, and the ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply-chain compromise that reached 2,250+ downstream customer environments. Talos counts more than 2,500 ARTEX-associated C2 IP addresses and says campaigns range from opportunistic scanning to targeted intrusion and supply-chain activity, including Storm-3358 hitting financial organisations in Southeast Asia. Some intrusions went from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours. The framework needs almost no operator skill, which is the point: it compresses the time banks have to detect and respond, and it often leaves no known indicators behind.

2

The RMM crisis is now a second wave, and the N-able chains are being exploited faster than vendors can patch. Microsoft published its own teardown of SCKit, the worm abusing cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels, and Huntress reported a second wave on 13 Nov — 205 hosts across 41 organisations, a new installer host and new markers. The technician-trap spread remains designed behaviour, not an observed infection path. Separately, the N-able 4EverAble2Shell chain was exploited within about five hours of its public PoC: researchers count 21 production N-central servers mining Monero, 19 of them already on Hotfix 2, while N-able says it has seen no compromise using the new flaws and has still not shipped a fix. The one solid control is disabling the Legacy API, which is not the default. CISA added the Check Point Gaia privilege-escalation flaw chained with PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-123039) to its exploited-vulnerabilities catalogue on 13 Nov.

3

A wave of confirmed financial-sector breaches landed overnight, led by India’s largest bank. State Bank of India filed a police case a month after hackers stole a 375,000-record set from its Global IT Centre; only 3,897 records in that set have been confirmed to hold customer personal data, and the bank says no account numbers, balances, passwords, one-time codes, card data, PAN or Aadhaar were in the identified records — the 375,000 figure is the size of the dark-web dataset, not a confirmed victim count. KB Capital in South Korea confirmed a breach of 1,811 people, and Brazil’s National Treasury confirmed a leak of about 30,000 registrations and about 4,000 Pix keys. INC Ransom claimed Raymond James, Game Changer Wealth and Jamaica’s JETS payment network — all unverified. Trezor confirmed hardware implants in three Safe 5 wallets sold by a Southeast Asian reseller. Singapore’s CSA says reported cyber incidents have tripled since September. Binance has still not published Recovery Update #10 or its full zero-knowledge proof, while the US Justice Department says more than $2.7bn of the stolen funds have been frozen.

Threat actor activity

Confirmed, reported and unconfirmed items are labelled as such. No MITRE mapping is shown where the source published none.

NewConfirmed

ARTEX operators — agentic intrusion frameworks

Financial services and cryptocurrency; ten sectors named by the FBI, including finance

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published in either the FBI FLASH or the Talos post. ARTEX is an open-source, LLM-driven agentic pentesting framework (Go, no model of its own; plugs into GPT, Claude, DeepSeek, Grok, GLM and Kimi) that plans and executes intrusions with little operator input. Talos found co-deployed tooling including ScopeWeaver, AntiFox, CyberStrikeAI, PentAGI (more than 700 reachable instances found via Censys), VShell, AdaptixC2, Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, GoPhish, Nessus, Acunetix, Fscan and Chisel. Named campaigns: Storm-3358, financially motivated and Cambodia-based, targeting financial organisations primarily in Southeast Asia and deploying RATs (VShell, AdaptixC2, WISP); an unattributed Chinese-speaking, financially motivated campaign against South Korean financial organisations that resulted in data exfiltration; VAPOR PANDA (CrowdStrike, from 17 Oct) against 200+ organisations in 14+ countries including the financial sector, with confirmed post-compromise activity at nine; Storm-0940 using ARTEX to accelerate sign-ins against 2,250+ downstream Microsoft 365 tenants after the ConnectWise credential compromise; unattributed agents searching public GitHub for credentials and AI API keys, in one case moving from GitHub search to Azure Key Vault exfiltration within five minutes. Amazon Threat Intelligence’s companion MadPot post the same day captured ARTEX AI-agent requests, including AI-credential theft and a KYC-deepfake campaign.
Impact
Confirmed (FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 Nov; Cisco Talos, 13 Nov 20:57 UTC / 14 Nov 04:57 SGT). The FBI says ARTEX has been used by a variety of malicious actors since at least August 2026, that some intrusions went from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours, and that more than 1,600 publicly exposed ARTEX consoles were found by early November. Talos identified more than 2,500 ARTEX-associated C2 IP addresses. The South Korean financial-sector campaign cited by the FBI exposed personal data of about 67,000 people. The framework lets low-skill actors run complex multi-target campaigns, and Talos warns future chains will likely culminate in autonomous data exfiltration and ransomware activation. Snort and ClamAV coverage is published in the Talos post. Critique: the FBI and Talos agree on the shape of the threat but neither publishes a MITRE mapping or a victim list, so detection rests on the behavioural indicators in the FLASH and the IOCs in the Indicators section — and Talos is explicit that there are often no known IOCs at all. The 67,000-person figure is the FBI’s, for one cited campaign; it is not a total for ARTEX activity.
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

Unknown actor — ScreenConnect SCKit worm

Managed service providers and their clients; MSPs serve small banks and financial firms

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published in the Microsoft post. Microsoft’s teardown (13 Nov) confirms ConnectWise’s reporting: attackers use the MSP’s panel Run Command to silently install a rogue ScreenConnect client (MSI with a c=Exploited<N> marker) connected to attacker infrastructure; a batch launcher fetches a PowerShell decoder from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev, which AES-256-CBC-decrypts (PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, device-specific MachineGuid key) and extracts the SCKit bundle. Persistence via scheduled tasks (TrapWatch) and Run registry entries, plus Defender path exclusions. RelayTrap rebuilds a malicious ScreenConnect client from local libraries and is designed to deliver the launcher to a connecting technician’s workstation; a separate component steals .ASPXAUTH session cookies from Chrome, Edge and Opera (database and memory-scanning routes, DPAPI/Chromium key decryption) and uses them with ToolboxRelayUploader.exe to push payloads through the victim’s management console to other managed devices. Initial access remains unconfirmed; ConnectWise is investigating abuse of the RMM+ extension (v1.0.31/1.0.32 accepted an empty API key when none was configured), bypassing console accounts, roles and MFA. ConnectWise states the fix for CVE-2026-84869 blocks the endpoint-to-technician spread.
Impact
Confirmed (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 13 Nov; Huntress update, 13 Nov 17:30 ET / 14 Nov 06:30 SGT). Second wave on 13 Nov: at 16:12 UTC, 205 hosts across 41 organisations were hit, again deploying rogue clients and checking for sckit-decoder.ps1 (no follow-on executions observed). New installer host 185.241.211[.]197 (attributed by Huntress to 1337 Services GmbH, a bulletproof hoster); installer marker now c=ExploitedNOTUSA; also Exploited529 and Exploited809 (190 downstream clients from a single panel). Wave 1 total stands at 288 hosts across 48 organisations. Huntress still has not observed the technician-takeover succeeding in recovered host logs — the spread is a designed capability, not a confirmed infection path. Microsoft stresses removing the rogue client alone does not remove persistence or invalidate exposed web sessions, and gives Defender XDR hunting queries. Critique: the wave-2 count is a separate Huntress observation; do not add it to the wave-1 total, since overlap between the waves is not established. The campaign is now in its second wave with no sign of stopping, and the entry route is still unconfirmed.
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

Unknown actor — N-able 4EverAble2Shell / Agent2Shell

RMM platform used by MSPs serving small banks and financial firms

TTPs
MITRE IDs from a secondary summary of the chains (SockAnalyst), not vendor-published: T1190, T1072, T1136, T1552, T1496, T1068. 4EverAble2Shell: unauthenticated RCE as root on the N-central server, chaining Apache Axis CVE-2026-90436 (9.8) with a separate N-central privilege escalation (no CVE yet; abuses the privileged setLDFileOwner helper and a symlink to make a root-owned script writable, then invokes serverControl). Requires the Legacy API to be enabled (non-default). Agent2Shell: chains 10+ flaws to run commands as SYSTEM on managed Windows agents; also requires the Legacy API. PoCs published 12 Nov by Sean Bales (repo under the renamed account MSPNightmare/CVEs), tested against Hotfix 2 (2026.4.1.26).
Impact
Exploitation confirmed by researchers, contested by the vendor — flag, do not resolve. SecurityWeek (13 Nov 07:20 UTC / 15:20 SGT) reports the chain was exploited within about five hours of the PoC: Huntback counted 21 production N-central servers mining XMRig, 19 of them on the Hotfix 2 build, across the US (9), South Africa (4), Canada (4), UK, Germany, France and Sweden; the miner uses about half the CPU cores and the payload is pulled by curl from 157.20.241[.]16. N-able’s 13 Nov update (03:50 UTC / 11:50 SGT) says it has identified additional IOCs and is working with specific affected customers, has turned off the Intune integration as a precaution and restricted the Legacy API — but N-able has not publicly published the IP/domain/hash IOCs itself (the IOCs in the Indicators section come from researchers), and its 12 Nov text still said it had “seen no signs of compromise”. There is still no fix for the new chains; a follow-up hotfix is planned. N-able says hosted N-central is not affected and servers on HF2 with Legacy API disabled are not exposed. Previdian warns the public PoC is unverified and may contain malware. Critique: the two accounts cannot both be complete — either the mining servers are compromised through this chain and the vendor has not confirmed them, or the miners arrived another way. Either way, Hotfix 2 is explicitly not sufficient, and the Legacy API is the control that matters.
NewConfirmed

