Window: approximately 9 November 09:00 SGT to 10 November 09:00 SGT. New and overnight developments, deduplicated against the 9 November edition, with gaps stated plainly.
GPUStack, FreeSWITCH, IBM Aspera Faspex (all 9.8) and OpenSSH SSHole (8.1) added 9 Nov, all with confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. Federal due date is 12 November.
FinCEN designated MEXC Global a primary money-laundering concern over at least $16bn in alleged illicit flows; US institutions will be barred from transacting with it from about December.
Wiz: attacker used Qubole-associated AWS credentials to assume customer roles, steal secrets and copy S3 data, 14–26 Oct. Any firm that ever connected Qubole to AWS should review CloudTrail from 1 Oct.
The bank has recovered part of the stolen funds; the amount was not stated. The ~€118m figure is still only an order of magnitude, not bank-confirmed.
Four new KEV additions on 9 November, all due 12 November — and all already exploited in the wild. GPUStack CVE-2026-102895 (9.8, authentication bypass), SignalWire FreeSWITCH CVE-2026-116779 (9.8, code injection), IBM Aspera Faspex CVE-2026-123218 (9.8, authorisation bypass) and OpenSSH CVE-2026-123158 (8.1, SSHole) were added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 9 November, with an unusually short three-day federal deadline. SSHole has the richest new evidence: GreyNoise recorded 16 successful exploitation chains from 6 IPs, one installing a Python C2 implant (“TAC Agent”), and Previdian counted 20 attempts from 13 IPs across 9 countries. Fortinet’s PSIRT advisories for the AI-found FortiOS / FortiManager / FortiAnalyzer flaws had still not been published as of 09:02 SGT — no CVE IDs yet.
Enforcement and a regulator breach lead the incident picture. FinCEN designated crypto exchange MEXC Global a primary money-laundering concern over at least $16bn in alleged illicit transactions (May 2021–May 2026), including Russian, Iranian and North Korean sanctions evasion; US financial institutions will be barred from transacting with it once the order takes effect, expected in December — this is not an OFAC asset freeze. The Philippine SEC confirmed a breach of its platform users, exposing names, contact details and tax identification numbers; no user count was given, the platform was not named, and the 487,000-line forum claim is unconfirmed. Wiz found Qubole-associated AWS credentials abused across customer accounts in October — a cloud supply-chain exposure for any firm that ever connected Qubole to AWS, including through dormant roles.
Follow-ups dominate the rest: partial recovery at Arkéa, an FSS inspection at Mirae Asset, and a denied Binance claim. Arkéa has recovered part of the stolen funds (amount unstated); note the Reuters piece confirming about €100m is dated 5 November, not 9 November — 9 November hits are re-syndications. The FSS began an on-site inspection at Mirae Asset Securities on 9 November, probing whether four Mirae Asset group incidents are linked (about 39,000 people affected in total). Mercado Bitcoin’s view-only access started on 9 November; Binance denied a ShinyHunters claim of 335.9 million records, calling it likely a scam, with no evidence published. N0n listed unnamed Canadian wealth-management firms and a US payment-card network — all unconfirmed, no victim named. No new AI-scaled phishing, vishing or deepfake campaign was found in-window.
Group Name | Target Sub-sector / Geography | TTPs (MITRE ATT&CK where available) | Impact
| Group | Target | TTPs | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unknown actor — Philippine SEC — NEW in this daily edition (confirmed by the regulator, 9 Nov) | Securities regulator, Philippines; registered users of its online platforms | No MITRE mapping published. The SEC says accounts “may have been leaked potentially through malware infection or unauthorized access by a third-party threat actor” of the user’s own device — the SEC’s preliminary account, not independently verified. No entry route confirmed. | Confirmed (Philippine SEC, 9 Nov). Personal information of registered users of its online / digital platforms was compromised; direct notifications to affected account holders went out on 9 Nov. Exposed categories are “strictly limited to”: full name, username, email address, mobile number, date of birth, gender, address and tax identification number (TIN). The SEC says no passwords in its databases leaked, no data was altered or destroyed, and no company / corporate records were involved. It formally notified the National Privacy Commission, reinforced access controls, updated authentication credentials and ran infrastructure-wide scans. Not confirmed: which platform was affected (no specific platform named), how many users are affected (no count disclosed), and the 5 November forum claim of about 487,000 lines of SEC data (alias “sinigangmixwithgabi”) — the SEC has not confirmed that dataset is connected to this incident. A separate alleged 10-million-record leak at the Bureau of Internal Revenue is unconnected — do not conflate the two. |
| Unknown actor — Insight Credit Union — NEW in this daily edition (confirmed by AG filings, 6 Nov; reported 9 Nov) | Credit union, Florida, USA | No MITRE mapping published. Incident window 4–7 September 2026, discovered 13 October 2026. The Storm ransomware group claimed on its leak site on 15 September that it took 209 GB (300,000+ files) — not confirmed by the credit union and not independently verified. | Confirmed (Texas and Vermont attorney-general filings, 6 Nov). 67,487 people affected in total (656 Texas residents, 16 Vermont residents). Exposed data: names, Social Security numbers, driver’s licence numbers, other government-issued ID numbers (passport / state ID) and financial information (account numbers, credit / debit card numbers). Notification by US mail. Class action Collazo v. Insight Credit Union was filed 30 October 2026 in the Middle District of Florida (reported by a law firm; docket not independently checked). Early headlines citing “656 Texans” are the Texas-resident subset, not the total. |
| N0n — unnamed Canadian wealth firms and a US payment-card network — NEW in this daily edition (reported / unconfirmed) | Financial planning / wealth management, Canada; payment-card network and services, United States | No MITRE mapping published. N0n is described by SOCRadar (October 2026) as an AI-assisted extortion operation using credential-based access (FortiGate SSL-VPN stuffing, exposed AWS keys, weak RDP / WinRM); no CVE-based exploitation identified. No attack detail, ransom figure or data volume published for these listings. | Unconfirmed. On 9 November N0n added a batch of unnamed victims, all marked “[PENDING EXPOSURE]” (claimed, no data released): #148 — payment-card network and services, US (discovered 09:26 UTC); #176 — financial planning, Canada (10:39 UTC); #182 — financial planning and wealth management, Canada (10:43 UTC); #186 — wealth management, Canada (10:46 UTC); #187 — financial planning and insurance, Canada (10:46 UTC); plus #169 and #177 (financial planning / advisory, Canada) and #194 (investment advisory, US). No victim has been named in any of these listings. The batch pattern matches N0n’s earlier mass-listing behaviour. Do not treat a listing as a breach; watch for a victim name or a data publication. |
| Krybit — CITIC Pacific — NEW in this daily edition (reported / unconfirmed) | Conglomerate with insurance interests, Australia | No MITRE mapping published. No evidence, intrusion detail or data sample provided. | Unconfirmed. ThreatMon reported on 9 November that Krybit listed CITIC Pacific (citicpacific.com) as a victim. Note: CITIC Pacific is a diversified conglomerate, not a pure insurer — the “insurance-sector” label comes from the ThreatMon notification. |
| Unknown actor — Vanguard Group — NEW in this daily edition (filing confirmed; 14m-record claim unconfirmed) | Asset manager, United States | No MITRE mapping published. Cause, incident date, discovery date and nationwide total are not disclosed in the public filing. | Filing confirmed; claim unconfirmed. Vanguard Group appears in the Vermont Attorney General’s security-breach register with a filing dated 4 November 2026, identifying 94 Vermont residents whose Social Security numbers were involved; it does not say whether the affected people were customers, employees or others. First reported 5 November. In-window (9 Nov), plaintiff law firms published class-action investigation pages relaying that threat actors “reportedly” posted claims on dark-web forums in mid-October alleging they had infiltrated Vanguard’s network servers and exfiltrated more than 14 million records. No corroboration found: no independent reporting, no sample, no named actor, and Vanguard has not publicly confirmed the dark-web claims, issued a detailed statement, or disclosed a total. The 14-million figure rests solely on the law firms’ relay of the forum claim. |
| Unknown actor — Mirae Asset Securities — Update, previously covered | Securities brokerage, South Korea | No MITRE mapping published. Unauthorised external access to the mobile-web phone-authentication login service on 4 November and to the internal groupware system (mi-global) on 5 November. The attack method and the attacker’s identity are undisclosed. | New in-window (9 Nov): the Financial Supervisory Service sent an on-site inspection team to Mirae Asset Securities HQ on the morning of 9 November, examining the scale of the leak, the circumstances, and whether the four Mirae Asset Group incidents are linked (intrusion routes, attack methods, internal controls). The FSS is also inspecting Mirae Asset Life Insurance and Mirae Asset Global Investments. The four group incidents in sequence: Mirae Asset Life (26 October), Mirae Asset Asset Management (28 October), Energy Infrastructure Asset Management (2 November), Securities (4–5 November). About 39,000 people affected in total across the Securities incident: account numbers of about 3,800 customers (names not leaked) and personal information of 35,255 employees (including retirees and outsourced staff; names, employee IDs, emails, mobiles, encrypted passwords). Resident-registration, passport and licence numbers were not leaked. No malware infection or service disruption; no financial damage identified to date; systems operating normally. The firm blocked the access routes and reported to the FSC, FSS and PIPC. CEO-sanction prospects are in focus under the accountability-structure regime. Customer assets under management: ₩693.3tn (about $472bn). The characterisation of the Mirae Asset attack as a suspected AI-agent attack remains suspected, not corroborated — see the AI section. |
| Unknown actor — Crédit Mutuel Arkéa — Update, previously covered | Cooperative banking group, France (incl. online bank Fortuneo and Keytrade Bank in Belgium as subsidiaries) | No MITRE mapping published. Provider-platform route to the bank directly; the bank’s own account used for transfers to other banks, then conversion to cryptocurrency via specialist platforms. | New in-window (9 Nov): Daniel Baal, president of the Crédit Mutuel national confederation, said on France 5 that the bank has recovered part of the stolen funds; the amount recovered was not stated (Univers Freebox, 9 Nov, translated from French). The about €118m (about $133m) figure is still not bank-confirmed — Arkéa validates only the “order of magnitude”. No individual customer accounts affected, per the bank. The Paris prosecutor’s cybercrime unit is investigating (complaint received 4 November). Correction to the wire’s dating: the Reuters piece confirming about €100m (about $112.6m) stolen is dated 5 November, not 9 November — 9 November appearances are re-syndications. No new loss figure, provider name, attribution or arrest. ZachXBT’s not-Lazarus assessment is his own, not a law-enforcement finding. Do not add figures: ZachXBT’s estimate, Bitquery’s $108.8 million in USDC withdrawals (1–2 November) and the later Bitquery figure of $126.04 million to 17 wallets measure different things, and the bank-to-chain link is not publicly proven. |
| TraderTraitor — Binance — Update, previously covered | Crypto exchange, global | No new MITRE list in-window. | New in-window (9 Nov): an actor using the “ShinyHunters” handle on a newly emerged underground forum offered data allegedly covering 335.9 million Binance users (about 170 countries) for $900,000, with a “pay or leak” ultimatum; claimed contents include KYC documents, emails, phone numbers, account passwords, crypto wallet private keys, transaction history and internal infrastructure information. A sample was reportedly behind a forum paywall. Binance denies the claim (confirmed): a spokesperson told BleepingComputer it found “no evidence that Binance systems, customer KYC data, account credentials, wallet private keys, or internal infrastructure information were compromised in connection with this listing” and that it “appears likely to be a scam”. Binance cited inconsistencies: it does not store user passwords in plaintext, does not hold private keys for users’ external wallets, and no longer operates in some jurisdictions the seller referenced. BleepingComputer notes the actor is believed to be impersonating ShinyHunters, and ThreatMon described the listing as unverified. No evidence (sample contents, proof of system access) was published. This is separate from the 29 October wallet attack. No numbered Recovery Update #10 was published. HYPE and APT withdrawals remain restored (8 Nov); INJ, PLASMA, NEAR and LTC are still pending. No new proof-of-reserves figures and no completion date for full restoration. The 44-token proof-of-reserves snapshot remains confirmed live (verified 7 Nov 23:07 SGT). The Elliptic (about 2,300 BTC converted) versus Arkham (about +115 BTC in labelled wallets) gap is unresolved. |
| Unknown actor — Mercado Bitcoin — Update, previously covered | Crypto exchange, Brazil | No MITRE mapping. | New in-window (9 Nov): the view-only reopening did start on 9 November (Brazil afternoon): customers can log in via the website to view balances, statements, holdings and investments. Withdrawals, deposits, trading, transfers, card and Pix payments remain suspended; open limit orders from 2 November were cancelled. Next step, planned for next week: Pix withdrawals only to accounts in the customer’s own name, after every customer re-confirms details and sets a new password in the app. Trading and crypto transfers return later, after external security review — no date. Figures, kept separate: the exchange’s own numbers are now about $36.3m affected and $12.9m blocked (its 3 November update); a separate tracker reports more than $16m now blocked. Chainalysis / Bitquery estimates of the total drained remain about $48.6–49m across 10–17 chains — higher than the exchange’s $36.3m “affected” figure. The company says it will cover customer losses from its own funds. No official technical explanation or entry point has been published. |
| Unknown actor — Gopax — Update, previously covered | Crypto exchange, South Korea (majority-owned by Binance) | No MITRE mapping published. The exchange acted after receiving a threatening email from a party claiming to have hacked the platform; no intrusion or theft has been detected and the threat has not been verified. | Still frozen on 9 November with no resumption date (three days after the 6 November halt); trading, deposits and standard withdrawals remain suspended. Manual withdrawal requests via customer support continue, limited to supported personal wallets, with direct transfers to other exchanges restricted. A senior FSS official was quoted on 8 November saying the timeline for restoring services remains unclear; Gopax says it will resume once security-patch safety is secured, with no specific date. Assets are being moved to 100% cold wallets on the financial authorities’ recommendation. The FSS will convene the CISOs of all virtual-asset service providers on 19 November. |
| Unknown actor — SMBC Consumer Finance — Update, previously covered | Consumer finance, Japan; customers of 189 partner banks, credit unions and online banks | No MITRE mapping published. No new detail on the attack method in-window. | New in-window (9 Nov): the roundup of banks’ own announcements, updated 9 November 20:36 JST (Security Measures Lab, translated from Japanese), still puts the blast radius at at least 26 banks — no new bank beyond 26 was found in-window, and no new secondary-fraud report was found. Per-bank figures already published (subsets of the up-to-320,118 ceiling — do not add them): Docomo SMTB Net Bank up to 122,635; Resona Bank 139, Kansai Mirai Bank 5,793, Minato Bank 3, Thirty-Three Bank 914, San-in Godo Bank 1,585, Fukui Bank 1. Several banks have suspended new loan applications or guarantee screening; others continue with possible delays. The guarantee system remains suspended with resumption aimed at mid-November. No secondary fraud confirmed as of 5 November, with no update on that point in-window. The 320,118 (Kyodo / Asahi) versus 321,018 (Nikkei) discrepancy is still unresolved. |
| Unknown actor — Daishin Securities — Update, previously covered (October incident; remediation announced 9 Nov) | Securities brokerage, South Korea | No MITRE mapping published. Abnormal access to an external groupware solution on 29 October; about 38,490 customer names exposed via its account-opening server (17 October incident). | New in-window (9 Nov): Daishin Securities announced support for the about 38,000 customers whose personal / credit information leaked: one year of voice-phishing / smishing compensation insurance (up to ₩10m) for all affected customers, plus December fee exemptions. This is a remediation follow-up, not a new breach. The FSS is already conducting an on-site inspection at Daishin. |
| Storm-3358 — No new development in-window | Financial sector, Southeast Asia | No MITRE mapping published. | No change in-window. Check Point’s 9 November threat-intelligence round-up and Cybersecurity Dive’s 9 November piece both re-report the 5–6 November Microsoft / Check Point ARTEX findings (Storm-3358 using ARTEX against financial firms in Southeast Asia since October) with no new count, victim or BFSI victim. See the AI section. |
| Deadlock — Fidex, Coopebis, Kadick — No new development in-window | Insurance broker (Mexico); savings and credit cooperative; agency banking (Nigeria) | No MITRE mapping published. | No change in-window. All three remain leak-site claims only, with no victim confirmation, no data sample and no new reporting. Coopebis’s country remains inconsistently reported (tracker region CR vs write-up “Colombian”) — do not cite a country. |
| Marlanwg — Bank Rakyat — No new development in-window | Cooperative bank, Malaysia | No MITRE mapping published. | No change in-window. The defacement of the third-party-managed corporate web portal (6 November) stands as confirmed; the actor’s claim of internal access and a retrieved data sample remains unverified, with no sample published and no new bank statement. |
| Unknown actor — NTT Docomo — No new development in-window | Telecom, Japan; bank account numbers exposed for some customers | No MITRE mapping published. | No change in-window. No 9 November follow-up was found. Up to 294,839 records leaked (disclosed 6 November); both sites remain suspended; the entry route is undisclosed; whether an AI agent was used is under investigation. |
No new in-window item was found for AU Small Finance Bank (no bank response to the 1.2 TB sale claim), Pekin Insurance, Higginbotham, Qilin / AXE – EXPERTS, the two unnamed Canadian firms (8 Nov), Scry Analytics, Moldova, FIN7 / Carbanak, Scattered Spider, RansomHub, Cl0p, or a FI-specific Initial Access Broker. Absence of reporting is not evidence of absence of activity.