Unknown actor — State Bank of India

India’s largest bank; Global IT Centre, CBD Belapur, Navi Mumbai

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. No intrusion detail published. Hackers using the name “Siriusim” allegedly accessed the bank’s Global IT Centre server on 9 Oct at about 16:13 and extracted data until about 18:00 on 15 Oct. The attribution to “Siriusim” is a claim in the police complaint, not confirmed by the bank.
Impact
Confirmed as an incident by the bank (stock-exchange filing, 21 Oct) and by police (FIR registered 12 Nov; press reports 13 Nov). The stolen set was about 375,000 records — 32 CSV files from the YONO 2.0 and RAAS applications, plus JSON files and 2,721 PDF files — and was posted on the dark web. The breach was detected 16 Oct. SBI’s filing says it was alerted 16 Oct by its threat-intelligence provider, the Defence Cyber Agency and CERT-In, and that preliminary analysis of the dark-web records identified 3,897 customer records containing personal data (names, mobile numbers, dates of birth, gender, email, address, branch/CIF and loan or lead metadata). The bank says core operations were not materially affected and it has engaged a CERT-In-empanelled agency for an independent assessment. Police say SBI told them the data had been removed from the dark web and had not been misused — that claim is unverified in the reporting. Critique: the 375,000 figure is the size of the dark-web dataset, not a confirmed count of breached customers — do not present it as such. The one-month gap between detection (16 Oct) and the police complaint (12 Nov) is unexplained, and removal from one dark-web posting does not prove the data was not copied or sold first. The bank says no account numbers, balances, passwords, one-time codes, card data, PAN or Aadhaar were in the identified records, which limits direct account-takeover risk but leaves the confirmed personal data as live impersonation material.
NewConfirmed

Unknown actor — KB Capital

Capital-finance arm of KB Financial Group, South Korea; vehicle lease asset management system

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. Intrusion method and attacker unidentified. The company detected repeated abnormal information lookups from a domestic IP address; the IP itself was not disclosed.
Impact
Confirmed (company website notice, 12 Nov; Korean press, 13 Nov — translated). A malicious attack detected 10 Nov exposed personal data of 1,811 people — 20 customers and about 1,791 partner-company employees and staff — from the vehicle lease asset management system. Customer data: names, dates of birth, mobile phone numbers, addresses and vehicle registration numbers. Staff and partner data: user accounts, names, mobile and landline numbers, department names, company names and job titles. No passwords or authentication information were included, per the company, and the system is an internal platform unrelated to financial transactions. The company halted the affected systems, blocked the external access route, reported to the Financial Supervisory Service the same day, posted a per-person lookup on its website and pledged full compensation for any loss. The 1,811 figure may include duplicates and could change. This is the third confirmed breach in Korea’s capital-finance sector after Hyundai Capital (September) and KDB Capital (October), and the FSS is expected to carry out an on-site inspection. Critique: direct account-takeover risk is limited, but staff and partner account details are impersonation and business-email-compromise material — and the pattern (an internal, non-transaction system reached from a domestic IP) echoes the FSI breach the day before, though no link has been established.
NewConfirmed

Unknown actor — Brazil’s National Treasury (Tesouro Nacional)

Brazil’s federal treasury; e-Serviços portal users and federal payment recipients

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. Attacker and entry route not disclosed; investigation ongoing.
Impact
Confirmed (Treasury confirmation, evening of 12 Nov; Portuguese press, 13 Nov — translated). Unauthorised access detected 4 Nov exposed personal data in two databases: the e-Serviços portal, where the public requests and tracks Treasury services — names, CPFs (Brazilian tax IDs) and email addresses of about 30,000 registrations — and an internal analytical database used to study federal payments already made — about 4,000 Pix keys of payment recipients, with data on those payments. The Treasury said there was no financial impact and no core payment system was compromised, and warned the exposed data could be used to make fraud attempts more convincing. It notified the data-protection authority (ANPD) and the government incident-response centre (CTIR Gov). Critique: distinct from the Caixa Vida e Previdência case — do not conflate the two. No payment system was compromised, so there is no direct transfer risk, but Pix keys plus CPFs plus emails are direct fraud material for impersonating the Treasury and federal payment recipients.
NewReported / unconfirmed

INC Ransom — Raymond James Financial, Game Changer Wealth, JETS Jamaica

US investment bank / wealth manager; Louisiana wealth manager; Jamaica’s payment-network operator

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. No intrusion detail published for any of the three listings.
Impact
Reported — leak-site claims only, none confirmed by the named organisations. Raymond James Financial (St Petersburg, Florida; about $2 trillion in assets under administration) was listed 12 Nov with an estimated attack date of 10 Nov. Hudson Rock infostealer telemetry cited in the reporting shows 153 compromised user accounts and 37 third-party employee credentials linked to the firm — that telemetry is not proof of a ransomware intrusion. Game Changer Wealth (Louisiana, offices in Baton Rouge, Lafayette and Metairie) was listed the same day, also with an estimated attack date of 10 Nov; no data has been published. Jamaica Electronic Transfer Services (JETS), operator of the MultiLink debit-card network and the ACH payment switch, was listed with an estimated attack date of 21 Oct; the listing was picked up 13 Nov. The October incident itself is confirmed — JETS admitted hackers accessed a limited part of its internal administrative systems, and files accessed may have exposed historical debit-card numbers and names of some ACH transfer recipients — but INC Ransom’s responsibility for it is unconfirmed: Jamaica’s Cyber Incident Response Team says it is aware of the claim but cannot substantiate it. JETS and the Bank of Jamaica say the MultiLink and ACH networks themselves were not compromised and remain operational, and PINs, CVVs and expiry dates are not stored in the affected systems. Critique: the Raymond James and Game Changer listings predate the window slightly (12 Nov) but were not in the 13 November edition, so they are new to the brief. Treat all three as claims until a company statement or published data appears; the JETS case is the most consequential if true, because it is a national payment switch.
NewReported / unconfirmed

PixelLeaks — Four Points Financial Solutions

Independent financial advisory and brokerage firm, Canada

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. No intrusion detail published.
Impact
Reported — claim only (BreachSense, 13 Nov). The actor PixelLeaks claims Four Points Financial Solutions Inc. as a breach victim; the leak size is unknown and no data sample is published. BreachSense states the claim has not been verified. No company statement has been found. Watch item only.
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

Unknown actor — Korean Financial Security Institute

Financial-sector security assessment body, South Korea; assessment staff at banks, insurers, securities firms

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. New detail in-window (13 Nov, Korean press — translated): the attack used an SMS-authentication bypass vulnerability in normal member registration to create a fake account, then exploited insufficient access-permission verification in the evaluation system’s operator check function to download files. SBS reported, citing FSI staff, that the evaluation system had been reverted from a pre-registered fixed-IP allow-list to accepting dynamic IPs because financial firms found the restriction inconvenient, and that the attackers exploited that opening.
Impact
Confirmed. New in-window: the Financial Services Commission released a detailed timeline to the National Assembly (13 Nov, via Maeil Business Newspaper — translated): the FSI detected abnormal access at 10:50 on 9 Nov, confirmed a webshell attack at 13:54 that failed because of file-encryption policy, detected an unauthorised login attempt at 14:11, stopped the service at 14:19 and confirmed the data leak at 15:50; the FSC was notified at 14:41 on 10 Nov and a formal incident report filed at 15:48; the Personal Information Protection Commission was notified at 21:45 on 11 Nov; all 246 attack IP addresses were blocked on 12 Nov (revised up from 236). Dong-A Ilbo reported about 850 records containing personal information had been exposed — a higher count than the FSI’s earlier estimate of about 300 personal-information items, and the two figures have not been reconciled. The FSC special audit of the FSI starts Monday 16 November. Critique: the dynamic-IP reversion is the sharpest lesson here — a security control was loosened for convenience and then exploited. The 850-versus-300 record counts remain unreconciled; do not pick one.
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

Unknown actor — Crédit Mutuel Arkéa

Cooperative banking group, France

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. New detail in-window (13 Nov, AFP interview with chair Julien Carmona, reported via Boursorama): the attackers created fake IBANs, including from the group’s online bank Fortuneo, to trigger payment orders from Arkéa’s own account through instant-payment systems — calling it a “heist of a new kind” and the first successful fraudulent attack of its kind against a French or European bank. The chair said the attackers took material from a hacked supplier to get into the bank, and that the group worked from 1 November to make the illegitimate transfers appear legitimate. The bank detected the abnormal transactions on 3 November; Fortuneo’s systems and customers were not affected. The service provider’s identity is still undisclosed.
Impact
Confirmed. The mechanism is now described, but the loss figure is still not final: the bank has validated only the order of magnitude of the reported $133 million (about €118 million) figure, and says losses were lower than that figure. A portion of funds was blocked and recovery efforts are under way; on 6 November the confederation president said part of the missing money had already been recovered, without saying how much. Critique: the fake-IBAN/instant-payment mechanism is the new, material fact — it is a third-party-platform-to-bank-account route, not a customer-account compromise, and it is exactly the pattern peers should be checking their own instant-payment controls against. The final amount and the service provider’s identity remain undisclosed, and the “hacked supplier” detail comes from the chair’s interview as re-reported, not from a bank statement — treat the provider’s own breach status as still unconfirmed.
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

TraderTraitor — Binance

Crypto exchange, global

TTPs
No new MITRE list in-window.
Impact
No Recovery Update #10 has been published, and the full zero-knowledge proof for the 198-token proof-of-reserves snapshot is still being generated, not published — the snapshot (00:00 UTC 12 Nov) should not be presented as verified. Status updates in-window (secondary reporting): the US Justice Department said on 12 Nov that combined government and private-sector efforts have frozen more than $2.7bn stolen from Binance, and courts have authorised seizure or restraint of more than $1.2bn of it. The Hacker News’ 13 Nov roundup puts about $3.0bn still in theft-linked addresses, with six NEAR meme coins used to launder about $430,000. Binance’s LinkedIn withdrawal update (13 Nov) newly re-enabled HYPE and APT withdrawals and aims to reopen HYPE, INJ, APT, PLASMA, NEAR and LTC by the end of next week. Binance has not published a final root-cause report or outside-review findings. Critique: the recovery figures come from the Justice Department and secondary reporting, not from Binance, and the $2.7bn frozen versus $1.2bn authorised versus $3.0bn still held are different measures from different sources — do not add them together.
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

Storm-1175 — Insight Credit Union

US lenders; Insight Credit Union and Sawyer Savings Bank

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. The compromise was inside the bank’s managed service provider’s environment, not the bank’s own systems. Microsoft links the group to N-able N-central exploitation via MSPs.
Impact
Confirmed. Status update not recorded in the 13 November edition: Insight Credit Union filed breach notices with the Texas and Vermont attorneys general on 6 Nov (incident 4–7 September, discovered 13 October); 67,487 people in total per the Texas filing, with Social Security numbers, driver’s licence / government ID numbers, account and card numbers exposed. Storm claimed 209 GB on 15 September. The other four claimed banks have still not publicly confirmed or denied. Sawyer Savings Bank’s figures are unchanged (16,069 people, names and Social Security numbers).
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

Unknown actor — Bank SinoPac

Bank, Taiwan; 418 customers hit in the 3 Nov incident

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. External attackers exploited a vendor-supplied “middle platform” (middleware layer of the bank’s new online-banking app) security setting; 427 abnormal transactions, NT$41.76 million siphoned to a Taipei Fubon Bank account; the bank reimbursed customers on 3 Nov.
Impact
Confirmed. New in-window (FSC briefing, 12 Nov — published just before the window, clarified in 13 Nov coverage): the FSC said the two newer cases are not SinoPac-style system breaches. Hua Nan Bank: 2 transfers totalling NT$100,000, one customer, device-bound with password, biometric and OTP passed and the IP matching the customer’s history; the bank says no system flaw. Taipei Fubon Bank: 2 transfers of NT$10,000 each, one customer, still being checked. The FSC still required both banks to file major-incident reports, and convened a CISO meeting with 76 institutions on 12 Nov. SinoPac’s own full report was due 12 Nov; there is no confirmation in the window that it was filed or what it says — flag as an open follow-up. The disputed system is used by no other Taiwanese bank.
Update — previously coveredConfirmed

Unknown actor — Caixa Vida e Previdência

Life-insurance and private-pension subsidiary of Caixa Seguridade / Caixa Econômica Federal, Brazil; 7.6 million active customers

TTPs
No MITRE mapping published. Attacker and entry route not disclosed; investigation ongoing.
Impact
Confirmed. No new development in-window beyond a timeline note: the 13 Nov Portuguese re-reporting adds that the ANPD was notified 11 Nov and supplementary information is due by 10 Dec. Figures unchanged: registration data for all 7.6 million active customers plus former customers; names and CPFs throughout, plus addresses, phones, emails and birth dates in part of the records; the “no financial data” conclusion is explicitly preliminary. The conflict stands: some wire reporting says the data was published, while the company says it has no evidence of public disclosure or misuse so far. The Banco do Brasil 22.7-million-record claim has no new corroboration in the window.
No new development in-window: Seven Bank; SMBC Nikko Securities; SMBC Consumer Finance; Mirae Asset Securities; Philippine SEC; Bank Rakyat; Storm-3358 (the Talos ARTEX post above is vendor analysis of autonomous AI tooling, not a new Storm-3358 campaign, victim or tool development); Deadlock — Fidex, Coopebis, Kadick; N0n / Krybit; Aoqin — Tyfone; Payoutsking — iLending & J.C. Flowers & Co.; Bank of Khartoum (Bankak allegations, still unconfirmed); INC_RANSOM — Shenwan Hongyuan (H.K.) and StrucSure Home Warranty (claims still unverified); DarkLunnen (Group-IB blog now dated to about 13 Nov; substance already covered, no financial victim named). No new in-window item was found for Vanguard Group, Gopax, Mercado Bitcoin, NTT Docomo, Pekin Insurance, Higginbotham, Qilin / AXE – EXPERTS, the two unnamed Canadian firms (8 Nov), Scry Analytics, FIN7 / Carbanak, Scattered Spider, RansomHub, Cl0p, or a FI-specific Initial Access Broker. Absence of reporting is not evidence of absence of activity.

Vulnerability watchlist

Two CISA KEV additions were made on 13 November. The catalogue stands at 1,781 entries (version 2026.11.13). The Barracuda pair (CVE-2026-116606 / CVE-2026-111560) and Ivanti CVE-2026-118527 fell due on 13 November with no new attribution, IOCs or PoC in-window — per the standing rule a due date alone is not a new development, so they are not carried forward as watchlist rows.