CVE ID | CVSS Score | Affected Product | Exploitation Status | Relevance to Finance
CrowdStrike’s Counter Adversary Operations research (5 Nov) sets the tempo for this section: for vulnerabilities with a public PoC that CrowdStrike saw exploited between January and July 2026, the median time from PoC publication to exploitation was under a day, the fastest was 35 minutes, and 91% were exploited within 48 hours. Treat a public PoC as a patch trigger, not a warning. Separately, Onapsis / Recorded Future’s “Days to Zero” research (6 Nov) found the median time from an SAP security-note release to verified exploitation or a public PoC has fallen to 1–3 days for 2025–26 patches, against 489 days for 2021 patches, and ransomware / extortion groups appearing in SAP content rose from 8 in 2023 to 26 in 2025.
| CVE | CVSS | Product | Status | Finance relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-102895 NEW — KEV 9 NOV | 9.8 | GPUStack before 2.2.0 | In the Wild (KEV) | New in-window (added to CISA KEV 9 Nov; federal due date 12 Nov; ransomware use Unknown). Before 2.2.0, get_current_user treated a loopback source as the built-in administrator when force_auth_localhost was false (the default). A remote request could appear to come from 127.0.0.1 via a same-host reverse-proxy peer or a client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP header. Grants unauthenticated admin access — user / model changes, persistent admin API-key creation, disclosure of worker and cloud-provider secrets, and code execution via POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml. The vendor advisory states exploitation was observed against a v2.1.1 deployment; CISA SSVC (9 Nov) lists exploitation as active, automatable, total technical impact. No attribution or victim count published. No public PoC confirmed. A sibling flaw, CVE-2026-102894 (9.1, SAML login account hijack), is fixed in 2.2.2 — so 2.2.2+ closes both. Finance relevance is indirect: GPUStack is an AI model-serving / GPU cluster manager, relevant where firms run self-hosted LLM inference; an exposed instance gives unauthenticated admin and cloud-secret disclosure. Upgrade to 2.2.0 or later (2.2.2+ for both flaws); do not expose GPUStack to the internet. |
| CVE-2026-116779 NEW — KEV 9 NOV | 9.8 | SignalWire FreeSWITCH before 1.11.3 | In the Wild (KEV) | New in-window (added to CISA KEV 9 Nov; federal due date 12 Nov; ransomware use Unknown). Inbound SIP MESSAGE handling splits the To-user on + and treats the left side as a chat-protocol selector with no allow-list; selecting the api chat protocol reaches switch_api_execute(), so a peer whose MESSAGE is accepted can run FreeSWITCH API commands including OS commands (system) with daemon privileges. The vendor advisory (28 Oct) states “Exploitation of this path has been observed in the wild.” No victim counts, dates or IOCs published by the vendor. Fixed in 1.11.3 (released 28 August, two months before the advisory); the fix gates the api chat protocol behind a new per-profile enable-chat-api-proto setting, off by default (blocked attempts get 403 and are logged). Workaround: set enable-chat=false on profiles not needing inbound SIP chat. Public PoC: hackzuoji/freeswitch-cve-2026-116779-POC (GitHub) — a third-party researcher’s toolkit (created 6 Nov; real code, tests and a Nuclei template, verified against the advisory); it includes reverse-shell functionality, and its “unauthenticated” framing applies only where a profile accepts MESSAGE without auth (disable-auth-messages) — normally SIP digest auth applies. Finance relevance is moderate: FreeSWITCH underpins call centres, hosted PBX, carrier SIP gateways and conferencing; banks’ contact-centre / telephony estates are the exposure. |
| CVE-2026-123218 NEW — KEV 9 NOV | 9.8 | IBM Aspera Faspex 5.0.0–5.0.19 | In the Wild (KEV) | New in-window (added to CISA KEV 9 Nov; federal due date 12 Nov; ransomware use Unknown). Incorrect authorisation (CWE-863): an authenticated / authorised user can craft a specific message to bypass authorisation and gain full administrative privileges. Fixed in 5.0.19 PL1 (container faspex-core image should report 5.0.19, Fix Pack 1). No workarounds listed. The CISA KEV listing is the exploitation evidence; IBM’s bulletin does not mention exploitation, and no actor, victim count or IOCs have been published. No public PoC confirmed. Inconsistency to flag, not smooth over: IBM’s bulletin text describes an authenticated / authorised user, while its CVSS vector says PR:N (no privileges required) — the practical exposure is via external / guest accounts if the PR:N reading is right. Finance relevance is high for file transfer: Faspex is a high-speed managed file-transfer platform used for large inter-company file exchange — a classic enterprise file-transfer exposure. |
| CVE-2026-123158 NEW DEVELOPMENT — KEV 9 NOV | 8.1 | OpenSSH sshd on musl Linux (Alpine Linux above all) | In the Wild (KEV) | New in-window: added to CISA KEV on 9 November (federal due date 12 Nov; ransomware use Unknown), with new sensor-confirmed exploitation evidence. GreyNoise recorded the first successful exploitation on its decoy servers on 7 November 00:46 UTC — about 40 hours after the fix — and 16 successful attack chains from 6 source IPs since; one attacker gained root and installed “TAC Agent”, a Python C2 implant with Chinese-language comments / logs, C2 at tac.vpnla[.]org, set up as a startup service. Post-exploitation included cloud-metadata queries, reading password hashes / root SSH keys, and modifying authorized_keys. GreyNoise cautions its sensors are not representative of global activity; no real-world victim is publicly confirmed. Previdian counted 20 exploitation attempts from 13 IPs across 9 countries (Denmark, Iran, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, US) as of 8 November; first attempt under nine hours after disclosure, confirmed root access on an Alpine honeypot — eight attempts, all from one Japan-based IP, 89.116.89[.]18. SANS honeypots logged 232 long-password login attempts on 5 November and 713 on 6 November (suspicious attempts, not confirmed break-ins). The flaw: on musl Linux without PAM, an oversized password (257+ chars) makes musl’s crypt() return *, which sshd then compares equal to the * password field of accounts configured with no password — authenticating as root, key-only users, LDAP users. Present since 2016. Public PoC / repro lab: oz9un/sshole (GitHub) — the researcher’s own repo, verified genuine; two further verified repro labs are leonjza/sshhole-lab and predkambrij/sshhole-repro. Other GitHub PoCs are unverified and could contain malware — do not link or run any other. Fix 10.6p2 or patched Alpine packages, restart sshd; workaround PasswordAuthentication no. Alpine is widespread in containers and cloud images used by fintechs; internet-facing sshd on musl hosts is directly exposed. |
| CVE-2026-124079 NEW 9 NOV | 9.8 | rConfig Core 8.0.0–8.2.18 / rConfig Pro before 8.4.1 | Not known exploited — no PoC confirmed | New in-window (published 9 Nov 13:17 UTC). Deserialisation of untrusted data (CWE-502) lets an unauthenticated network attacker execute arbitrary code by pushing a crafted serialised job onto the Redis-backed Laravel Horizon queue, which runs without authentication. Fixed in Core 8.2.19 and Pro 8.4.1. No public exploit confirmed, not in KEV. Finance relevance is low — network-device configuration management, enterprise infrastructure; a watchlist entry only where rConfig is in use. |
| CVE-2026-58868 NEW 9 NOV | Critical | Android 14–17 | Not known exploited | New in-window (November Android security bulletin, surfaced via Check Point’s 9 Nov round-up). Critical remote code execution without user interaction, Android 14–17. No CVSS figure, exploitation evidence or PoC was given in the sources read, and the bulletin date was not independently verified from the primary bulletin. Finance relevance is moderate: mobile banking runs on these devices, and a no-interaction RCE is the highest-value mobile flaw class — check the November bulletin and patch managed devices. Flagged as thinly sourced; do not overstate. |
| CVE-2026-123551 | 10.0 | OpenAM 14.0.0–16.1.3 | Not known exploited — no PoC (vendor withheld) | No change in-window. Published 8 Nov; fix 16.1.4 released 22 Oct. OpenAM broadcasts live session tokens (iPlanetDirectoryPro) on the notification WebSocket when agent notifications are enabled — the default — and the agent-only check on that WebSocket can be bypassed unauthenticated via an unvalidated internal forward on legacy Liberty ID-FF endpoints. An attacker holding a connection passively collects live tokens for every user whose session is created, changed or ended — including administrators — and can use them as bearer credentials against OpenAM and every SSO application behind it; an admin token can escalate to server command execution. The vendor deliberately withheld PoC code to give operators time to upgrade; EPSS 0.43%. Not in CISA KEV. Workarounds published (restrict /openam/notifications and /openam/ws/* to agent hosts; disable agent notifications; block legacy ID-FF endpoints). Finance relevance is high: OpenAM is an identity / SSO gateway, and a 10.0 unauthenticated session-hijack flaw in an SSO front door is directly relevant to banks’ customer and workforce authentication. Upgrade to 16.1.4 or apply the workarounds now — do not wait for exploitation reports. |
| CVE-2026-123550 | 9.8* | OpenAM before 16.1.4 | Not known exploited — no PoC | No change in-window. Same 16.1.4 batch (18 CVEs). SAML v2.0 service provider accepts unsigned assertions on ECP (PAOS) and HTTP-Artifact bindings when WantAssertionsSigned is false, letting an unauthenticated attacker forge a session as any mapped user, including admins. A third critical in the batch, CVE-2026-123549 (9.3), is privilege escalation via a self-registration attribute bypass. No known exploitation, not in KEV, no public PoC. *cve.now lists 9.3 for this CVE; 9.8 is the figure used by most trackers. Fixed in 16.1.4. |
| CVE-2026-114432 | 9.8 | Contact Form 7 6.2–6.2.3 | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. Published 8 Nov; vendor fix 6.2.4 released 29 Oct. The plugin does not validate the type or extension of files uploaded through a form file field, and a flaw in temporary-file cleanup leaves rejected uploads on disk, allowing unauthenticated arbitrary file upload (RCE on stock Apache setups where .phar maps to PHP). 10,000,000+ installs. Found by Shinya Murakami and Jakub Herman, reported via WPScan. Not in KEV, no exploitation reported. Finance relevance is moderate — WordPress is widely used for financial firms’ public and marketing sites, and mass-exploit is the usual pattern. Update to 6.2.4+. |
| CVE-2026-107331 | 9.9 | IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data | Not known exploited — no PoC reported | No change in-window. Published 8 Nov; IBM bulletin, fix available. A remote authenticated attacker can obtain sensitive information due to an absolute-path traversal vulnerability (CWE-36). A sibling in the same bulletin, CVE-2026-107330 (7.7), allows arbitrary file write via path traversal. Not in KEV, no exploitation reported. Finance relevance is low to moderate — DataStage is enterprise ETL / data-integration infrastructure; check the IBM bulletin for the fixed build. Also in the 8 Nov IBM batch: IBM Concert CVE-2026-6715 / CVE-2026-15266 (both 9.8, unauthenticated OS command injection, fixed in 3.1.0) — enterprise software, no BFSI-specific exploitation reported. |
| CVE-2026-96652 / 96654 / 96655 / 96656 (Plex2Shell) | — | Plex Media Server on NAS devices | In the Wild (KEV) | No change in-window. Synology advisory SA-26:17 (8 Nov) covers the four previously disclosed Plex2Shell flaws in its Plex Media Server package (not DSM itself): fixed package 1.43.5.11079-720011079 for DSM 7.4/7.3 and 1.43.5.11079-700011079 for DSM 7.2.2/7.2.1. QNAP’s 6 November warning stands. Updating does not remove installed payloads — check for compromise, reinstall the operating system if needed and reset credentials. In CISA KEV since 20 October. Finance relevance is low — a NAS / media server, not core banking — but branch-office and home-office NAS devices are in scope for device hygiene. |
| CVE-2026-120984 | 9.1 | Red Hat Build of Keycloak, client management with authorisation services enabled | Not known exploited — no PoC | No change in-window. Published 7 Nov. An authenticated attacker with high-privilege client-management access can upload a malicious JavaScript policy on client creation or import, leading to arbitrary code execution. No PoC, no Exploit-DB or Metasploit entry, not in CISA KEV. Red Hat rates it Important rather than Critical because privileged authenticated access is required. Finance relevance is moderate: identity and access management / single sign-on is core to banks, but the flaw needs a privileged account first. No fix version was listed in the sources checked — check the Red Hat advisory for the patched build before acting. |
| CVE-2026-118267 | 8.1 | WordPress WP Data Access plugin, 5.5.89 and earlier | Not known exploited — no PoC | No change in-window. Published 7 Nov. Incorrect authorisation allows unauthenticated privilege escalation via the key / val parameters on app/update. No PoC known, not in CISA KEV. Finance relevance is low to moderate — a WordPress plugin only, relevant where a bank or insurer runs WordPress with this plugin. |
| CVE-2026-116366 | 9.5 | ClickHouse Server, via bundled Brotli 1.2.0 | Not known exploited — PoC unverified | No change in-window. Published 7 Nov. Unauthenticated remote code execution through the bundled Brotli 1.2.0 library — the same root cause as the Brotli flaw (CVE-2026-111497) below. Fixed by Brotli 1.2.1 (ClickHouse fix 22 October). An aggregator listing cites a PoC / lab repository, but the repository was not verified — author, date and contents were not checked — so it is not linked here and the flaw is not presented as exploited. Finance relevance is moderate: ClickHouse is used in analytics pipelines that can hold customer and transaction data; check the bundled Brotli version rather than assuming the database is unaffected. |
| CVE-2026-19868 | 7.5 / 7.1* | SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN (Gen7 and Gen8 firewalls) | In the Wild (KEV) | Minor update in-window: SonicWall advisory SNWLID-2026-0014 was updated to v1.1 on 9 November; no change to the flaw, affected versions or fix. Added to CISA KEV 6 November; federal due date 20 November. A user holding valid credentials for an alternate authentication method can bypass SAML authentication controls on the SSLVPN service, and may also bypass SAML-enforced MFA. Affects SonicOS 7.3.3-7015 and older (Gen7) and 8.2.2-8015 and older (Gen8); fixed in 7.3.4-7013 / 8.2.3-8015. Applies only where SAML is configured for SSLVPN logins. No workaround. *NVD 7.5 vs SonicWall 7.1. PoC status: secondary sources warn of possible fake / malicious PoC repos naming this CVE — none verified, none linked; no public PoC is treated as known. No actor, victim, scale or IOCs published; known ransomware use listed as Unknown. This is not unauthenticated RCE — valid alternate-method credentials are required. Advisory SNWLID-2026-0014 bundles seven CVEs, including CVE-2026-107154 and CVE-2026-107155 (both 8.8, management-interface flaws) and CVE-2026-82308 (7.5, SSL-VPN DoS) — no exploitation confirmed for those three. Edge VPN plus MFA bypass is a direct route into a bank’s network; treat as priority patching before 20 November. |