CVE IDCVSS scoreAffected productExploitation status (PoC / in the wild)Relevance to finance
CVE-2026-123039 — NEW KEV 13 Nov7.8Check Point Security Gateways (Gaia DynamicCLI)In the Wild (KEV, due 16 Nov)New in-window (CISA KEV addition, 13 Nov). Local privilege escalation in Gaia DynamicCLI, chained with PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619) in the Mobile Access Portal to gain root on unpatched Security Gateways. Check Point reported exploitation from 30 Oct to 4 Nov, “a couple of dozen” systems in one region. Fix is the November Jumbo Hotfix: R82.20 Take 14, R82.10 Take 52, R82 Take 132, R81.20 Take 174 or later; stopping dynamic_server is a temporary mitigation. No standalone PoC reported — exploitation is via the chained PHP2Shell flaw. KEV ransomware use: Unknown. Verification limit: the live CISA feed fetched during this run was a stale cached copy (1 Nov); the addition is confirmed by three independent KEV trackers (Carthage Electronics, Axis Intelligence, EastBayCyber) agreeing on the date, catalogue version 2026.11.13 and 1,781 entries — see Could not verify.
CVE-2026-114713 — NEW KEV 13 Nov8.6UnrealIRCd 6.0.0–6.2.7 (5.x also affected, end-of-life)In the Wild (KEV, due 16 Nov)New in-window (CISA KEV addition, 13 Nov). Improper neutralisation of delimiters (CWE-140) in the IRCv3 label handling; a normal user on a linked network can run commands with server authority. The project said exploitation had already been observed online in its 7 Nov advisory. Fix: 6.2.7.1 or the emergency hot-patch bundle-20261107. Low BFSI relevance — IRC servers are not a finance stack component; included only as a one-line KEV note. KEV ransomware use: Unknown. No PoC reported.
Citrix NetScaler November batch — STATUS, CVE records 13 Nov9.5 (highest)NetScaler ADC, NetScaler Gateway, NetScaler Console, Secure Access Client (Windows/Linux)Not known exploited — no PoC reportedNew in-window development: the CVE records for the batch were published 13 Nov. SecurityWeek counts 28 fixes, nine critical; SecurityOnline said four bulletins fixing 31 CVEs; The Hacker News said 12 flaws. The count is still unresolved between sources — do not pick one. Headline flaws: CVE-2026-107412 (9.5, memory flaw); CVE-2026-120868 (9.3, memory overflow in packet processing, affects all ADC/Gateway deployments); CVE-2026-120869 (9.4, improper authentication in NetScaler Console, unauthenticated bypass of authentication to access restricted resources — adjacent-network, needs Console IP access); CVE-2026-118268 (8.5, Secure Access Client for Windows privilege escalation to SYSTEM) and CVE-2026-118269 (Linux equivalent). Fixes: ADC/Gateway 14.1-73.57 and 13.1-64.39; Console 14.1-74.34. Citrix says it is not aware of any exploits for the announced vulnerabilities. Separately, CitrixBleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777) is still actively exploited — OffSeq honeypots recorded 316,950 exploitation attempts from 19 source IPs in the last 30 days, last seen 13 Nov 21:41 UTC (14 Nov 05:41 SGT), with DragonForce ransomware as the severe outcome in past cases.
CVE-2026-119618 — STATUS, PoC verified as crash-only9.8 (Red Hat) / no CVSS yet (NVD)Apache HTTP Server 2.4.55–2.4.70; standalone mod_h2 2.0.8–2.0.42Public PoC — in-the-wild exploitation not confirmedNew in-window development: the third-party research PoC (GitHub googlesky/CVE-2026-119618, created 12 Nov) was verified directly on GitHub in this window. It reproduces heap corruption and ASan crashes on 2.4.70 and clean behaviour on 2.4.71, with a containerised lab and ASan/TSan evidence — but it does not demonstrate code execution. Conflict — flag: Red Hat scores the CVE 9.8 and says public research demonstrates a reliable exploit against a default-configured server; Sysdig (13 Nov) and Abijita (12 Nov) both stress there is no public RCE PoC and no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation as of 12–13 Nov, and the CVE is not in CISA KEV. Treat exploitation status as “public PoC now exists; it demonstrates heap corruption, not code execution; in-the-wild exploitation not confirmed”. Nine GitHub repos now carry the CVE name, including two new labs on 13 Nov that were not verified — do not link them. Race condition in mod_http2 assign_headers(). Fixed in httpd 2.4.71; disabling HTTP/2 is a mitigation.
4EverAble2Shell / Agent2Shell — CVE-2026-90436 + VULN-2026-0009 — STATUS, exploitation confirmed by researchers9.8 (CVE-2026-90436)N-able N-central (on-premises servers with Legacy API enabled)Exploitation claimed — contested (see actors)New in-window (SecurityWeek, 13 Nov; N-able update, 13 Nov). 4EverAble2Shell chains Apache Axis CVE-2026-90436 (9.8) with a separate N-central privilege escalation (Previdian VULN-2026-0009, no CVE yet) to unauthenticated root on the server; it requires the Legacy API to be enabled (non-default). Agent2Shell chains 10+ flaws to SYSTEM on managed Windows agents. Huntback counted 21 production N-central servers mining XMRig, 19 of them on the Hotfix 2 build; N-able says it has seen no signs of compromise using the new flaws and has published IOCs but not confirmed the mining count. No fix existed at publication; follow-up hotfix planned. PoC repo: MSPNightmare/CVEs — N-Central N-Able (GitHub) — genuine researcher disclosure (Sean Bales), with Previdian’s caveat that the public PoC is unverified and may contain malware. RMM used by MSPs serving small banks; a Hotfix-2 bypass with claimed live exploitation is a live patching and hunting priority. Disable the Legacy API; hunt the IOCs in Indicators.
CVE-2026-109618 / 109619 (PHP2Shell) — STATUS, chained flaw now in KEV9.2PHP; PAN-OS and other network/security products; Check Point Security GatewaysIn the WildNew in-window development: the chained privilege-escalation flaw CVE-2026-123039 was added to CISA KEV on 13 Nov (see the row above). GreyNoise telemetry reported in the 13 Nov afternoon deep-research check shows PHP2Shell exploitation continued through 12 Nov. The Check Point campaign detail is unchanged: attackers chained PHP2Shell in the Mobile Access Portal with CVE-2026-123039 to gain root on unpatched gateways, planted the TSGA backdoor, pivoted to a VMware ESXi host and ran a wiper — “a couple of dozen” systems in one region. Both fixes are in the November Jumbo Hotfix. The PHP2Shell fix had been available since 23 Oct — the one-week patch lag is the lesson. Keep management interfaces off the internet; apply the November Jumbo Hotfix. IOCs: 130.94.19[.]204, 130.94.19[.]168; upload_progress_pwn string in PHP session files; process masquerading as CPconfigdaemon; DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes.
CVE-2026-124194 — STATUS, Patch Tuesday follow-up6.5Microsoft Outlook (NTLMv2 hash disclosure)In the Wild (KEV)New in-window (Qualys, 13 Nov): November Patch Tuesday is the largest on record by Qualys’s count — 1,252 CVEs this month. Conflict — flag: Microsoft’s own count differs (1,362 CVEs across 27 updates per other trackers) and Tenable counted 1,093 — a counting-method difference between trackers, not a new item. About 35% of November patches carried a Low reliability rating in Qualys’s assessment as of 11 Nov. Outlook CVE-2026-124194 remains the exploited item in the batch. Microsoft confirmed the Windows 11 update KB5132061 fails to install on some devices that took the October non-security preview KB5127936, and KB5131085 (Windows 10 / Server 2019) is reported to break Exchange — both affect deployment planning.
CVE-2026-127063 — carried9.3DataComm RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnectNot known exploited — no PoC reportedNo change in-window. “The third-party RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect uses a static API secret by default.” Caveat: the CVE wording (“static API secret”) differs from Huntress’s account of a blank access key accepted when none was configured — treat as the same extension weakness pending vendor confirmation. This is the extension weakness behind the SCKit worm. Check RMM+ versions 1.0.31/1.0.32 and remove or re-key the extension.
CVE-2026-121529 (“Fortinet2Shell”) — carriedCritical (no CVSS figure in sources read)FortiClientMac 7.4.0–7.4.7; FortiClientWindows 7.4.0–7.4.7 and 7.2.0–7.2.14Public exploit — in-the-wild exploitation not reportedNo change in-window. Origin-validation flaw, unauthenticated remote code execution on FortiClient endpoints. PSIRT FG-IR-26-194. Not in CISA KEV. FortiClient is the endpoint agent on bank staff machines; an unauthenticated RCE with a public exploit is a patching priority.
Able2Shell — seven CVEs — carried9.3 (highest)N-able N-centralPoC public — exploitation of new chains claimed, contestedNo change in-window except the 4EverAble2Shell row above. Original Able2Shell (9 Nov): researcher Sean Bales published PoC code for 33 alleged N-central flaws. Hotfix N-central 2026.4 HF2 (build 2026.4.1.26), released 10 Nov, fixes seven CVEs: CVE-2026-125883 (XXE, 9.3), CVE-2026-125878 (OGNL injection), CVE-2026-125879, CVE-2026-125880, CVE-2026-125881 (SSRF), CVE-2026-125882 (RCE via path traversal), CVE-2026-91000. All hosted servers upgraded by 11 Nov 01:04 UTC. The Able2Shell PoC repository (Oracle-Security/CVEs, path “0-Days/N-Central N-Able”, 26 Python PoC scripts) is a genuine researcher disclosure — linkable as the PoC source, with the caveat that N-able has not validated all 33 findings.
CVE-2026-123864 — carriedHigh (no CVSS published)Node.js 22.x / 24.x / 26.x (HTTPS servers)Not known exploited — no PoC reportedNo change in-window. HTTPS heap-memory disclosure: a zero-length TLS write re-enters the HTTP parser, and the server copies other connections’ heap memory — including TLS private keys and other users’ requests — into a request body. Fixed in 26.13.1 / 24.22.3 / 22.23.5. Node.js published no CVSS scores and lists no workarounds — upgrade only.
Node.js batch — six further High — carriedHigh (no CVSS published)Node.js 22.x / 24.x / 26.xNot known exploited — no PoC reportedNo change in-window. CVE-2026-123863, CVE-2026-123865, CVE-2026-123866, CVE-2026-123872, CVE-2026-123874, CVE-2026-126051 (HTTP/2 and TLS memory disclosure / DoS / use-after-free). Six Medium and three Low complete the 16-CVE release. Node.js states 16 CVEs; one aggregator lists 17 IDs — report Node.js’s count.
CVE-2026-126263 — carried9.8FortiMail 8.0.0–8.0.1, 7.6.0–7.6.4, 7.4.0–7.4.6Not known exploited — no PoC reportedNo change in-window. SQL injection (CWE-89): an authenticated attacker can execute unauthorised code/commands via crafted requests. Fixed in 8.0.2 / 7.6.7 / 7.4.7; FortiMail Cloud already remediated. Internally discovered with the Frontier AI model Claude Mythos.
CVE-2026-126155 — carried9.1FortiMail 8.0.0–8.0.1, 7.6.0–7.6.6, 7.4.0–7.4.8, 7.2 all versionsNot known exploited — no PoC reportedNo change in-window. Incorrect authorisation (CWE-863): an unauthenticated remote attacker can obtain an authenticated IBE webmail session as any IBE recipient and read or send their encrypted mail. Fixed in 8.0.2 / 7.6.7 / 7.4.9; 7.2 must migrate to a fixed release; FortiMail Cloud remediated 5 Oct.
CVE-2026-121653 — carried9.8Ivanti Endpoint Manager Core, 2024 SU7 and earlierNot known exploited — no PoC reportedNo change in-window. SQL injection in EPM Core allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution. Fix: EPM 2024 SU8. Sibling critical: CVE-2026-121683 (9.4, missing authentication in Cloud Services Application 5.0.8 only; fix 5.0.8.1). Ivanti says it is not aware of any customers being exploited, and none of the 13 CVEs in its 10 Nov batch is in CISA KEV.
VSA-2026-062 (no CVE ID yet) — carried— no CVSS assignedXen Orchestra / Xen Orchestra ApplianceActively exploitedNo change in-window. Empty-object login token gives Admin privilege; full XCP-ng host takeover as root. Fixed in Xen Orchestra 6.9.1 / 6.10.0. IOCs: 91.211.251.112:8001 and Tor domain ustar3rqxgnskzgnwkgpofgtvxevm6cx3lxdbwt4mndtveqyaohid.onion:3333.
SAP November Patch Day — four CVSS 10.0 — carried10.0SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP / Web Dispatcher / GatewayNot known exploitedNo change in-window. CVE-2026-76964 (ICM memory corruption, unauthenticated RCE — “ICM2SHELL”), CVE-2026-89126 (Web Dispatcher memory corruption, unauthenticated RCE), CVE-2026-89103 (Gateway broken access control), CVE-2026-120017 (SAML2 missing authentication). Patch internet-facing systems first.
Fortinet batch — eight criticals — carried9.8–9.0FortiOS / FortiManager / FortiAnalyzer / FortiSASENot known exploitedNo change in-window. Worst CVE-2026-126170 (9.8, JSON RPC API). Fixed in FortiOS 7.2.14/7.4.13/7.6.8/8.0.2 and FortiManager/FortiAnalyzer 7.2.13/7.4.12/7.6.8/8.0.2 — some fixes still “upcoming”; apply the FortiGuard virtual patch, keep OFTP/FGFM ports off the internet.
Microsoft November Patch Tuesday — carriedUp to 9.9Microsoft enterprise stack (Exchange, SharePoint, SQL Server, AD, LDAP, DNS)One exploited (Outlook CVE-2026-124194 — see row above)No change in-window except the Qualys follow-up above. 1,094 newly released CVEs per Microsoft (Qualys counts 1,252 for the month; Tenable counts 1,093 — counting-method differences, flagged not resolved). Notable criticals, none reported exploited: SharePoint CVE-2026-120002 (9.9); SQL Server CVE-2026-116945 (9.8); Windows Search CVE-2026-116928 (9.8, zero-click); LDAP CVE-2026-119958 (9.8, zero-click, unauthenticated); Windows DNS CVE-2026-88218 (9.8); iSCSI CVE-2026-88234 (9.8); Exchange CVE-2026-118207 (8.8); AD DS CVE-2026-118146 (8.8); Schannel CVE-2026-119952 (8.1). Tenable notes the exploited Outlook CVE was discovered by a researcher using Claude.
CVE-2026-88771 — carried9.5 / 9.8*Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler GatewayIn the Wild (KEV)No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 Nov). Unauthenticated pre-auth command injection as root via attacker-controlled text written to appliance logs, later executed by maintenance script ns_monuploadd_err.pl — execution can lag the request by up to 24 hours. In KEV since 27 Sept. Fixed in 14.1-73.37 and 13.1-64.23. Patching does not remove existing implants. *CVSS v4.0 9.5 (Citrix) vs v3.1 9.8 (NVD).
CVE-2026-76443 — carried9.8Cisco Secure Email Gateway and Secure Email and Web Manager, 15.5 and earlierIn the Wild (KEV, sibling)No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 Nov). Rapid7 describes the module as an S/MIME/email-parsing SQL injection leading to unauthenticated root RCE — treat the CVE mapping as Rapid7’s, not Cisco’s. The actively exploited zero-day in the same family is sibling CVE-2026-76461 (9.8, in KEV since 14 Sept).
CVE-2026-97229 — carried10.0GitLab CE / EEIn the Wild (KEV)No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 Nov). CI/CD RegExp integer-overflow RCE as the git user; authenticated, requiring write access to a public project. In KEV since 29 Oct.
CVE-2026-119977 — carried8.1 / Low*WordPress core 4.7.0–7.1.3In the Wild (attempts)No change in-window. 240,000+ blocked attempts (peaking at 74,000+ on 30 Oct). Still no victim publicly named and no confirmed compromise. Fix 7.1.4 / backport; block web access to wp-content/upgrade/ before updating. Public PoC: lysophavin18/CVE-2026-119977 (GitHub). A second repo claiming to bypass the 7.1.4 fix holds no code, only a download link — flagged as a likely malware lure, do not download. *Wordfence 8.1 vs WordPress Low.
CVE-2026-107441 — carried8.8 (Zyxel) / 9.8*Zyxel GS1900 series switches, ten models, web management interfaceIn the Wild (zero-day)No change in-window. June fix added a check that ran after the unsafe copy in /cgi-bin/dispatcher.cgi, so June-patched firmware stayed exploitable. Payloads: Jitterly backdoor and Sixzut rootkit; suspected Chinese-speaking actor Kapibala/Red Heron (attribution via Binarly/Acronis, not independently verified). *Secondary analysis rates it 9.8. Not in KEV as of 7 Nov. Fix: 22 Oct firmware; change default credentials.
CVE-2026-109593 / 109594 — carried9.1 / 6.8SonicWall Global Management System 9.5.2 and earlier (end-of-life)Not reported exploited in-windowNo change in-window. 109593 critical (9.1): unauthenticated information disclosure via internal file reads. 109594 medium (6.8): high-privilege SQL injection. SonicWall will not patch — migrate to Network Security Manager.
CVE-2026-72898 — carried10.0Metabase 58+ (free and paid editions)In the WildNo change in-window. CSA Singapore warned 4 Nov that this SQL-injection flaw, fixed 6 Aug and on KEV since 11 Aug, is actively exploited and a PoC is public. Public PoC: 4minx/CVE-2026-72898 (GitHub), referenced in CSA alert AL-2026-158. Safe releases: 58.24, 59.21, 60.17, 61.11, 62.9, 63.5+.
CVE-2026-40217 — carried8.8LiteLLM proxyIn the Wild (LLMjacking)No change in-window. User-ID rebind to PROXY_ADMIN. Update LiteLLM, lock endpoints off the internet, rotate keys.
CVE-2026-98432 — carried9.8Linux kernel IPv4 TCP, 4.4+Research exploit onlyNo change in-window. Demonstrated exploit needs MPTCP; RHEL fixed kernels require reboot, Ubuntu was still in -proposed on 3 Nov.
CVE-2026-58115 — carried10.0Node-RED / Siemens IoT2050In the WildNo change in-window. Port 1880 without adminAuth remains an active target. Siemens scope revision noted 8 Nov (more SIMATIC IoT2050 models).
CVE-2026-111497 — carried9.2Google Brotli; Cisco and Splunk products (Node2Shell)In the Wild (KEV)No change in-window. Scope as of 5 Nov: 19 Cisco products affected, dozens under investigation, about a dozen Splunk products also affected. Same Brotli root cause also affects ClickHouse. KEV federal due date fell 10 November, but per the KEV rule a deadline alone is not a new development. Qualys published detection/verification guidance for PHP2Shell and Node2Shell on 12 Nov (four non-intrusive QIDs, two intrusive verification QIDs) and reports 167 million PHP installations across 10,000+ customers; attackers probed PHP2Shell four days before a patch existed.