| CVE-2026-88771 | 9.5 / 9.8* | Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway | In the Wild (KEV) | No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 November) packages exploitation. Unauthenticated pre-authentication command injection as root, reached by writing attacker-controlled text into the appliance’s logs which the maintenance script ns_monuploadd_err.pl later runs as a shell command — execution can lag the request by up to 24 hours. Exploited in the wild as a zero-day before disclosure; in CISA KEV since 27 September (due date 30 September, passed). Affects all deployments in the default configuration. Fixed in 14.1-73.37 and 13.1-64.23. Citrix says patching does not remove existing implants — check for persistence, not just the patch. *CVSS v4.0 9.5 (Citrix) vs v3.1 9.8 (NVD). NetScaler ADC / Gateway is widely used as a finance perimeter and remote-access device. |
| CVE-2026-76443 | 9.8 | Cisco Secure Email Gateway and Secure Email and Web Manager, 15.5 and earlier | In the Wild (KEV, sibling) | No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 November). Rapid7 describes the module as an S/MIME / email-parsing SQL injection leading to unauthenticated root RCE via a crafted email, and says it has “reason to believe” the module maps to CVE-2026-76443 — Cisco’s advisory is vague, so treat the CVE mapping as Rapid7’s, not Cisco’s. The actively exploited zero-day in the same advisory family is the sibling CVE-2026-76461 (9.8, email-parsing SQL injection to root RCE, in CISA KEV since 14 September). Apply the fixed builds from Cisco advisory cisco-sa-esa-inj-2bLVGmhX; no workaround exists. Email gateways sit in front of every bank’s mail flow, so an unauthenticated root RCE there is a direct route to mail interception and credential theft. |
| CVE-2026-97229 | 10.0 | GitLab CE / EE | In the Wild (KEV) | No change in-window. Public Metasploit module (6.5.9, 6 November). CI/CD RegExp integer-overflow RCE as the git user; authenticated, requiring write access to a public project. In CISA KEV since 29 October. GitLab hosts source code and CI pipelines — including for fintechs that self-host it — so a packaged RCE lowers the barrier for opportunistic attacks on unpatched instances. |
| CVE-2026-119977 | 8.1 / Low* | WordPress core 4.7.0–7.1.3 | In the Wild (attempts) | No change in-window. 7 November coverage re-reports the Wordfence 5 November figures: 240,000+ blocked attempts (peaking at 74,000+ on 30 October). Still no victim publicly named and no confirmed compromise tied to this flaw — blocked attempts are not compromises. Federal due date passed 6 November. The fix install itself can expose a site one last time: the update unpacks its files using the site’s old, unpatched code, so block web access to wp-content/upgrade/ before updating. Public PoC published 4 Nov: lysophavin18/CVE-2026-119977 (GitHub) — research PoC with a lab run. A second repo claiming to bypass the 7.1.4 fix holds no code, only a download link, and is flagged as a likely malware lure — do not download it. *Wordfence 8.1 vs WordPress Low. Fix 7.1.4 / backport. |
| CVE-2026-107441 | 8.8 (Zyxel) / 9.8* | Zyxel GS1900 series switches, ten models, web management interface | In the Wild (zero-day) | No change in-window. The June fix added a check that ran after the unsafe copy in /cgi-bin/dispatcher.cgi, so June-patched firmware stayed exploitable. Payloads observed: Jitterly backdoor and Sixzut rootkit; suspected Chinese-speaking actor Kapibala / Red Heron campaign (attribution via Binarly / Acronis, not independently verified here). *Secondary analysis rates it 9.8. Not in CISA KEV as of 7 November. Fix: 22 Oct firmware; change default credentials. |
| CVE-2026-109593 / 109594 | 9.1 / 6.8 | SonicWall Global Management System 9.5.2 and earlier (end-of-life) | Not reported exploited in-window | No change in-window. 109593 is critical (9.1): unauthenticated information disclosure via internal file reads. 109594 is medium (6.8): high-privilege SQL injection. SonicWall will not patch — migrate to Network Security Manager. |
| CVE-2026-72898 | 10.0 | Metabase 58+ (free and paid editions) | In the Wild | No change in-window. CSA Singapore warned 4 Nov that this SQL-injection flaw, fixed 6 Aug and on KEV since 11 Aug, is actively exploited and a PoC is public. Public PoC: 4minx/CVE-2026-72898 (GitHub), referenced in CSA’s alert AL-2026-158. It can give an unauthenticated attacker admin access and database credentials. Safe releases: 58.24, 59.21, 60.17, 61.11, 62.9, 63.5+. BFSI relevance: self-hosted analytics dashboards that hold database credentials are a credential-theft target, not just a reporting tool. |
| CVE-2026-109618 / 109619 (PHP2Shell) | 9.2 | PHP; PAN-OS and other network/security products | In the Wild | No change in-window. CSA 3 Nov: PAN-OS management interfaces exploited, chained with CVE-2026-46300 to root. Keep management interfaces off the internet. |
| CVE-2026-40217 | 8.8 | LiteLLM proxy | In the Wild (LLMjacking) | No change in-window. User-ID rebind to PROXY_ADMIN. Update LiteLLM, lock endpoints off the internet, rotate keys. |
| CVE-2026-116606 / 111560 | 9.3 / 8.6 | Barracuda Email Security Gateway and related products | Not known exploited | No change in-window. Chain gives unauthenticated remote root on ESG (watchTowr disclosure 5 Nov; 7 November coverage is re-reporting). Patch and remove admin interfaces from internet reach. |
| CVE-2026-98432 | 9.8 | Linux kernel IPv4 TCP, 4.4+ | Research exploit only | No change in-window. Demonstrated exploit needs MPTCP; RHEL fixed kernels require reboot, Ubuntu was still in -proposed on 3 Nov. |
| CVE-2026-58115 | 10.0 | Node-RED / Siemens IoT2050 | In the Wild | No change in-window. Port 1880 without adminAuth remains an active target. Siemens scope revision noted 8 Nov (more SIMATIC IoT2050 models). |
| CVE-2026-111497 | 9.2 | Google Brotli; Cisco and Splunk products (Node2Shell) | In the Wild (KEV) | No change in-window. Scope as of 5 Nov: 19 Cisco products affected, dozens under investigation, and about a dozen Splunk products also affected. Check the updated Cisco advisory against your own estate rather than the original short product list. The same Brotli root cause now also affects ClickHouse (CVE-2026-116366 above). Its KEV federal due date falls today, 10 November, but per the KEV rule a deadline alone is not a new development — no new attribution, IOCs or PoC in-window. |
Four CISA KEV additions were made on 9 November (GPUStack, FreeSWITCH, OpenSSH, IBM Aspera Faspex); the catalogue stands at 1,773 entries. No new core-banking, SWIFT/payment-gateway or enterprise file-transfer CVE was reported in this window in sources searched, beyond Faspex above. Fortinet’s PSIRT advisories for the AI-found FortiOS / FortiManager / FortiAnalyzer flaws had not been published as of 09:02 SGT — expect CVE IDs later today.
On 6 November FinCEN issued an order under §9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act designating Seychelles-incorporated MEXC Global a “primary money laundering concern in connection with Russian illicit finance”, as part of Treasury’s “Operation Economic Outcast”. Treasury alleges MEXC facilitated at least $16bn in illicit transactions between May 2021 and May 2026 (the FinCEN order text itself uses $16.7bn — press-release rounding, not a substantive discrepancy); about $1.5bn of that is attributed to Russian sanctions evasion, including $232m in direct transactions with already-sanctioned entities. Flows are also linked to Iranian and North Korean sanctions evasion, cybercrime, ransomware, scams and darknet markets; FinCEN linked MEXC to the Central Bank of Iran, the IRGC, Garantex and the A7 network. MEXC processed more than $1bn a day as of June 2026, with about $5bn in reserve assets. What changes: once effective, covered US financial institutions are prohibited from engaging in any transmittal of funds (sending or receiving, including convertible virtual currency) to or from MEXC Global, with no end date. This is not an OFAC SDN designation — it does not freeze customer assets or block property. The order takes effect 30 days after publication in the Federal Register; as of 7 November searches of the Register returned no entry, so no fixed effective date exists yet (December at the earliest). MEXC says it is aware of the order, is reviewing it with legal / compliance teams, and that operations are normal and user assets secure. OKX has warned users against direct transfers from MEXC. Separately the same day, OFAC sanctioned eight Canadian money-service businesses over Iran ties. The control question: which of your payment rails, counterparties or customers touch MEXC, and are your sanctions-screening lists ready for the effective date?
An attacker used IAM credentials from an AWS account observed as Qubole’s platform account (805246085872) to assume customer IAM roles created to trust Qubole, then enumerated storage / compute / database / identity / key services, read Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager and SSM parameters, tested secrets with TruffleHog, and copied S3 data. Activity ran 14–26 October 2026; first seen 14 October from a Mullvad VPN address (45.83.220[.]211), then an OVH VPS (57.129.54[.]120) from 15 October. Role session names start quiam-; a bootable image (sso_agent.iso) was hosted on the OVH IP. Separate, unlinked activity on 8–11 October used customer-owned AWS keys believed created for Qubole integrations. How the credentials were obtained has not been disclosed; Qubole / Idera had posted no statement when The Hacker News checked on 9 November; whether the credentials have been disabled or the activity stopped was not stated. Wiz / Sentra advice: review CloudTrail from 1 October 2026 in every account holding a Qubole integration role; look for AssumeRole from 805246085872 from outside AWS; rotate credentials, revoke sessions, enable S3 data logging. No victim count or sector breakdown was published; financial-sector exposure is via any bank or insurer that ever connected Qubole to AWS, including through dormant roles. This is the week’s clearest third-party cloud risk: a vendor’s trusted role is a standing path into customer clouds.
The roundup of banks’ own announcements, updated 9 November 20:36 JST (Security Measures Lab, translated from Japanese), still puts at least 26 banks in scope — no new bank beyond 26 was found in-window, and no new secondary-fraud report was found. Per-bank figures already published (subsets of the up-to-320,118 ceiling — do not add them): Docomo SMTB Net Bank up to 122,635; Resona Bank 139, Kansai Mirai Bank 5,793, Minato Bank 3, Thirty-Three Bank 914, San-in Godo Bank 1,585, Fukui Bank 1. Several banks have suspended new loan applications or guarantee screening; others continue with possible delays. The guarantee system remains suspended with resumption aimed at mid-November. No secondary fraud confirmed as of 5 November, with no update on that point in-window. The control question for any bank that outsources loan guarantees: which of your customers’ data sits in a guarantor’s system, and how would you know it had leaked?
Dr.Web’s fake-GitHub-security-tools campaign (disclosed 5 Nov; 2,000+ Windows systems compromised) was re-reported on 9 November with no new IOCs, repo names, takedown or victim update. One re-report notes several repos in Dr.Web’s IOC list were still live two days after the report. The campaign pivoted from crypto-wallet users to fake security projects on GitHub (scanner-output parsers, testing and log-analysis tools) aimed at cybersecurity professionals; malicious code hides in Visual Studio project files, Python and Go sources behind long whitespace; PowerShell fetches an encrypted link to a modular Electron loader (“Microsoft.exe”); final payloads are AsyncRAT, a crypto clipper and an infostealer (browser data, VPN / FTP settings, Discord tokens, exfiltrated via a Telegram bot). A third-party write-up maps this to MITRE T1195.002 / T1036, but that mapping is not vendor-published. GitHub intel-layer item: verify any security tooling pulled from GitHub before running it — the target here is the security team itself.
Reactor, KYT and Address Screening were restored on 7 November; Data Solutions and Chain (Beta) were still offline as of 8 November reporting. All users must still reset passwords and rotate API keys, and restoration sits behind trusted-IP allowlisting. No new attribution or exposure figures. Forward watch: Fortinet’s PSIRT advisories for the AI-found critical flaws in FortiOS / FortiManager / FortiAnalyzer (fixed builds available since 22 October: 7.4.13, 7.6.8, 8.0.2, 7.2.14) had not been published as of 09:02 SGT — the newest advisories on the PSIRT page were still dated 13 October; expect CVE IDs later today (US hours). Node.js security releases land tomorrow, Wednesday 11 November (High severity, lines 22.x / 24.x / 26.x). SWIFT’s November standards release was postponed and structured / hybrid address enforcement timing is now uncertain — the 14 November date given in earlier editions no longer stands; check the SWIFT notices before treating 14 November as fixed.
The SEC’s own advisory warns it never asks for passwords or security PINs — expect phishing that cites the breach and the direct notifications sent on 9 November. The leaked data (names, usernames, emails, mobiles, dates of birth, addresses, tax identification numbers) is directly usable for impersonation: messages impersonating the SEC, or impersonating account holders to the SEC and to banks. The SEC says no passwords in its databases leaked and no corporate records were involved. Banks and brokers in the Philippines should warn customers that any message about the SEC breach carrying a link or asking for credentials is suspect until verified via the SEC’s official channels.
Four men (aged 27–39) are to be charged on 10 November over an alleged scheme to obtain more than S$6 million in mortgage loans from two credit companies by impersonating a homeowner with forged NRIC / documents and luring him away for property valuations; the case surfaced on 3 April, arrests were made on 14–15 April, and a fifth man is still sought. Alleged, not cyber — identity-document fraud against lenders, not a network intrusion — but it is a live example of document-forgery fraud against credit providers, and the same forged-identity pattern feeds account-takeover and loan fraud. Source: Channel NewsAsia, 9 Nov.
FortiGuard Labs sensors logged about 350,600 attack activities aimed at Indonesia in 24 hours to 7 November, about 214,000 against banking / finance / insurance. A later dashboard reading on 9 November showed about 1.6 million blocked in 24 hours, about 761,000 against banking (one outlet reports about 807,000 for banking — the two outlets disagree; both cite the same dashboard). OJK (banking supervision chief Dian Ediana Rae) said on 9 November it has been coordinating with banks’ IT teams since Friday to raise vigilance, and Coordinating Minister Airlangga Hartarto commented on 9 November, citing Arkéa as a warning. BSSN and OJK say these are detected-and-blocked attempts, not successful intrusions; local experts caution the raw count is misleading without a baseline (about 258 million attacks in H1 2026). Do not present as a breach. Group-IB’s “Infostealers in Banking Fraud” analysis (6 Nov) argues stolen credentials and tokens have overtaken malware as the primary initial-access route; one stolen log feeds account takeover, mule onboarding, session hijacking and ransomware — analytical, no new incident.
The 8 November Mae Sot arrests (three men, 40 seized phones with banking apps pre-installed, recruits paid 8,000–10,000 baht per account, resold to scam gangs and online gambling operators along the Thai–Myanmar border, operating for over a year) stand as the enforcement item. 9 November items found are single-person arrests only: a 27-year-old mule-account holder arrested in Nakhon Pathom in a 2025 case involving a 17-year-old victim and about 310,000 baht, and a 46-year-old man arrested in a Bangkok mall on an outstanding fraud / mule-account warrant. Neither is a new scam-centre enforcement wave.