Showing all 30 watchlist rows.

Supply chain & third-party risk

Vendor, SaaS and service-provider exposure affecting financial organisations.

Trezor Safe 5 hardware implants — NEW (confirmed, 13 Nov)

Trezor confirmed three Safe 5 devices sold by Southeast Asian reseller CryptoBilis contained malicious hardware implants — an extra circuit board designed to capture the wallet recovery phrase from the screen and exfiltrate it over a cellular network. All three were bought from CryptoBilis between 20 Aug and 23 Sep 2026; 48 CryptoBilis customers have contacted Trezor since its 30 Oct warning. Firmware 2.13.1 (released 11 Nov) stops the implants found so far from capturing anything, but cannot protect phrases already captured. No affected customer has reported lost funds. Trezor has cut its reseller network by about 80%.

Critique: a crypto-custody supply-chain case, not a bank breach — but the pattern (a trusted reseller channel compromised, a firmware fix that cannot undo already-captured secrets) is the same one banks face with any third-party hardware or software in the custody chain. Clients holding crypto should be told to buy only from the vendor directly and to treat any recovery phrase entered on a reseller-bought device as compromised.

wfx-loot — STATUS (GitGuardian, 13 Nov)

The CI secret-stealer campaign that used stolen GitHub credentials to push a payload into 61,764 repositories is still being measured. GitGuardian’s 13 Nov follow-up adds: the npm-hook delivery form bypassed GitHub’s workflow hold (public job logs from 19 repositories, 18 with successful exfiltration); hook commits rose to 838 per three hours on the morning of 11 Nov and 1,210 on the morning of 12 Nov; version 3 added Telegram delivery with fallback C2 153[.]75[.]82[.]159:8080/exfil (v2a C2 18[.]143[.]168[.]96:8080/exfil). Aikido’s counts stand at 4,837 compromised accounts, 61,764 probed repositories and the payload run in at least 1,806–1,835 repositories. The campaign is a GitHub-account takeover (stolen tokens), not a GitHub vulnerability.

Critique: financial firms running CI/CD on GitHub should already have audited and rotated secrets; the new detail that matters is the workflow-hold bypass — a control teams may have been relying on — and the Telegram delivery channel, which makes exfiltration harder to spot on network egress.

ScreenConnect and N-able — MSP supply chain (updates)

Both RMM stories in the actor section are supply-chain stories first: a compromised MSP panel reaches straight into customer networks. SCKit’s second wave (205 hosts, 41 organisations) and the N-able mining servers (21, 19 on Hotfix 2) show the route is live in both directions — MSP to customer, and potentially customer device back to the technician’s session. Firms should ask their providers whether they run ScreenConnect with the RMM+ extension and whether they run N-central with the Legacy API enabled, and hunt for RelayTrap, the TrapWatch task and the N-central IOCs in the Indicators section.

Microsoft 365 outage — operational, not a cyberattack

An outage that began 12 Nov (Exchange Online) disrupted Outlook, Teams, Copilot and Defender XDR for users across 74 countries — about 130,000 Downdetector Outlook reports at peak — and was mostly restored by about 03:00 SGT on 14 Nov, with email queues still draining. Microsoft states there was no malicious activity and no security breach; the outage is a technical issue “not related to cyber or AI/agents”. The UK’s NCSC warned on 13 Nov to beware scam calls and messages exploiting the outage. Critique: the incident is operational, not a threat event — but the fraud risk is real and immediate, since outage-themed phishing was already being warned about while mail was still delayed.

Arara — no new development in-window

The Arara email-delivery breach continues to produce downstream disclosures (MUFG, Nomura, Cabinet Office and Hyakujushi Bank were covered in the 13 November edition), but no new Arara-linked disclosure appeared in this window. The platform’s 6 Nov third report put the total at 81,329,467 email addresses (deduplicated) across up to about 380 client companies, exfiltrated 28–31 Oct; the same platform was also abused 28–30 Oct to send up to about 7.13 million phishing emails impersonating a credit-card company. Do not add the per-company figures together — they are subsets of the same incident.

CSC Telecom — no new development in-window

The open database that exposed 125 million+ SMS messages, including Swedbank account details and one-time codes, has no new development in this window. Swedbank has stopped using the provider and opened an investigation; CERT.LV is investigating. No evidence anyone other than researchers read the data; no confirmed account takeovers or financial loss.

Emerging fraud & attack vectors

Account takeover, mobile banking trojans, infostealers, DDoS extortion and vishing/smishing.

Indian NBFC payout APIs — “Crafty Falcon” fraud wave — NEW (confirmed reporting, 13 Nov)

Cybercriminals exploited the payout APIs of Indian non-banking financial companies, with three Telangana lenders reporting 304 fraudulent transactions between 19 October and 6 November: VIVIFI Indian Finance detected 183 fraudulent transactions worth Rs 3.34 crore within 88 minutes on 19 October; Spandana Sphoorthy Financial reported 82 transactions amounting to Rs 7.8 crore on 1 November; Keerthana Finserv detected 39 transactions worth around Rs 7 crore on 6 November. Similar attacks were reported in six other states and Union territories (Karnataka, Maharashtra, Delhi, Chandigarh, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry), with cumulative losses across India estimated in the hundreds of crores of rupees — an estimate, not a confirmed total. Siphoned funds were diverted through 50–60 bank accounts in each case before being transferred to gaming and betting applications, including Dafabet, 1xBet, WinZO, Betway, My11Circle and Bet365. The Telangana Cyber Security Bureau attributes the exposure to exposed testing environments, outdated APIs, credentials embedded in source code and partner tokens that remain valid for too long. CERT-In’s advisory of 4 November flagged an AI-assisted campaign designated “CRAFTY FALCON” involving exposed testing systems, shared credentials, Rs 1 test transfers and unauthorised payouts, and repeat attacks were reported where remediation was incomplete.

Critique: whether AI was used in the Telangana incidents remains under examination, and the attackers have not been identified — traced IP addresses in six countries do not by themselves establish the attackers’ location. What is established is the pattern: exposed test environments, long-lived partner tokens and Rs 1 test transfers are the early warning, and the same CERT-In advisory already covered this campaign on 4 November. The Rs 1 test-transfer pattern is a concrete detection signal for fraud teams either way.

MEXC Global cut off from the US financial system — NEW (FinCEN order)

The US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has cut crypto exchange MEXC Global off from the US financial system over sanctions evasion and cybercrime ties. The FinCEN order says MEXC facilitated more than $16bn in illicit transactions between 2021 and 2026, acting as a clearinghouse for ransomware gangs, darknet activity and Russia, Iran and North Korea sanctions evasion, and cites AML/KYC deficiencies. MEXC says it is reviewing the order with legal counsel. (Reported via SentinelOne’s 13 Nov roundup; FinCEN is the primary.) Critique: this is an enforcement action, not a breach — but a $16bn illicit-flow figure attached to an exchange that banks’ customers use is a screening and de-risking signal, and Binance is already rejecting MEXC-linked transfers.