Arkéa has warned customers of increased phishing risk. Bank Rakyat’s defaced pages and the minister’s statement will be cited in phishing within days. Mirae Asset’s leak gives attackers 3,800 customer account numbers plus the names, email addresses and mobile numbers of 35,255 employees and contractors — enough to impersonate the brokerage to customers and staff internally. The SMBC Consumer Finance leak gives attackers real bank names, loan products and contract dates to build convincing “re-examination”, “guarantee renewal” or “refund fee” lures — no such fraud is confirmed yet. Binance, Mercado Bitcoin (view-only reopening started 9 November), Gopax (manual-withdrawal emails) and Nubank / Mercado Pago outage messages remain live phishing bait. Verify via official status pages only, never via links in messages claiming to restore withdrawals, refunds or loan access.
Banco Central del Paraguay’s 8 November warning stands: fraudulent messages offering to open a supposed “Cuenta de Ahorros BCP” via links are circulating, exploiting the Ueno Bank deposit-return process that began 5 November under the deposit-guarantee fund. Cybercrime police confirmed four complaints about fake messages and links impersonating the central bank. Classic secondary fraud riding on a bank-resolution event.
Techniques actually published for this edition. No mapping is invented where a source published none, and older research recirculated in-window is marked as context, not as a new sighting.
| MITRE technique | Behaviour | Seen in this edition | BFSI relevance / detection |
|---|---|---|---|
| No mapping published | Cross-account cloud abuse: assume customer IAM roles created to trust a vendor, enumerate storage / compute / database / identity / key services, read Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager and SSM parameters, test secrets with TruffleHog, copy S3 data; role session names starting quiam- | Qubole / Wiz — 14–26 Oct (reported 9 Nov) | Any bank or insurer that ever connected Qubole to AWS, including dormant roles, is in scope. Review CloudTrail from 1 Oct for AssumeRole from account 805246085872 from outside AWS; rotate credentials, revoke sessions, enable S3 data logging. No MITRE ID was published for this behaviour in sources read. |
| No mapping published | Authentication bypass by spoofing a loopback source (same-host reverse-proxy peer or client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP header) treated as the built-in administrator; then admin API-key creation, secret disclosure, code execution via /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml | GPUStack CVE-2026-102895 — exploited in the wild (KEV 9 Nov) | Self-hosted LLM inference estates: do not expose GPUStack to the internet; upgrade to 2.2.0+. No MITRE ID was published for this flaw in sources read. |
| No mapping published | Crafted SIP MESSAGE selects the api chat protocol and runs FreeSWITCH API commands including OS commands (system) with daemon privileges | FreeSWITCH CVE-2026-116779 — exploited in the wild (KEV 9 Nov) | Contact-centre / telephony estates: upgrade to 1.11.3 or set enable-chat=false on profiles not needing inbound SIP chat. No MITRE ID was published for this flaw in sources read. |
| No mapping published | Authorisation bypass: an authenticated / authorised user crafts a specific message to gain full administrative privileges on a file-transfer platform | IBM Aspera Faspex CVE-2026-123218 — exploited in the wild (KEV 9 Nov) | Managed file-transfer estates: upgrade to 5.0.19 PL1. Note the IBM text (authenticated user) vs CVSS vector (PR:N) inconsistency. No MITRE ID was published for this flaw in sources read. |
| No mapping published | Oversized password (257+ chars) accepted for locked / key-only accounts on musl Linux without PAM; post-exploitation: cloud-metadata queries, reading password hashes / root SSH keys, modifying authorized_keys, installing a Python C2 implant (“TAC Agent”, C2 tac.vpnla[.]org) | OpenSSH CVE-2026-123158 — exploited in the wild (KEV 9 Nov; GreyNoise 7 Nov, Previdian 8 Nov) | Container / cloud estates on Alpine or other musl images: patch to OpenSSH 10.6p2, restart sshd; hunt sshd logs for “Accepted password” on passwordless accounts. No MITRE ID was published for this flaw in sources read. |
| No mapping published | Leak-site claims with no TTPs, entry point or compromise date published; post date is not compromise date | N0n: unnamed Canadian wealth firms and a US payment-card network — 9 Nov; Krybit: CITIC Pacific — 9 Nov | Watch for a victim name or a data publication before treating as a breach; warn customers against phishing citing the named firms. No MITRE ID was published for these behaviours in sources read. |
| No mapping published | Unauthorised external access to a mobile-web phone-authentication login service and to an internal groupware system; method undisclosed; AI-agent use suspected, not confirmed | Mirae Asset Securities — disclosed 7 Nov; FSS inspection began 9 Nov | Review web login and groupware access controls; watch for phishing and impersonation using the exposed employee contact details and customer account numbers. No MITRE ID was published for this behaviour in sources read. |
| No mapping published | Service-provider platform used as the route to the bank directly; the bank’s own account used for transfers, then conversion to cryptocurrency via instant exchanges and Monero; part of the funds now recovered (amount unstated) | Crédit Mutuel Arkéa — 4–9 Nov | Review service-provider platforms that can reach the bank directly, not only customer-facing channels; verify transfer-authorisation and verification controls with every such provider. No MITRE ID was published for this behaviour in sources read. |
| No mapping published | Regulator platform-user breach: names, usernames, emails, mobiles, dates of birth, addresses and tax identification numbers exposed; origin stated by the regulator as possibly malware on users’ own devices or third-party access — preliminary, unverified | Philippine SEC — confirmed 9 Nov | Warn customers against impersonation using the exposed data; treat any SEC-branded message carrying a link or asking for credentials as suspect. No MITRE ID was published for this behaviour in sources read. |
| No mapping published | Unauthenticated remote code execution by deserialisation of untrusted data pushed onto an unauthenticated job queue | rConfig CVE-2026-124079 — 9 Nov | Network-device configuration management estates: upgrade Core to 8.2.19 / Pro to 8.4.1. No MITRE ID was published for this flaw in sources read. |
No technique in this edition was published with a MITRE ID in sources read. Recurring watch (context only, not a new sighting): valid-account / cloud-account abuse (T1078.004) — now directly evidenced by the Qubole cross-account role abuse, and by Storm-3358’s abuse of compromised cloud identities — and the Mirae Asset AI-agent characterisation remains suspected, not confirmed; a vendor report links ARTEX to the Korean wave, which is vendor analysis, not regulator confirmation, and is not counted as a confirmed AI technique here.
AI as a target, AI as a weapon or accelerator, and AI as a risk and control problem for BFSI.
No new LLM / API-key theft, exposed LLM endpoint or LLMjacking incident was reported in this window. Standing: the Apiiro Claude Code “Don’t Ask Again” research (5 Nov; Anthropic responded 7 Nov) — choosing “Yes, and don’t ask again” saves the approved shell command verbatim, secret included, as an allow rule in .claude/settings.local.json, which is not added to the project’s .gitignore; 1,122 public copies (1.1%) hold at least one real secret, 1,379 secrets in total. And the Google / Mandiant LLMjacking research (2–3 Nov) — stolen cloud credentials and LLM API keys, fraudulent bills over $100,000 in a single day and up to about $1 million cumulative at some victims, financial services among the victims, exploitation of CVE-2026-40217 in LiteLLM, and hijacked access resold via “LLM Mixers” including Jet Night (about $60 a month for claimed frontier access). Standing controls: key inventory and rotation, endpoint exposure (no unauthenticated Ollama / LiteLLM on the internet), spend and invocation monitoring with revoke-and-rotate.