Flybit crypto exchange — NEW (confirmed, disclosed 13 Nov)

Korea Digital Exchange, operator of the Flybit virtual-asset exchange, suffered a leak of personal data of 40 customers through unauthorised external access on 1 November, disclosed 13 November (Korean press — translated). The entry route, the exact data items exposed and whether any customer funds were affected have not been disclosed. Small scale, but a confirmed leak at a Korean exchange in the same week as the wider Korean financial-sector incident wave.

Ukrainian crypto romance-baiting ring dismantled — NEW (reported, 13 Nov)

Ukrainian Cyber Police, with German authorities, broke up a network that used social media and dating apps to lure European victims into bogus trading platforms and attacker wallets; four suspects were detained and hardware wallets, SIMs and more than $13,000 seized. About €4.3m in victim losses is reported. (Via SentinelOne’s 13 Nov roundup.) Fraud, reported — the figures come from the police operation, and the victim count has not been published.

Operation Endgame — Have I Been Pwned loads CastleRAT data (status update)

Have I Been Pwned loaded 179,700 CastleRAT email addresses and 893,000 unique passwords on 13 Nov, from the Operation Endgame seizure (Gootloader, CastleRAT and StealC infrastructure; 235 servers and 257 domains seized; about 6.4 million victim datasets secured). The 12 Nov seizure itself was covered in the 13 November edition; the HIBP loading is the in-window development. Fraud teams should check staff and customer credentials against the notification.

Phishing watches — SBI, KB Capital, Tesouro / Caixa, Arara, FSI, SMBC Nikko (ongoing)

SBI’s confirmed personal data is impersonation material — expect phishing citing SBI loan and account-opening details. KB Capital’s leaked staff and partner details are business-email-compromise material. The Tesouro Nacional leak (names, CPFs, Pix keys) and Caixa’s leaked CPFs are impersonation material for 7.6 million-plus people — expect phishing citing Caixa Vida e Previdência, Caixa Seguridade or the Treasury. Arara’s 81 million leaked shareholder emails are live phishing bait, and the same platform was already abused to send about 7.13 million phishing emails impersonating a credit-card company. The FSI leak gives attackers real assessment-staff contact details and firm names — expect phishing citing the FSI or the evaluation process. SMBC Nikko’s leaked holdings and account details are impersonation material for shareholders. Mirae Asset’s leak gives attackers 3,800 customer account numbers plus names, emails and mobiles of 35,255 employees. Binance, Mercado Bitcoin, Gopax and Nubank/Mercado Pago outage messages remain live phishing bait, and the Microsoft 365 outage is now being exploited in scam calls and messages — verify via official status pages only. Watch for Rs 1 test transactions on compromised accounts.

CSA Singapore — Advisory AD-2026-017 — NEW (13 Nov)

Singapore’s Cyber Security Agency issued Advisory AD-2026-017 on 13 Nov urging all organisations to strengthen cyber defences: the average monthly number of reported cyber incidents since September is three times the January–August average, and at least 12 incidents involving Singapore organisations or their service providers were reported between 24 October and 13 November. CSA says the incidents appear to reflect a broader global trend of opportunistic attacks rather than coordinated campaigns targeting Singapore, with attackers scanning for weak systems and using AI to find and exploit weaknesses faster. The Personal Data Protection Commission said separately on 13 Nov that the data breaches it observed arose from attacks exploiting common vulnerabilities in IT systems. CSA has briefed all critical information infrastructure sectors, including banking and finance. Named cases in the window include personal finance portal MoneySmart (3 Nov, customer data copied in Singapore and Hong Kong) and local clothing label Our Second Nature (reported 13 Nov). Critique: the advisory is general, not BFSI-specific, and names no financial victim — but the cause list (unpatched exposed systems, compromised vendors, AI-accelerated exploitation) matches this week’s exploitation themes exactly.

Bank of Khartoum — no new development in-window

Customer allegations of thefts from Bank of Khartoum accounts via the Bankak mobile banking app remain reported / unconfirmed: more than 50 traders and customers in West Kordofan claim millions of Sudanese pounds were stolen, with individual reported losses of SDG 18–45 million. The bank has still not responded to comment requests, and no technical evidence that the app itself was breached has been published. Treat as an allegation, not a confirmed bank breach.

TTP tracker — threat actors and key vulnerabilities

Techniques actually published for this edition’s actors and key vulnerabilities. No mapping is shown where the source published none.

MITRE technique IDTechnique / behaviourSeen in this editionBFSI relevance / detection noteStatus
T1046, T1110.001, T1505.001, T1059.003, T1059.005, T1105, T1071.001, T1071.002, T1095, T1053.005, T1543.003, T1547.001, T1036.005, T1027.002, T1496, T1562.002, T1057, T1082, T1012, T1112Network service discovery; password guessing; SQL stored procedures; Windows command shell and Visual Basic; ingress tool transfer; web protocols and file transfer protocols; non-application-layer protocol; scheduled task/job; Windows service; registry run keys / startup folder; masquerading; obfuscated files; resource hijacking (Monero mining); impair defences; system information discovery; system information discovery (registry); modify registryFortiGuard Labs T-SQL campaign against internet-exposed Microsoft SQL Server (published 12 Nov; catch-up — not in the 13 November edition)Direct: SQL Server underpins core banking and payment back-ends. The campaign brute-forces TCP 1433 with a 2,700+ password list (users sa, admin), enables xp_cmdshell, then drops an XMRig miner and a Gh0st RAT variant. Detect on failed 1433 logins, xp_cmdshell enablement and scheduled tasks mimicking Microsoft Edge Update. No SQL Server vulnerability is involved — this is a configuration failure, not a patch failure.Confirmed
T1190, T1072, T1136, T1552, T1496, T1068Exploit public-facing application; software deployment tools; create account; unsecured credentials; resource hijacking; privilege escalationN-able 4EverAble2Shell / Agent2Shell chainsRMM used by MSPs serving small banks. Hunt for requests to /dms/services/ServerUI referencing jline.internal.TerminalLineSettings, unexpected xvd.service units and mining processes. The Legacy API is the gating control.Reported in secondary summary
T1595.001, T1595.002, T1583.003, T1588.002, T1588.005, T1588.007, T1190, T1133, T1078, T1078.004, T1059.008, T1047, T1136.001, T1505.003, T1550.002, T1003.002, T1003.004, T1557.001, T1555.003, T1552.001, T1110.001, T1021.002, T1021.006, T1572, T1567Active scanning (vulnerability and IP block); acquire infrastructure; obtain capabilities (exploits, code signing, AI); exploit public-facing application; external remote services; valid accounts (default and domain); network device CLI; Windows Management Instrumentation; create account (local); server software component (web shell); pass the ticket; OS credential dumping (security account manager, LSA secrets); adversary-in-the-middle; credentials from password stores; unsecured credentials; brute force; remote services (SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Windows Remote Management); protocol tunnelling; exfiltration over web serviceGroup-IB DarkLunnen — offensive operations against European targets (blog dated to about 13 Nov; substance covered in the 13 November edition without the mapping)Indirect but material: the operator used a modified FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 PoC to create a backdoor super-admin account, stole cleartext VPN passwords from a FortiGate config, and brute-forced 5,775 VNC endpoints. FortiGate edge/VPN exploitation and stolen VPN credentials are a direct path into financial networks; no financial victim is named. Note T1588.007 — obtain capabilities: artificial intelligence — the operator had Moonshot AI’s Kimi coding assistant installed, though Group-IB says the evidence does not establish whether or how it was used.Confirmed
— none publishedAgentic intrusion via ARTEX and related frameworks (planner/worker LLM agents, autonomous exploitation and credential theft)FBI FLASH-20261113-001; Cisco Talos ARTEX post (13 Nov)Financial services explicitly named. Neither source publishes a MITRE mapping, so no IDs are shown — do not invent one. Detection rests on the behavioural indicators in the FLASH: sub-second Azure capability checks and test blob write/delete, ARM deployment dry-runs, AWS DryRun probes, lookups to api.db-ip[.]com, output to rotating webhook.site URLs, unexpected egress to LLM APIs and self-hosted gateways (CLIProxyAPI, New API), and new 100 GB volumes before exfiltration.No mapping published
— none publishedRogue ScreenConnect client deployment; session-cookie theft (RelayTrap); technician-workstation trapMicrosoft SCKit teardown; Huntress second wave (13 Nov)MSP supply-chain risk for banks and insurers. No MITRE mapping was published in the Microsoft post. Hunt for the TrapWatch scheduled task, the sckit-decoder.ps1 artefact, the c=Exploited<N> client markers and the domains in the Indicators section.No mapping published

Recurring-TTP watch: the techniques that keep recurring across editions are exploitation of internet-facing management and edge interfaces (RMM panels, gateways, VPNs), weak or default credentials on exposed services (SQL Server 1433, FortiGate VPNs), and abuse of trusted third-party channels (MSP remote-access tools, email-delivery and CI/CD services). No technique was published with a MITRE ID for the ARTEX or SCKit items in this edition — that gap is stated, not filled.

AI in the current threat landscape

The three AI roles are kept separate. Vendor forecasts are marked as forecasts.

AI as a target

Railway AI-secrets breach — confirmed (via SentinelOne roundup, 13 Nov). Cloud host Railway confirmed attackers escaped build-filesystem isolation on 20 Oct via an unknown flaw and stole decrypted customer auth secrets, including AI-provider API keys — likely for resale or model distillation — hitting at most about 1.85% of workspaces (about 100,000 environments) and linked-account tokens for 1,852 users. About $740,000 of unauthorised AI usage followed. No customer databases were accessed and no private Git repositories were downloaded; tokens were rotated and Railway will cover unreimbursed fraudulent charges. Attackers used autonomous AI agents in a 26-hour contest with defenders.