Check Point’s 9 November threat-intelligence round-up and Cybersecurity Dive’s 9 November piece both re-report the 5–6 November Microsoft / Check Point ARTEX findings (Storm-3358 using ARTEX against financial firms in Southeast Asia since October; CERT-In’s Crafty Falcon advisory on ARTEX, PentAGI, Cairn and CyberStrikeAI against Indian financial services) with nothing new beyond those two primaries — no new ARTEX campaign, victim or tool development was reported in the window. GitGuardian published a catalog on 9 November of about 45 agentic attack frameworks (32 catalogued plus forks / variants): ARTEX family 1,428 Shodan services (7 Nov); PentAGI 33.6k stars, last push 22 October; HexStrike AI 13.4k stars, last push 3 August; Cairn 4.9k stars, last push 7 September, 41 Shodan services; CyberStrikeAI 3.4k stars, last push 7 November. Cairn has no authentication by default; HexStrike AI is an MCP server exposing 150+ offensive tools with no authentication by default. This is inventory, not an incident — no new exploitation tied to any of these was reported in the window. The DOJ $129m AI-impersonation prosecution (5 Nov) remains the clearest confirmed case of AI-cloned executive voices and images used to move money; no new development in-window. The Mirae Asset attack is still only suspected to involve AI agents — reported, not confirmed. No new AI-scaled phishing, vishing or deepfake campaign was found in-window.
NCSC UK chief executive Richard Horne warned in press reporting on 9 November that AI is exposing flaws in legacy / under-maintained technology and that an AI-powered ransomware attack on UK critical national infrastructure is “highly likely” by 2028 (the underlying State of the Cyber Nation assessment is dated 3 November); he spoke of a “real prospect of an unprecedented rise” in incidents. Mark this as a forecast / assessment, not a new incident. Microsoft’s FORGE Lab (9 Nov) published defensive research: agentic tools identifying memory-safety issues in Rust core / standard library, including cases where safe Rust can trigger undefined behaviour — AI as defence, not as a threat item. Cisco’s 9 November AI Defense announcement (Anthropic Claude Mythos red-teaming for AI agents, Splunk Tokenomics) is a product announcement; vendor claims (for example “98% lower evaluation cost”) are Cisco’s own, unverified. No new OCC, MAS, CSA Singapore or FSS AI-in-finance guidance was issued in this window (the OCC examiner framework is 4 November; MAS’s final AI risk-management guidelines are 7 October). Standing context: the CSA / GovTech / IMDA personal-AI-agent advisory of 6 November — do not give agents access to banking, government or healthcare accounts; Sophos X-Ops’ research on malicious AI-agent “skills” (6 Nov) — a skill’s description and its code need not agree, and obfuscation defeats static scanners; Haiou “prompt adware” (Check Point, 4 Nov); and Elastic’s finding that attackers execute commands through Claude Code and ChatGPT desktop in confirmed intrusions. Standing controls: agent-tool access, invocation monitoring, key inventory and rotation, endpoint exposure, and spend and invocation monitoring with revoke-and-rotate.
No newly reported AI-generated phishing, vishing or deepfake campaign against a BFSI victim was found for 9–10 November. That is absence of reporting, not evidence it has stopped. The DOJ $129m case is a prosecution of past fraud, not a new campaign, and the Mirae Asset, Bank Rakyat, Arkéa and SMFG cases are not re-labelled as AI campaigns — none attributes them to AI tooling, and the single newspaper characterisation of Mirae Asset as a suspected AI-agent attack is unconfirmed.
Philippine SEC: which platform was affected and how many users are affected are not disclosed; the 487,000-line forum claim is unconfirmed and has not been connected to the incident by the SEC; the SEC’s “malware on users’ own devices” origin account is preliminary and unverified. N0n claims (unnamed Canadian wealth firms, US payment-card network): leak-site claims only, no victim named, no data released. Krybit / CITIC Pacific: leak-site claim only, no evidence or data sample. Vanguard: the 14-million-record dark-web claim rests solely on plaintiff law firms relaying an alleged forum post — no sample, named actor or company statement; the confirmed fact is the Vermont filing (94 residents, SSNs). Binance ShinyHunters claim: no evidence published; Binance denies it and calls it likely a scam; the actor is believed to be impersonating ShinyHunters. Insight Credit Union: the Storm ransomware claim (209 GB) is not confirmed by the credit union; the class-action docket was not independently checked. Deadlock claims (Fidex, Coopebis, Kadick): all leak-site claims only, with no victim confirmation and no independent verification; Coopebis’s country is inconsistently reported (tracker region CR vs write-up “Colombian”). AU Small Finance Bank: no bank response to the 1.2 TB sale claim; Pekin Insurance, Higginbotham, Qilin / AXE – EXPERTS and the two unnamed Canadian firms: all leak-site claims only. Gopax: the hacking threat in the email is unverified and no intrusion or asset loss has been detected; when services will resume has not been announced. Bank Rakyat: the actor’s claim of internal access and a retrieved data sample is unconfirmed and is now disputed in framing — the minister says a hack limited to defacement with no data theft, the bank says a third-party technical problem — and neither party has addressed the internal-access claim directly; whether customer data or funds are affected is unconfirmed. Mirae Asset: the attack method and the attacker’s identity are undisclosed, and whether the exposed account numbers or employee data have been misused has not been reported; the characterisation of the attack as a suspected AI-agent attack is unconfirmed. The Scry Analytics claim (N0n) is a leak-site claim only, with no new development in-window. Arkéa: final loss figure (bank about €100 million vs €118 million per Le Télégramme vs investigator above $133 million), which provider’s platform was used, whether that provider was itself breached, how much has been recovered (only “part” is confirmed), and whether the Reuters 5 November piece or later re-syndications are the source of the 9 November coverage; ZachXBT’s not-Lazarus assessment is his own, not a law-enforcement finding. SMBC Consumer Finance: the affected-customer figure differs between outlets — 320,118 (Kyodo / Asahi) versus 321,018 (Nikkei) — and the full list of affected partner institutions is still being pinned down; the attack method is undisclosed. Mercado Bitcoin: loss total disputed (about $36.3 million affected per the exchange vs about $48.6 million Bitquery vs about $49 million Chainalysis) and entry point unpublished; the blocked-funds figure differs by source ($12.9 million per the exchange vs more than $16 million per trackers). Binance: whether INJ, PLASMA, NEAR and LTC are restored is unresolved (HYPE and APT confirmed restored 8 Nov); the Elliptic (~2,300 BTC converted) and Arkham (~+115 BTC in labelled wallets) laundering figures conflict and the gap is unresolved; no Recovery Update #10 has been published. NTT Docomo: the entry route is undisclosed; whether an AI agent was used is under investigation; no secondary misuse has been reported yet. Storm-3358: no victim names, victim count or loss figures published; no specific CVE or product named. Qubole: how the attacker obtained the Qubole-associated AWS credentials has not been disclosed; Qubole / Idera had posted no statement as of 9 November; whether the credentials have been disabled or the activity stopped was not stated; no victim count or sector breakdown published. MEXC: the FinCEN order’s effective date is not fixed (30 days after Federal Register publication; no Register entry found as of 7 November); the $16bn vs $16.7bn difference is press-release rounding vs order text. GPUStack: no public PoC confirmed; no attribution or victim count published. FreeSWITCH: no victim counts, dates or IOCs published by the vendor; the linked PoC is a third-party researcher’s toolkit, not the vendor’s, and includes reverse-shell functionality. IBM Aspera Faspex: IBM’s bulletin text (authenticated user) conflicts with its CVSS vector (PR:N); no actor, victim count or IOCs published; no public PoC confirmed. Android CVE-2026-58868: no CVSS figure, exploitation evidence or PoC in the sources read, and the bulletin date was not independently verified from the primary bulletin. Fortinet: PSIRT advisories for the AI-found flaws had not been published as of 09:02 SGT — no CVE IDs, CVSS scores or technical details are available yet. OpenAM: no known exploitation and no public PoC (the vendor withheld it); CVE-2026-123550’s CVSS differs between trackers (9.8 vs 9.3). Contact Form 7: no exploitation reported and no PoC reported. IBM DataStage: no exploitation reported; check the IBM bulletin for the fixed build. rConfig: no public exploit confirmed. No in-window evidence was found for new FIN7 / Scattered Spider / Carbanak / RansomHub / Cl0p BFSI attacks, FI-specific IAB sales, SWIFT / core-banking / file-transfer CVEs beyond Faspex, a new public FS-ISAC alert, or a new AI-scaled phishing, vishing or deepfake campaign.