ARTEX agents hunting AI keys (Talos, 13 Nov). Unattributed agents searched public GitHub for credentials and AI API keys and, in one case, moved from GitHub search to Azure Key Vault exfiltration within five minutes. Datadog-observed ARTEX activity in AWS included compromised long-term keys, public Cognito pools and CloudWatch searches for financial information and secrets.

wfx-loot (status update). The CI secret stealer continued to harvest AI service keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, Cursor, Copilot) from compromised repositories — see the supply-chain section.

AI as a weapon or accelerator

ARTEX — the item of the day (FBI FLASH + Talos, 13 Nov). An open-source, LLM-driven agentic pentesting framework is being used in live intrusions since at least August 2026, letting low-skill actors run complex multi-target campaigns at machine speed — some intrusions went from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours. Financial services are explicitly named among the targeted sectors. Co-deployed tooling includes AntiFox, CyberStrikeAI and PentAGI. Talos’s forecast — marked as a forecast — is that future chains will likely culminate in autonomous data exfiltration and ransomware activation.

KYC-deepfake campaign (Amazon MadPot, 13 Nov). Amazon Threat Intelligence’s companion honeypot post captured ARTEX AI-agent requests including AI-credential theft and a KYC-deepfake campaign. This is a honeypot observation, not a confirmed bank-targeted campaign — do not present it as one.

No new AI-scaled phishing, vishing or deepfake campaign against a named bank was found in this window beyond the MadPot observation above. The FBI’s FaceStealer announcement ($400m+, 900+ webcam videos) is 12 November reporting, already covered in the 13 November edition; its 13 November coverage adds no new facts.

AI as a risk and control problem for BFSI

AI agents as a new attack surface — research walkthrough, not a real incident (Token Security, via BleepingComputer, 13 Nov). Researchers showed how an AI invoice-processing agent could be tricked by hidden text in an email into changing vendor bank details in an ERP system — a hypothetical walkthrough of five enterprise security gaps in agentic systems, not a real incident. It is usable as a control lesson, not as evidence of an attack: firms deploying invoice or payment agents should treat agent tool calls (especially bank-detail changes) as privileged actions with human approval, and should test for prompt injection through email and document content.

CSA Singapore (13 Nov) says AI is letting attackers find and exploit weaknesses faster — the same acceleration theme as the ARTEX reporting, stated by a regulator rather than a vendor.

Taiwan’s FSC has issued an agentic-AI security advisory for the sector (covered in the 13 November edition); no new development in this window. Railway’s 26-hour contest between autonomous attacker agents and defenders is a live example of AI-versus-AI incident response, and of the detection-time compression banks should plan for.

Indicators & defensive actions

Notable indicators from this edition, and prioritised steps for SOC and vulnerability-management teams.

SCKit (Microsoft 13 Nov; Huntress second wave)

  • Domains: ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev, sc[.]payproofkit[.]com, cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com, newnewnew[.]gotdns[.]org, soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org
  • IPs: 185[.]99[.]255[.]28, 155[.]94[.]150[.]39, 185.241.211[.]197 (wave 2 installer host)
  • SHA-256: sc.msi 61a672a13f03a9e81f573535ee92b1ed6cb7e848a33a06048865312d4e185ae2; ToolboxRelayUploader.exe 8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06af; TrapWatch.ps1 d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a
  • Artefacts: sckit-decoder.ps1; TrapWatch scheduled task (SYSTEM); C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap; rogue client markers c=ExploitedNOTUSA, Exploited529, Exploited809

N-able N-central (researcher-published, 13 Nov)

  • IPs: 157.20.241[.]16 (ports 8080, 19202–19418; URLs /jup.sh, /xvgz, /xmrig.tgz, /ob/cronhit, /ob/fcheck), 139.99.69[.]109:10128, 79.76.51[.]56:39100
  • Requests to /dms/services/ServerUI referencing jline.internal.TerminalLineSettings; unexpected xvd.service systemd units; files under /tmp/.xvd or /var/tmp/.xvd; XMRig processes

ARTEX (FBI FLASH-20261113-001 via CTXSec hunt summary; Amazon MadPot 13 Nov)

  • ARTEX host (South Korea campaign): 38.244.50[.]120; proxies 101.53.80[.]20, 205.214.59[.]31, 124.155.252[.]63, 154.201.79[.]246, 23.248.249[.]90, 23.158.220[.]98, 103.248.148[.]84, 203.160.133[.]172, 209.209.85[.]38; LLM reseller domain xcai[.]pro
  • ConnectWise campaign: 144.172.64[.]60/.99/.128, 187.15.88[.]186, 187.15.90[.]217, 187.15.89[.]186
  • Storm-3358 (active as of 6 Nov): WISP C2 199.19.95[.]66–68; ARTEX servers 91.92.240[.]238, 85.11.168[.]45, 178.16.54[.]129, 31.77.229[.]35; C2 85.11.167[.]52
  • Amazon MadPot: 104.28.225[.]223, 31.22.91[.]156, 150.136.38[.]110, 128.242.115[.]131, 216.176.239[.]231; KYC-deepfake 212.107.28[.]51, 103.142.140[.]158, 104.28.251[.]98/.99, 104.28.219[.]97, 125.103.213[.]41
  • Behaviours: sub-second Azure capability checks and test blob write/delete; ARM deployment dry-runs; AWS DryRun probes; lookups to api.db-ip[.]com; output to rotating webhook.site URLs; unexpected egress to LLM APIs and self-hosted gateways (CLIProxyAPI, New API); WISP / vshell / AdaptixC2 / BLOODALCHEMY; new 100 GB volumes before exfiltration

wfx-loot; PHP2Shell / Check Point; FortiGuard T-SQL

  • wfx-loot: C2 18[.]143[.]168[.]96:8080/exfil (v2a), 153[.]75[.]82[.]159:8080/exfil (v3, Telegram delivery); PR title “docs: dependency audit notes”, branch wfx-docs, commit “ci: refresh build cache”; gaps in GitHub Actions run numbers are the tell
  • PHP2Shell / Check Point: 130.94.19[.]204, 130.94.19[.]168; upload_progress_pwn string in PHP session files; process masquerading as CPconfigdaemon; scanner/wiper files under /tmp or /temp; DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes
  • FortiGuard T-SQL: domains site.vietnam852[.]com:88, ftp.vietnam852[.]com:88, server.vietnam852[.]com:8000, www.swordaa[.]com:8000, site.hfgjjkrewjk[.]com, site.jiancai008[.]com; SHA-256 dllhost.exe 8CE2CD98EF6CEEECE8239936E4AEA042C41807F632CD691D5091705BF6C0076D, winlogon.exe (Gh0st RAT) 3F64B0146B323C5716043360E84384A5A197A897F46088DF93A910470A29E1A0, MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe (miner) 2A23E10BFC097E98295CBFF8124BD403C4CB677E709B48CCC53D6ACA216C3061
  1. Patch the KEV additions now: apply Check Point’s November Jumbo Hotfix (R82.20 Take 14, R82.10 Take 52, R82 Take 132, R81.20 Take 174 or later) to every Security Gateway, Management Server, Multi-Domain Server and Log Server — federal due date 16 November. Treat any unpatched gateway with an exposed Mobile Access portal as potentially compromised and hunt for the PHP2Shell/TSGA indicators.
  2. Disable the N-able Legacy API on every on-premises N-central server, and confirm it is off — Hotfix 2 does not fix the new chains. Hunt for the researcher IOCs above; any server showing them should be treated as fully compromised.
  3. Hunt for SCKit in MSP environments: ask providers whether they run ScreenConnect with the RMM+ extension (versions 1.0.31/1.0.32) and whether they have seen the TrapWatch task, the sckit-decoder.ps1 artefact or the rogue client markers; revoke exposed sessions and reset credentials from a trusted device. Removing the rogue client alone does not remove persistence or invalidate exposed web sessions.
  4. Patch the Citrix NetScaler batch (ADC/Gateway 14.1-73.57 and 13.1-64.39; Console 14.1-74.34) and restrict Console access to trusted networks; the Console authentication bypass needs only network access to the Console IP. Separately, hunt for existing CitrixBleed 2 implants — patching does not remove them.
  5. Upgrade Apache HTTP Server to 2.4.71 (or disable HTTP/2) — the public PoC reproduces heap corruption on 2.4.70, and Red Hat says a reliable exploit has been demonstrated, even though no public RCE chain or in-the-wild exploitation is confirmed.
  6. Check internet-exposed SQL Server (TCP 1433): enforce strong credentials, disable xp_cmdshell where unused, and alert on brute-force login bursts and Edge-Update-mimicking scheduled tasks — the FortiGuard campaign needs no vulnerability, only weak credentials.
  7. Audit GitHub Actions secrets, cloud credentials, SSH keys and AI service keys for wfx-loot exposure: hunt for wfx-docs pull requests and gaps in Actions run numbers, check pinned versions of the affected packages, and rotate anything that may have been exfiltrated. Inventory internet-facing applications and restrict cloud admin, Kudu/SCM and backup platforms to trusted networks (FBI FLASH mitigations for ARTEX).
  8. Fraud teams: warn customers about SBI, KB Capital, Tesouro/Caixa and Arara impersonation; screen MEXC-linked transfers; check staff and customer credentials against the Operation Endgame / Have I Been Pwned notifications; watch for Rs 1 test transactions on compromised accounts; brief frontline staff on Microsoft 365 outage-themed scams and on the fake finance-minister deepfake video, the Diwali-aid WhatsApp hijack lure and the Bermuda vishing numbers.
  9. Watch for the Korean FSI special audit starting Monday 16 November and for SinoPac’s full report, which was due 12 November with no confirmation it was filed.

Could not verify

  • CISA KEV additions (13 Nov): the live CISA feed fetched during this run was a stale cached copy (catalogue version 2026.10.30, crawled 1 Nov), so the additions were not confirmed by a live CISA read. They are confirmed by three independent KEV trackers (Carthage Electronics, Axis Intelligence, EastBayCyber) agreeing on the date, catalogue version 2026.11.13 and 1,781 entries.
  • FBI FLASH-20261113-001: the IC3 PDF URL was not returned verbatim by search, so the FLASH is cited via the FBI’s own LinkedIn post and The Record’s report; the IOC list is cited via the CTXSec hunt summary, not the FLASH itself.
  • CSA Singapore AD-2026-017: cited via The Straits Times report; no csa.gov.sg URL was returned verbatim.
  • Interbanking (Argentina): a BreachForums post (8 Nov) offers 804,000 records from 56 Argentine financial entities; Interbanking denies any breach, no statement from the Banco Central de la República Argentina, and the post is from a newly created account with no evidence. Outside the window and unsubstantiated — not included as a breach, noted here only as a watch item.
  • Raymond James, Game Changer Wealth, JETS, Four Points Financial: leak-site or actor claims only; no company confirmation, no published data, no data volume for any of them. The JETS October incident is confirmed, but INC Ransom’s responsibility for it is not.
  • Marquis 672,075: re-reported again on 13 Nov — this is the March 2026 Maine AG disclosure of the August 2025 breach, re-reported, not new. Not included.
  • Group-IB DarkLunnen blog: the page itself shows no publication date in the extracted text; the date (about 13 Nov) rests on the search index and embedded image filenames dated 10 Nov. The substance was covered in the 13 November edition.

Sources

Every source is hyperlinked to the original vendor, government or primary reporting; translated items link to the original-language article.

  1. FBI Cyber Branch — ARTEX FLASH post (LinkedIn, 13 Nov): linkedin.com
  2. Cisco Talos — ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms (13 Nov): blog.talosintelligence.com
  3. CTXSec — Hunt: FBI FLASH ARTEX IOCs, Storm-3358 WISP C2, Amazon MadPot LLM honeypot IPs: ctxsec.com
  4. Pipkins Reports — FBI warns critical sectors of AI cyberattacks (ARTEX background, 13 Nov): pipkinsreports.com
  5. Microsoft Security — SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions (13 Nov): microsoft.com
  6. Huntress — SCKit worm: rogue ScreenConnect (updated 13 Nov): huntress.com
  7. SecurityWeek — Hackers exploit new N-central zero-day hours after PoC publication (13 Nov): securityweek.com
  8. Tenable — Able2Shell frequently asked questions (updated 12 Nov): tenable.com
  9. SOCRadar — 4EverAble2Shell at a glance: socradar.io
  10. CISA — Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue: cisa.gov
  11. Carthage Electronics — November 13 2026 CVE threat brief (KEV additions): carthageelectronics.com
  12. Axis Intelligence — CISA KEV tracker: axis-intelligence.com
  13. EastBayCyber — CISA KEV additions by date: eastbaycyber.com
  14. HOL — Check Point CVE-2026-123039 on CISA KEV: how to fix and check: hol.org
  15. Undercode News — Critical UnrealIRCd vulnerability added to CISA KEV (CVE-2026-114713): undercodenews.com
  16. Check Point Research — PHP2Shell exploitation on Check Point gateway (12 Nov): research.checkpoint.com
  17. Citrix — Security updates for NetScaler ADC, NetScaler Gateway and NetScaler Console (CTX697305): support.citrix.com
  18. ThreatAft — Citrix NetScaler CTX697305, 28 CVEs, November 2026: threataft.com
  19. OffSeq — CitrixBleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777) telemetry: mirage.offseq.com
  20. GitHub — googlesky/CVE-2026-119618 (Apache mod_http2 PoC, verified): github.com
  21. Sysdig — HTTPD CVE-2026-119618: detecting heap corruption and RCE in Apache HTTP Server mod_http2 (13 Nov): sysdig.com
  22. Abijita — Apache HTTP2 RCE CVE-2026-119618: abijita.com
  23. Censys — Advisory: CVE-2026-119618: censys.com
  24. Qualys — November Patch Tuesday: how to sort through the patches (13 Nov): blog.qualys.com
  25. Fortinet FortiGuard Labs — T-SQL being abused to deliver malware on compromised MS SQL Servers (12 Nov): fortinet.com
  26. Group-IB — Inside the server: 14 months of offensive cyber operations targeting Europe (DarkLunnen): group-ib.com
  27. SentinelOne — The good, the bad and the ugly in cybersecurity, week 46 (13 Nov): sentinelone.com
  28. GitGuardian — wfx-loot: a CI secret stealer pushed with stolen GitHub credentials (13 Nov): blog.gitguardian.com
  29. GitHub — nirzadokox/php2shell vulnerability check (pre-existing detection rule): github.com
  30. The Times of India — State Bank of India files police case a month after hackers stole 375,000 records (13 Nov): timesofindia.indiatimes.com
  31. Free Press Journal — Navi Mumbai cyberattack exposes alleged data theft of 3.75 lakh bank customers’ records (13 Nov): freepressjournal.in
  32. Newsband — Cyber security breach: SBI: newsband.in
  33. The Times of India — Inside the international cyber raids on India’s NBFCs (Crafty Falcon, 13 Nov): timesofindia.indiatimes.com
  34. Seoul Economic Daily — KB Capital hacked, leaking data of 1,800 staff and clients (13 Nov; English): en.sedaily.com
  35. Herald Business — KB Capital (Korean, 13 Nov): biz.heraldcorp.com
  36. Dong-A Ilbo — KB Capital (Korean, 13 Nov): donga.com
  37. Newsis — KB Capital (Korean, 13 Nov): newsis.com
  38. Olhar Digital — Tesouro Nacional: data of 30,000 people and 4,000 Pix keys accessed (12 Nov; Portuguese — translated): olhardigital.com.br
  39. Olhar Digital — Caixa Vida e Previdência attack exposes CPFs (12 Nov; Portuguese — translated): olhardigital.com.br
  40. Nationwide News Network (Jamaica) — Known ransom group takes credit for JETS cyber breach (13 Nov): nationwideradiojm.com
  41. QPulse — INC Ransom targets Raymond James Financial: qpulse.quasarcybertech.com
  42. QPulse — INC Ransom claims attack on Game Changer Wealth: qpulse.quasarcybertech.com
  43. Undercode News — INC Ransomware group claims Raymond James and GameChanger Wealth: undercodenews.com
  44. BreachSense — Four Points Financial data breach (PixelLeaks claim, 13 Nov): breachsense.com
  45. BleepingComputer — Trezor confirms crypto-stealing implants in three wallets, releases fix (13 Nov): bleepingcomputer.com
  46. The Hacker News — Trezor confirms hidden hardware implants (13 Nov): thehackernews.com
  47. BleepingComputer — How one AI agent exposed five critical enterprise security gaps (Token Security, 13 Nov): bleepingcomputer.com
  48. Channel NewsAsia — Data breaches: cybersecurity campaigns, Singapore, CSA (13 Nov): channelnewsasia.com
  49. The Straits Times — Beef up cyberdefences now, CSA urges, as reported incidents triple (13 Nov): straitstimes.com
  50. USA Today — Microsoft outage: Outlook updates (13 Nov): usatoday.com
  51. American Banker — Ransomware crew claims 5 banks and a CU, 2 confirm breaches (Insight Credit Union, 11 Nov): americanbanker.com
  52. Yonhap — Financial Security Institute (Korean — translated): yna.co.kr
  53. USA News Hub — “Heist of a new kind”: AI-enabled scam reportedly managed to steal $110 million from French bank (13 Nov; re-report of the AFP interview with Arkéa chair Julien Carmona, via Boursorama): allusanewshub.com
  54. The Hacker News — ThreatsDay 59 (Binance laundering update, 13 Nov): thehackernews.com
  55. Reuters — North Korean hackers steal more than $400 million using video images, FBI says (FaceStealer, 12 Nov): reuters.com
  56. Carried sources (items unchanged in-window — full detail in the 13 November edition): Huntress SCKit blog; ConnectWise Trust Center advisory (11 Nov); BleepingComputer SCKit; Blackpoint Cyber; Caixa Seguridade market notice (12 Nov); FSI press coverage (Yonhap, Seoul Economic Daily, Digital Daily, Seoul Shinmun, Dong-A Ilbo, Herald Business, NoCut News, SBS, Newsis, etoday); Seven Bank notice (Japanese — translated); SMBC Nikko Securities notice (Japanese — translated); NHK / Nikkei SMBC Nikko (Japanese — translated); SMBC Consumer Finance disclosure; Mirae Asset Securities notice; Philippine SEC notice; Bank Rakyat (Pokde.Net, Siakap Keli, Malay Mail); TMC Insight / American Banker Storm-1175; Ransomware.live Shenwan Hongyuan / Game Changer; Undercode News Shenwan Hongyuan; CyberThreatIntelligence StrucSure; Radio Dabanga / Dar Hamar Emergency Rooms Bank of Khartoum; Node.js November 2026 security releases; Apache HTTP Server 2.4 vulnerabilities; Fortinet PSIRT FG-IR-26-277 and FG-IR-26-207; Ivanti November 2026 Security Update; Unit 42 Cairn post; Unit 42 ARTEX post (31 Oct); Microsoft GSocket and FORGE Lab posts; Datadog ARTEX in AWS; BleepingComputer AntiFox; BleepingComputer wfx-loot; Aikido wfx-loot; SafeDep wfx-loot; Check Point October 2026 threat landscape; Ransomware.live Tyfone page; QPulse Tyfone; Undercode News Tyfone; BreachSense Raymond James; CyberKendra Node.js; Security Online Node.js and Apache; The Hacker News Cisco BroadWorks/Openwave; oz9un/sshole; leonjza/sshhole-lab; predkambrij/sshhole-repro; lysophavin18/CVE-2026-119977; 4minx/CVE-2026-72898; hackzuoji/freeswitch-cve-2026-116779-POC; ThreatDefence Able2Shell; FNN SMBC Nikko recap; Threadlinqs TL-2026-5804 (Baker Tilly) and TL-2026-5771 (SignDrop); NoCut News Flybit; KSB Setouchi Broadcasting / NHK Hyakujushi Bank (Japanese — translated); Cybernews CSC Telecom; KSB Hyakujushi Bank; Nextapple / NOWnews SinoPac (Chinese — translated); Livedoor MUFG / Cabinet Office Arara (Japanese — translated).
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